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My research investigates factors related to the reporting of unethical conduct.  
While accounting for known individual, organizational and situational correlates, I 
focus particularly on leaders and especially on trust in leaders as whistle-blowing 
research to date has neglected the well-developed sociological literature of trust.  
Leveraging the benefits of multiple methods, I analyze recent secondary data on 
federal civilian employees, collect and analyze interview data at four civilian and 
military sites, and conduct a factorial vignette study to test factors and themes 
identified in the first two sections of my research. 
My secondary data analyses support previous whistle-blowing research in 
relating supervisor status, greater importance placed on anonymity, greater 
organizational support for anonymous reporting, greater organizational protection for 
whistle-blowers and greater severity of observed misconduct to increased reporting.  




misconduct and in-group location of misconduct relate to increased reporting.  With 
the exception of an expressed in-group preference, my qualitative analyses reinforce 
these findings and identify a peer-oriented culture and self-preservation as reasons 
why unethical conduct may go unreported.  My interview data also reveal that 
participants prefer to report unethical conduct to a trusted leader, although the 
severity of such misconduct may moderate this preference. 
My vignette analyses find greater trust in leaders is related to increased 
reporting only for non-supervisors, highlighting the additional importance trust plays 
for lower-status individuals.  Also, good behavior by the leader accepting a report is 
related to increased reporting for all participants.  My vignette data bolster previous 
findings, including relating a lesser orientation towards Machiavellianism to 
increased reporting, and find the severity of observed misconduct has the largest 
relative effect on the reporting outcome.  Counter to my prediction, vignette 
participants are less likely to report unethical conduct perpetrated by a supervisor 
supporting the notion that fear of retaliation may factor into the reporting decision.  
By highlighting obstacles to reporting, I assist leaders in addressing such barriers 
possibly contributing to the identification and correction of unethical conduct.  I 
conclude with implications for federal employees and all leaders seeking to increase 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
My research investigates factors related to the reporting of unethical conduct, 
or whistle-blowing.  Previous empirical research identifies individual, organizational 
and situational factors that relate to the whistle-blowing decision.  At the individual 
level, certain persons may be more predisposed to report; a variety of factors such as 
power and status, attitude towards whistle-blowing, and self-interest could affect this 
predisposition.  In an organization, support for whistle-blowers, avenues to report 
unethical conduct anonymously and the behavior of leaders in the organization may 
affect the decision to report or not.  Situationally, the location and severity of the 
observed misconduct may also play into the reporting decision.  These concepts 
frame my inquiry into factors related to the reporting of unethical conduct.  While 
accounting for known individual, organizational and situational factors, I focus 
particularly on leaders and especially on trust in leaders.  Research to date on whistle-
blowing has neglected the well-developed social psychological literature of trust.  
Accounting for previously-identified individual, organizational and situational 
factors, I examine the relationship between whistle-blowers and their leaders to 
explore whether or not trust in leaders is related to the reporting of unethical conduct. 
Reporting unethical conduct has important implications in civilian and 
military settings in the United States.  Among federal civilian employees, estimates of 
those who observe wrongdoing such as mismanagement of federal programs, stealing 
and providing funds to ineligible persons range from 25% to 45% across studies 
(Miethe and Rothschild 1994; MSPB 1981).  Given the low public visibility of most 




actions by employees.  In the military, an increasing focus on sexual harassment and 
assault led the Department of Defense to request an independent assessment of these 
issues.  The resulting RAND Military Workplace Study examined, among other 
things, decisions to report such behavior and found that sexual harassment is a 
common experience in the military, especially for women, and that 52% of women 
who report sexual assault perceive some form of retaliation (Morral et al. 2015); this 
gender effect on perceived retaliation is consistent with results from other studies 
(Rehg et al. 2008). 
 Data indicates that reporting unethical conduct is the exception rather than the 
norm.  When internal auditors are excluded, only 42% of those that observe unethical 
conduct report it.  Of these reports, 79% are made internal to the organization in 
which they occur (Miethe and Rothschild 1994).  Reasons cited for this silence 
include an individual’s belief that nothing will be done, fear of reprisal, culturally 
negative views of a whistle-blower as a “tattle-tail” and the implied disloyalty to the 
organization associated with reporting.  Although not previously considered, trust in 
leaders is another reason why individuals may choose to report or not. 
Two recent cases implicate trust in leaders as relevant to the reporting of 
unethical conduct.  Federal government contractor Edward Snowden leaked classified 
information from the National Security Agency on global surveillance programs; this 
information was subsequently published in The Guardian, The Washington Post and 
The New York Times.  In an interview with The New York Times, Snowden revealed 
he places little trust in his leadership, observing the requirement to, “report 




whistle-blower protection for government contractors (Risen 2013).  Speaking further 
on the lack of trust he had in NSA leaders, Snowden said his breaking point was, 
"seeing the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, directly lie under oath to 
Congress [by denying that the NSA knowingly collects data on millions of 
Americans]” (Greenberg 2013; The Courage Foundation 2014). 
In the military, Coast Guard Commander (CDR) Benjamin Strickland’s 
reporting of a sexual assault onboard the Coast Guard Cutter Munro in 2013 and the 
subsequent retaliation he faced also highlights the relationship between whistle-
blowers and their leaders.  CDR Strickland alleged multiple acts of retaliation by the 
Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) and senior Coast Guard officials, and 
expressed his frustration with and distrust of the CGIS (Myers 2015).  In both this 
case and that of Edward Snowden, the individual reporting the unethical conduct 
express a lack of trust in leadership.  In Edward Snowden’s case, this lack of trust 
may have contributed to his decision to report external to the organization.  In both 
cases, the individuals express mistrust of those organizational entities responsible for 
receiving a report of misconduct.  Are individuals who report regardless of their trust 
in leaders the norm or the exception, and what reporting avenue(s) might they use? 
In the following chapters, I consider previously identified individual, 
organizational and situational factors related to the reporting of unethical conduct and 
seek to establish a relationship between trust in leaders and the reporting of such 
conduct.  I use multiple methods to explore my research question, taking advantage of 
the strengths of each method in different sections of my research (Khan and Fisher 




by established literature, to confirm individual and organizational factors related to 
the reporting of unethical conduct without explicitly implicating trust in leaders.  
Next, I conduct open-ended, semi-structured interviews at four civilian and military 
sites.  In these interviews, participants provide nuanced, open-ended responses to 
questions eliciting themes associated with the reporting of unethical conduct.  These 
themes identify trust in leaders and situational factors as related to reporting, and 
explore the mechanisms underlying relationships observed in my secondary data 
analyses.  Thematic analysis of qualitative data, in combination with factors identified 
in my secondary data analyses, inform the final section of my research; a factorial 
vignette study to test factors and themes identified in the first two sections of my 
research.  In this experimental approach, I consider multiple explanations for the 
reporting of unethical conduct and address causality in observed relationships. 
Results from my secondary data analyses support previous whistle-blowing 
research in relating individual and organizational factors to the reporting of unethical 
conduct.  Individual factors such as supervisory status and greater importance placed 
on anonymity are related to increased reporting of unethical conduct, as are the 
organizational factors of leader misconduct, greater organizational support for 
anonymous reporting and more perceived protection for whistle-blowers.  The results 
of my qualitative analyses reinforce these findings, and identify a peer-oriented 
culture and self-preservation as reasons why unethical conduct may go unreported.  
Additionally, in my interviews I identify the themes of in-group preference and 
severity of observed misconduct as related to the reporting of unethical conduct; 




relevant to my research question, my qualitative analyses reveal that participants 
overwhelmingly prefer to report unethical conduct to a trusted leader as opposed to an 
untrusted leader.  However, factors such as the severity of observe misconduct may 
influence individuals to report when presented with only an untrusted leader as a 
reporting option; a significant number of military participants state they would report 
the unethical conduct regardless of their trust in leadership. 
In my factorial vignette study, I test observed relationships from my 
secondary data and qualitative analyses.  My vignette analyses indicate that trust in 
leaders is related to reporting only for non-supervisors, highlight the additional 
importance that trust plays for lower-status individuals when deciding whether or not 
to report unethical conduct.  Additionally, good behavior by the leader accepting a 
report is related to increased reporting for all participants.  Greater organizational 
support for anonymous reporting and more severe observed misconduct are both 
related to increased reporting, as well.  The severity of observed misconduct has the 
largest effect on the reporting outcome, with a relative effect 23% greater than the 
next closest factor.  Counter to what I predict, vignette participants are less likely to 
report unethical conduct in vignettes with misconduct perpetrated by a supervisor as 
compared to a coworker.  This finding supports the notion that fear of retaliation from 
an individual in power (e.g. a supervisor) may factor into the reporting decision. 
 In my vignette analyses, three participant factors have the predicted effect on 
reporting; participants who are supervisors, those with a greater importance placed on 
anonymity and those with a lesser orientation towards Machiavellianism all are more 




decision for the workplace misconduct depicted in my vignette, it is clear from my 
interview themes that gender does matter for certain types of misconduct.  Interview 
participants who are women were more likely to discuss sexual harassment and 
assault as a form of misconduct they were familiar with, and only women shared 
personal stories of friends (both men and women) they were aware had experienced 
sexual harassment or assault.   
This chapter covers the logic underlying my research question, and provides a 
general summary of my findings.  In Chapter 2, I review the literatures of whistle-
blowing, power and status, attitudes, trust and leadership to identify known factors 
related to the reporting of unethical conduct and propose a relationship between trust 
in leaders and such reporting.  In Chapter 3, I summarize my research approach and 
expectations based on previous work.  In Chapters 4 and 5, I present the results of my 
secondary data analyses using recent survey data on federal civilian employees and 
considering individual and organizational factors related to the reporting of unethical 
conduct.  In Chapters 6 and 7, I present the results of my qualitative analyses of 
interview data, establishing trust in leaders as a potential factor related to the 
reporting of unethical conduct.  In Chapter 8, I establish additional quantitative 
support for my interview themes by exploring situational factors that influence 
reporting.  In Chapters 9 and 10, I present the results of my factorial vignette study 
where I test the relationship of reporting unethical conduct with factors and themes 
identified in previous chapters, particularly trust in leaders.  I conclude with a general 





I make two contributions to the sociological body of knowledge.  First, I 
connect the well-established literature of trust with recent research on whistle-
blowing.  This interdisciplinary approach brings insight from the social psychology 
literature of trust to whistle-blowing research in the fields of management and 
psychology.  In addition to trust, the sociological literatures of power and status, 
attitudes, and altruism enhance my findings.  Second, my factorial vignette study 
experimentally explores the effect of individual, organizational and situational factors 
on the reporting of unethical conduct, allowing me to determine the relative effect of 
each on the reporting outcome.  By highlighting obstacles to reporting, I assist leaders 
and organizations in addressing such barriers which could contribute to the 
identification and correction of unethical conduct.  My findings have implications for 
federal employees and all leaders seeking to increase the reporting of unethical 




Chapter 2: Theory Development 
 
Established sociological literature is well-poised to contribute to recent 
whistle-blowing research.  I draw from four such areas to address my research 
question; these areas correspond to how trust in leaders, power, status and attitudes 
relate to the reporting of unethical conduct.  First, I consider the literature of whistle-
blowing, which informs my analyses by identifying known factors related to reporting 
unethical conduct.  I next consider the literatures of power and status as well as 
attitudes, and how they related to my research question.  Previous power and status 
research examines individual characteristics which make trust in leaders more or less 
likely to relate to the reporting of unethical conduct.  The attitudes literature shows 
that individuals’ attitudes about a particular issue, in this case the reporting of 
unethical conduct, are related to but not always consistent with their actions on the 
issue.  Finally, I consider the literatures of trust and leadership, particularly as they 
relate to each other.  Identifying known outcomes of trust in leaders assists me in 
forming specific predictions on the potential relationship of trust in leaders with the 
reporting of unethical conduct. 
Reporting Unethical Conduct 
 Whistle-blowing is defined as “the disclosure by organization members 
(former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of 
their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to affect action” (Near 
and Miceli 1985, p. 4).  Whistle-blowing is a dynamic process involving multiple 
social actors.  At a minimum, there is an individual or organization accused of 




an individual or organization that receives the report.  Unethical conduct encompasses 
behavior that is illegal, immoral or illegitimate, but behavior that falls into these 
categories can be interpreted differently by various individuals (Near and Miceli 
1996).  For the purposes of my research, the view of the observer is taken; if an 
individual feels observed conduct is unethical, the conduct is assumed to be unethical.  
This assumption carries the risk of accepting false whistle-blowing reports as 
legitimate, but the data I use do not follow reported incidents to their conclusion 
which precludes establishing the validity of such reports. 
 Whistle-blowing is differentiated from top-down social control in three ways.  
First, whistle-blowing involves the reporting of unethical conduct by individuals upon 
peers, more senior personnel or the organization itself.  Second, while in some cases 
it may be normative to report unethical conduct, whistle-blowing is not considered 
part of an individual’s work role.  This is as opposed to quality control personnel or 
internal monitors whose job it is to bring to light unethical conduct within an 
organization.  Third, a whistle-blower has the prospect of facing some level of 
retaliation for their reporting as it is outside the scope of their responsibilities (Miethe 
and Rothschild 1994). 
In an early attempt to determine whether whistle-blowing is related to 
individuals’ positions within an organization, Miceli and Near (1984) find four 
distinct profiles emerge; individuals who do not observe wrongdoing, those who 
observe wrongdoing but do not report it and two categories of whistle-blowers; those 
who report via internal channels only and those who report via external channels 




literature (Miethe and Rothschild 1994).  Elliston (1982) differentiates three 
categories of internal whistle-blowers; those who inform supervisors, those who go 
directly to higher levels of management, and those who bypass management and 
inform another internal group in the organization.  In addition to Elliston’s categories, 
it is also possible for an individual to report unethical conduct to friends or 
coworkers.  This avenue may provide a sense of having done something, but may not 
result in action to correct the behavior. 
Analyses of Merit Systems Protection Board questionnaire data (Miceli and 
Near 1984) find that both individual and organizational factors are related to whether 
or not individuals report unethical conduct.  Those who report via external channels 
tend to be less educated and in non-supervisory positions.  This research also finds 
correlation between the reporting of unethical conduct and favorable attitudes towards 
whistle-blowing.  Organizationally, individuals who did not blow the whistle are 
more fearful of organizational retaliation, and organizations which have a culture of 
unethical conduct may provide strong indicators that retaliation will occur (Miceli 
and Near 1984). 
Concerning position within an organization, it is difficult to disentangle 
whether level of responsibility within an organization results in varying exposure to 
unethical conduct or whether the power and status of individuals relates directly to 
the likelihood of reporting.  The positive relationship between being a manager and 
internal reporting may be indicative of wanting to keep the organization’s problems 
from the public eye (Near and Miceli 1985), or just an artifact of increased exposure 




individuals with lower status to report unethical conduct (Miceli and Near 1984).  
Some research positively relates anonymity to whistle-blowing (Lee and Fargher 
2013), but anonymous reporting may also be received as less credible than attributed 
reporting (Miethe and Rothschild 1994).  As a lack of credibility undermines trust 
(Miceli and Near 2002) and change theory suggests that individuals resist change 
when they mistrust the change agent (Kotter and Schlesinger 1979), it is possible that 
identified whistle-blowers are more likely to persuade others to terminate unethical 
conduct (Miceli and Near 2002). 
Individuals who report unethical conduct harbor an expectation that their 
reporting will affect the termination of the wrongdoing (Near and Miceli 1996).  
Results from three field studies indicate that would-be whistle-blowers perceive 
unethical conduct will be terminated when it occurs infrequently, is relatively minor 
in impact or has occurred for a short period of time.  As well, individuals in higher-
status positions and those who have the support of others tend to believe action will 
be taken on their reporting (Miceli and Near 2002).  If an individual believes that 
their report will not end the unethical conduct, this may deter them from reporting.  
One study found the belief that nothing can be done about observed wrongdoing to be 
the primary obstacle to reporting (Near et al. 2004), and prior exposure to 
wrongdoing is related to decreased intentions to report (Curtis and Williams 2014). 
Later research (Near and Miceli 1996) points out that organizational factors 
explain more variance in a whistle-blower’s decision to report than do individual 
factors.  Organizational factors that support whistle-blowing include perceived 




commitment and the type of the wrongdoing itself, especially when the wrongdoing is 
seen as illegal (Chen and Lai 2014; Kang 2015; Lee and Fargher 2013; Miethe and 
Rothschild 1994; Near and Miceli 1996).  In a survey of employees at a military base, 
those observing mismanagement, sexual harassment or unspecified legal violations 
were significantly more likely to report the behavior than employees observing 
stealing, waste, safety problems or discrimination (Near et al. 2004). 
Experimental research indicates that factors representing organizational 
policies, managerial practices, and degree of demographic dissimilarity between 
employees and top managers can contribute to a culture of silence which in turn has 
an effect on an individual’s willingness to blow the whistle (Park and Keil 2009).  
Also, organizations are known to recruit individuals who support their mission and 
further socialize employees to be loyal.  This loyalty grows over time as benefits such 
as retirement plans and sick leave are accumulated, possibly decreasing the likelihood 
of reporting observed wrongdoing.  Finally, when leaders are known to condone 
unethical conduct it makes the reporting of such behavior less likely (Miethe and 
Rothschild 1994). 
Power and Status 
Two areas of sociological literature positioned to contribute to whistle-
blowing research are power and status.  The whistle-blowing literature (Miceli and 
Near 1984) identifies individual factors related to whistle-blowing, and theorizes that 
power plays a role in the decision to report unethical conduct (Near and Miceli 1995) 
via theories of resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), minority influence 




on power in exchange relations, Molm (2003) considers reciprocal exchange and 
notes different causal mechanisms behind power use, different emphasis on learning 
versus rational choice, different motivations, and different emphasis on cooperation 
versus competition that affect an actor’s experience with the exchange (Molm 2003).  
Molm’s research on reciprocity informs her reciprocity theory of social exchange, in 
which risk of non-reciprocity, expressive value and salience of conflict mediate the 
relationship between the structure of reciprocity and social solidarity.  Later research 
by Molm and colleagues explores generalized exchange, finding reciprocal acts of 
unilateral giving promote bonds of trust, affective regard, and solidarity by increasing 
risk and uncertainty and decreasing the salience of conflict (Molm 2010; Molm, 
Collett and Schaefer 2007). 
Empirical testing of earlier power theories in whistle-blowing research yielded 
inconsistent results (Near and Miceli 1996).  One possibility is that these earlier 
theories did not account for personal characteristics of the observer (Miethe and 
Rothschild 1994).  Incorporating status, or inequality based on differences in esteem 
and respect, is one way to address these personal characteristics.  In a summary of 
power and status research (Lucas and Baxter 2012), status is identified as a 
differentiator in groups where members of disadvantaged status groups have less 
influence and face challenges in acquiring and using power.  Individually, status 
motivates behavior just as power does.  Culturally, status promotes resource and 
power inequality via beliefs about group differences; these beliefs result in resource 
advantages attributed to group membership in groups perceived as more esteemed.  




hierarchy.  The cumulative effect of status results in positions of increased resource 
and power for members of higher status groups, while simultaneously holding back 
lower status group members.  In this way, status institutionalizes group differences 
such as gender, race, and class into organizational structures of resource and power 
(Ridgeway 2014). 
Previous whistle-blowing research shows that factors representing power and 
status play a role in whether an individual reports unethical conduct or not.  In a 
summary of whistle-blowing literature (Near and Miceli 1996), those who did report 
have more years of service, hold a supervisory role, are better educated and are more 
likely to be men as compared to individuals who did not report observed unethical 
conduct.  These individual factors are not consistent across every study, but the 
relationships appear in a majority of the literature reviewed.  It is also possible that 
the influence of power and status on reporting unethical conduct is attributed to 
power and status differences in the likelihood of observing unethical conduct (Miethe 
and Rothschild 1994). 
Theoretically, I incorporate status via the group processes tradition of status 
characteristics theory (SCT).  SCT has its roots in research on power and prestige 
differences in small groups (Bales 1965) and developed as a branch of the expectation 
states research program (Berger, Wagner and Zelditch 1985).  Expectation states are 
properties of relations between individuals, not the individuals themselves, and are 
assumed to arise out of social interaction (Berger, Rosenholtz and Zelditch 1980).  
Social characteristics (e.g. race, gender), social rewards and behavior patterns all 




Status processes from the Bales research indicate that when group members 
are initially status equals a status hierarchy will emerge, and when there are 
differences in status initially that these differences immediately establish a hierarchy 
(Berger et al. 1980).  One of the ways individuals differentiate performance 
expectations is via status characteristics.  Status characteristics can be diffuse, 
applying generally across tasks, or specific, applying only to a limited range of tasks.  
Cultural meanings impact which status characteristics are relevant to given tasks; for 
example, race may be more relevant to performance expectations in one culture than 
another.  SCT seeks to explain how cultural beliefs about status characteristics 
translate to performance expectations (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch 1972; Correll and 
Ridgeway 2003). 
The Attitude-Behavior Relationship 
In addition to power and status, the sociological literature of attitudes could 
contribute to whistle-blowing research as attitudes towards whistle-blowing affect the 
decision whether to report or not (Miceli and Near 1984; Trongmateerut and Sweeney 
2013).  Research on the relationship between attitudes and behavior stems from the 
seminal study by LaPiere (1934) on attitudes and the operationalization of behavior.  
Not until decades after LaPiere’s work did sociologists develop general interest in the 
attitude-behavior relationship.  In a review of existing literature at the time, Schuman 
and Johnson (1976) define an attitude as an affective response towards objects; this is 
differentiated from behavior intentions which are actions one would personally take.  
Varying levels of attitude-behavior consistency are theorized: conceptual (do they 




correlational (are people ordered the same way on attitude and behavior measures?).  
A small to moderate degree of correlation is noted in most attitude-behavior studies 
reviewed, equivalent to studies of other social phenomena (Schuman and Johnson 
1976). 
Given that early research on the attitude-behavior relationship finds variation 
across settings, the attitudes literature progressed to ask under what circumstances a 
relationship exists by taking into account moderators such as situational factors and 
personality variables.  Despite empirical improvements, however, little work was 
done to advance theory on or mechanisms underlying the attitude-behavior 
relationship.  To remedy this, Fazio (1990) proposed spontaneous and deliberate 
models attempting to conceptualize the relationship.  Some empirical support is seen 
for both models, but a mixed-model is more likely to represent real-world attitude-
behavior linkages (Fazio 1990).  Assuming that whistle-blowing is a behavior that 
individuals consider before performing, Fazio’s deliberate model may be more 
applicable. 
Based on my review of the literature thus far, Table 2.1 lists individual and 
organizational factors associated with whistle-blowing.  The sociological literatures 
of power, status and attitudes complement the whistle-blowing literature in 
highlighting individual and organizational factors potentially related to reporting.  As 
a whole these literatures evidence that the relationship with leaders is relevant as 
potential whistle-blowers make their reporting decision, but questions remain; 





Table 2.1: Factors Related to Whistle-blowing in Previous Research 
Individual Factors Organizational Factors 
Power and Status Support for Reporting 
-Seniority  -Stated Support of Leaders 
-Supervisory Status -Official Policy  
Attitudes -Acceptance of Wrongdoing 
-Whistle-blowing -Demographic Similarity Between 
Leaders and Followers -Expectation That 
Wrongdoing Will Cease Reporting Methods  
-Anonymity -Path for Anonymous Reporting 
-Status of Offender -Perceived Retaliation 
Demographics Attributes of Wrongdoing 
-Education -Severity/Moral Nature 
-Gender   -Type   
 
Trust in Leaders 
Having considered the existing whistle-blowing literature and the sociological 
concepts of power, status and attitudes, I now establish trust in leaders as a relevant, 
although unexplored, factor in the reporting of unethical conduct.  Existing research 
relates supervisory ethical leadership (Mayer et al. 2013), manager integrity (Kang 
2015) and authentic leadership (Liu, Liao and Wei 2015) to whistle-blowing 
intentions, but trust is not specifically addressed despite the fact it is well-established 
in social psychological literature (Gambetta 1990; Simpson, Harrell and Willer 2013).  
The exact meaning of trust varies across studies; in my research, I define trust as a 
belief in another person’s integrity.  Trust is conceptualized as a social belief 
impacting the relationship between leader and follower (Ross and Mirowsky 2003; 
Ross, Mirowsky and Pribesh 2001). 
For Cook (2004), trust is grounded in ongoing relationships where individuals 




individuals are often characterized by uncertainty, especially initial interactions where 
familiarity is limited.  Will another person reciprocate a gift given, or will that person 
take advantage of the gift giver?  Trust assists individuals in acting to sustain a 
relationship, aiding in the expectation of reciprocity.  Initial assessments of trust may 
be based in previous successful exchange behavior or in judging potentially favorable 
exchange partners based on status characteristics, kinship or stereotype (Cook 2004).  
Longitudinal research examining the effect of interaction with family, friends, and 
other group members (Glanville, Andersson and Paxton 2013) suggests that 
generalized trust is something that can be altered over time.  As well, in an 
experiment Paxton and Glanville (2015) find that generalized trust varies across 
changing social circumstances when initial trust expectations are mismatched with 
actual social interactions.  These findings have important implications for leaders 
seeking to build trust with followers of dissimilar backgrounds in a variety of 
situations. 
Other social psychological research demonstrates the importance trust plays in 
the leader-follower interaction.  Simpson et al. (2013) show how individuals’ 
perceptions of leader trustworthiness affect their behavior when making moral 
judgements.  The psychological literature indicates that leaders who display what 
their followers believe to be the characteristics of a good leader get increased 
response from and more favorable evaluations by their followers (Eagly and Karau 
2002; Epitropaki and Martin 2005; Lord and Hall 2003).  Recent work (Schilke, 
Reimann and Cook 2015) also shows that power differentials, such as those between 




Status is also related to trust; experimental research demonstrates that higher 
status individuals trust others more than lower status individuals.  Mediation analyses 
reveal that having status alters the perception of others’ intentions, such that the 
perceived positive intentions account for the relationship between status and trust.  
This may result in lower status individuals trusting their leaders less, possibly 
impacting the reporting of unethical conduct (Lount and Pettit 2012). 
Having defined the concept of trust and demonstrated its importance in past 
research, I next consider the concept of leadership.  This is important as leaders likely 
play a pivotal role in both influencing would-be whistle-blowers and in receiving 
such reports of wrongdoing. 
Leadership Defined 
 What actually defines a leader?  Addressing this question, European 
theoretical approaches to the study of leadership inspired work in the United States in 
the field of group dynamics.  Here, leadership is defined via roles in social groups 
which help group members achieve collective ends.  The primary method of studying 
leadership focused on interaction within the group (e.g. observation and peer 
evaluation).  Early studies demonstrate that the same group of people would behave 
differently when their leaders behaved differently.  While not claiming that individual 
leadership characteristics were the sole determinant of group performance, these 
studies forward that the degree to which leaders support their followers and 
encourage group integration has consequences for the group (Lewin, Lippitt and 
White 1939).  More recently, the focus of leadership research includes structural 




constant finding is that the nature and quality of interaction between the leader and 
the group is strongly related to the group’s effectiveness (Segal 1981). 
 Subsequent work on the variation of leadership across cultures empirically 
established nine cultural leadership dimensions, making it possible to capture 
similarities and/or differences across societies.  These dimensions include power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, humane orientation, institutional collectivism, in-
group collectivism, assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, future orientation and 
performance orientation.  This research compliments earlier literature in identifying a 
leader’s goal as helping the group achieve a common goal.  However, it goes much 
further in identifying the mechanisms by which a leader influences, motivates, and 
enables others to achieve such goals (House et al. 2004).  In my research, rather than 
conceptualizing a leader by position, I focus on the interpersonal processes in social 
groups by which an individual (the leader) assists the group in completing a collective 
task. 
The follower is an equally important part of the equation; the follower’s 
interactions with the leader and the situation need to be accounted for (Fiedler 1967).   
The interaction between these three entities, leader, follower and situation, is brought 
together in an interactional framework.  A particular case can be analyzed by 
considering each of the three entities separately, but greater insight is gained when the 
interaction between the three entities is considered.  For example, it is necessary to 
take the leader’s traits and abilities into account but it is also necessary to determine 
how the situation impacts the leader’s ability to employ specific traits (Hollander 




Dadhich 2011) indicates that both quality of leadership and the leader-follower 
interaction impact the whistle-blowing decision. 
Summary 
 Although previous empirical work addresses whistle-blowing, it does not 
consider the social psychological literature of trust.  As well, the sociological 
literatures of power, status and attitudes have much to offer to whistle-blowing 
research.  Guided by these literatures, in the next chapter I present hypotheses which I 
test in my secondary data analyses.  I also leverage the trust and leadership literatures 
to make predictions on the relationship between trust in leaders and the reporting of 




Chapter 3: Research Approach and Expectations 
Theoretical consideration of the literatures of whistle-blowing, power and 
status, and attitudes reveals a lack of attention to the potential relationship between 
trust in leaders and the reporting of unethical conduct.  To address this gap, I first 
analyze recent secondary data on federal civilian employees, guided by established 
literature, to confirm factors related to the reporting of unethical conduct without 
explicitly implicating trust in leaders.  I next analyze qualitative data from four 
civilian and military sites constructed from open-ended, semi-structured interviews.  
Thematic analysis of this qualitative data, in combination with factors identified in 
my secondary data analyses, informs the final section of my research; a factorial 
vignette study where I test factors and themes identified in the first two sections of 
my research. 
Hypotheses for Secondary Data Analyses 
Position in an organization may affect the likelihood of both observing and 
reporting unethical conduct.  It is possible that individuals with different levels of 
responsibility have different exposure to unethical conduct (Miceli and Near 1984), 
where supervisors occupying central positions or with other high-status attributes are 
more likely to directly observe unethical conduct (Miethe and Rothschild 1994).  
Having been exposed to such behavior, individuals with higher power and status may 
be more likely to report this behavior despite possible retribution as their position 
could provide greater options for employment outside of the organization (Miceli and 
Near 1984).  As well, reporting unethical conduct carries with it the assumption that 




Individuals with higher power and status could have a greater belief that their 
reporting will be acted upon based on their elevated positions in the organization and 
support from others (Miceli and Near 2002), as well as perceived benevolence from 
others (Lount and Pettit 2012). 
H1a: Individuals who are in a supervisory position, have more years of federal 
service, have higher education, and are in the demographic majority (e.g. non-
Hispanic, white) are more likely to observe unethical conduct than their counterparts 
of lower power and status. 
 
H1b: Individuals who are in a supervisory position, have more years of federal 
service, have higher education, and are in the demographic majority (e.g. non-
Hispanic, white) will report unethical conduct more than their counterparts of lower 
power and status. 
 
Organizations that engage in unethical conduct may be highly dependent on 
such behavior (Near and Miceli 1985).  Organizations that rely on unethical practices 
to survive may provide indicators that retaliation will occur against whistle-blowers, 
either through organizational practices or the expressed attitudes or behavior of 
leaders in the organization.  Observers of unethical practices could be discouraged by 
this culture of silence, and rationalize not reporting by attributing the behavior to 
established organizational culture (Miceli and Near 1984; Miceli and Near 1985).   
H2: Individuals who observe more instances of misconduct by their leaders will 
report unethical conduct less than those who observe fewer instances. 
 
Organizational factors shown to support whistle-blowing include perceived 
support for whistle-blowing by organizational policy and organizational commitment 
(Chen and Lai 2014; Kang 2015; Lee and Fargher 2013).  Perception of support for 
whistle-blowing by the organization is related to whether individuals report unethical 




individuals report unethical conduct or not (Miceli and Near 1984; Miceli and Near 
1985), both at the organizational and individual levels. 
H3a: Individuals with a greater perception of organizational support for whistle-
blowing will report unethical conduct more than those who perceive less support. 
 
H3b: Attitudes towards anonymity will influence the reporting of unethical conduct, 
where greater individual importance of anonymity and greater perceived 
organizational support for anonymity are correlated with increased reporting. 
 
Those with less education and in non-supervisory positions are more likely to 
report externally (Miceli and Near 1984), while supervisors may be more likely to use 
internal channels to report unethical conduct due to an increased belief that the 
organization will see their reporting as legitimate (Kolarska and Aldrich 1980).  
However, most external reporters have also reported the incident internally (Miceli 
and Near 1985; Rothschild and Miethe 1999), indicating that their complaint was not 
addressed potentially due to their lower power and status.  An unethical culture could 
also be related to greater external reporting (Miceli and Near 1985). 
H4a: Individuals with lower education will report unethical conduct via external 
avenues more than those with higher education. 
 
H4b: Individuals in a supervisory role will report unethical conduct via internal 
avenues more than those not in a supervisory role. 
 
H4c: Individuals with lesser perception of organizational support for whistle-blowing 
will report more using external avenues than those who perceive greater support. 
 
Predictions for Qualitative Analyses 
Based on the trust and leadership literatures, I expect that trust in leaders is 
related to the reporting of unethical conduct where greater trust in leaders correlates 
with increased reporting.  When leaders are known to condone unethical conduct, the 




literature relates trust in leaders to more moral judgements by and increased response 
from individuals they lead (Eagly and Karau 2002; Epitropaki and Martin 2005; Lord 
and Hall 2003; Simpson et al. 2013).  Assuming that trust represents a belief in 
another person’s integrity, individuals with greater trust in their leaders should be 
more likely to report unethical conduct due to a belief that they will be supported by 
their leaders and that their leaders will take action on the report (Miceli and Near 
2002). 
I also expect status to be related to trust in leaders, as experimental research 
has shown higher status individuals trust others more than lower status individuals 
(Lount and Pettit 2012).  The whistle-blowing literature I reviewed supports this 
notion, as well.  My qualitative analyses could reveal different mechanisms by which 
status is related to trust in leaders.  Before considering these mechanisms and the 
relationship of trust to reporting, however, I first test my hypotheses via secondary 




Chapter 4: Secondary Data Analyses – Data and Methods 
 
In this chapter and the one following, I analyze data from the 2010 Merit 
Principles Survey (2010 MPS) to explore factors related to the reporting of unethical 
conduct.  A whistle-blowing study using earlier Merit Principles Survey (MPS) data 
(Miceli and Near 1984) finds both individual and organizational factors related to the 
reporting of unethical conduct.  While enlightening, these analyses use data now 35 
years old.  More recent MPS data exists, specifically survey data from 2010, which I 
use to determine if previous findings are still relevant. 
One major limitation of the 2010 MPS data is the lack of gender information.  
Although other demographic information is available, such as race, ethnicity and 
educational attainment, 2010 MPS respondents were not asked for their gender.  This 
is particularly relevant to research on whistle-blowing, as previous literature (Miceli 
et al. 2012; Near and Miceli 1996) indicates gender is applicable to the reporting 
decision.  I address this shortcoming further in the limitations section of the next 
chapter, including ideas on compensating for it in subsequent sections of my research. 
The literature broadly defines whistle-blowing as, “the disclosure by 
organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices 
under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to 
affect action” (Near and Miceli 1985, page 4).  It is important to note that definitions 
used in the collection of the 2010 MPS data limit whistle-blowing to a subset of 
conduct the literature defines.  Specifically, in addressing hypothetical misconduct the 
2010 MPS frames wrongdoing as, “the creation or toleration in the workplace of a 




in line with the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, but does not 
encompass the “immoral” aspect that whistle-blowing literature addresses.  Further, 
when asking respondents if they actually observed or had direct evidence of 
misconduct, the 2010 MPS only queries for “illegal or wasteful” activity.  Although 
respondents were previously primed with the complete Whistleblower Protection Act 
definition, it is possible that they omitted misconduct (e.g. health or safety danger and 
abuse) not meeting the narrower definition used in collecting personal experiences. 
To begin, I discuss the 2010 MPS data as a whole after which I explain how I 
construct measures from these data pertinent to my research question.  Following this, 
I present my plan of analyses. 
Data 
I first address my research question via secondary data analyses of whistle-
blowing data from federal civilian workers' responses to the 2010 MPS.  The 2010 
MPS is a government-wide survey of federal employees that solicits their opinions 
and experiences related to their careers, organizational human resources practices, 
and leadership.  The survey is administered by the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB), an entity established to ascertain whether prohibited personnel practices are 
occurring in the civil service (MSPB 1981).  Topics covered in the 2010 MPS include 
employee engagement, workforce motivation, adherence to merit system principles, 
fairness, prohibited personnel practices, leadership, disability, whistle-blowing and 
competency requirements.  The 2010 MPS was administered to permanent, full-time 





Table 4.1: Departments and Independent Agencies Participating in the 2010 MPS 
 
Departments Independent Agencies 
• Department of the Air Force (N=1,069) 
• Department of the Army (N=1,030) 
• Department of the Navy (N=1,024) 
• Department of Defense (N=1,142) 
• Department of Agriculture (N=2,853) 
• Department of Commerce (N=1,749) 
• Department of Justice (N=3,085) 
• Department of Labor (N=3,025) 
• Department of Energy (N=486) 
• Department of Education (N=636) 
• Department of Health and Human Services 
(N=2,380) 
• Department of Homeland Security 
(N=3,480) 
• Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (N=541) 
• Department of Interior (N=2,723) 
• Department of State (N=628) 
• Department of Transportation (N=2,335) 
• Department of the Treasury (N=2,824) 
• Department of Veterans Affairs (N=2,252) 
• Environmental Protection Agency 
(N=602) 
• Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(N=845) 
• General Services Administration (N=668) 
• National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (N=674) 
• Office of Personnel Management 
(N=594) 
• Social Security Administration (N=1,588) 
 
Note: The number of respondents per department or agency is obtained after dropping 
those who had missing data when asked if they observed unethical conduct in the past 
12 months. 
 
The 2010 MPS data include 42,020 valid responses with an overall response 
rate of 58%.1   Responses drawn from the 24 different government departments and 
agencies represent over 97% of the permanent, full-time federal workforce as of 
September 2009.  For almost all employees, the survey was administered online 
through e-mail invitations and a dedicated, secure web site.2   Employees were 
informed that survey participation is voluntary and that their responses would be 
confidential. 
                                                 
1 To be accepted as valid, a survey had to contain non-missing responses to 25 or more core items.  
Lower response rates may compromise the random sampling methodology used and affect the 
generalizability of the data across the population sampled (Khan and Fisher 2014). 
2 At the request of the Department of Transportation, MSPB distributed paper surveys to 
approximately 1,300 employees in the Federal Aviation Administration who could not receive or 




Employees were selected for inclusion through stratified random sampling 
drawn from records in the Office of Personnel Management’s Central Personnel Data 
File.  The strata were designed to provide usable measures of employee opinion by 
supervisory status (supervisor and non-supervisor) and department or agency.  The 
sampling plan required oversampling of some groups to provide statistically reliable 
results; accordingly, MSPB calculated response weights to produce results 
representative of government-wide employee opinion.  My analyses are weighted 
unless stated otherwise (see Appendix A for weighting methodology).3 
Measures 
Although my secondary data analyses are largely exploratory, incorporating 
all 2010 MPS variables is impractical both theoretically and statistically.  In addition 
to demographic measures, the 2010 MPS data contain information on satisfaction 
with supervisors, perceptions of supervisors’ actions towards whistle-blowing and 
other unethical conduct, respondent attitude and behavior regarding whistle-blowing, 
and respondent perceptions of institutional protections against and support for 
whistle-blowing.  Due to the large volume of data available, I make decisions about 
which variables to consider initially in my analyses. 
I begin by conceptualizing the 2010 MPS data in line with existing literature.  
Following Miceli and Near (1984), I organize questions into individual and 
organizational categories.  For individual factors, I identify both demographic 
variables and variables previous whistle-blowing literature relates to the reporting of 
                                                 
3 Instead of weighting, I control for supervisory status and department/agency in my logit regression 
analyses.  These are the two strata used in the sampling design, and the oversampling performed 




unethical conduct.  Table 4.2 presents these individual factors, and their respective 
questions from the 2010 MPS are noted in parentheses.4 
Table 4.2: Individual Factors from the 2010 MPS 
 
 Demographics     
 -Hispanic Descent (DEM_02)   
 -Race (DEM_03)   
 -Years of Education (DEM_04)   
 Power and Status    
 -Supervisory Status (DEM_05)   
 -Years of Federal Service (DEM_01)   
 Attitudes     
 -Anonymity (WB_08)   
            
For organizational factors, I construct indices measuring satisfaction with 
leaders, perceptions of leaders’ actions with regard to a variety of misconduct, trust in 
the organization, and perceptions of organizational support for whistle-blowing.  
Other 2010 MPS questions measure perceived organizational protection for whistle- 
blowers and perceived organizational support for anonymous reporting.  Table 4.3 
presents these organizational factors, and their respective questions from the 2010 
MPS are noted in parentheses. 
 Before beginning to construct my variables, I consider all cases (N=42,020) 
and whether respondents indicate that they have personally observed or obtained 
direct evidence of one or more illegal or wasteful activities in the past 12 months 
(WB_15).  This question is pivotal to my research, both in identifying respondents 
who observed unethical conduct for potential reporting and in creating a comparison 
group of those who did not observe such misconduct.  I drop 3,787 cases with 
 
                                                 




Table 4.3: Organizational Factors from the 2010 MPS 
 
 Leaders   
 -Leader Behavior (Index from MSP_03)  
 Attitudes   
 -Satisfaction with Leaders (Index from ENG_04/05/18/19/24) 
 Organization   
 Attitudes     
 -Organizational Trust (Index from MSP_01)  
 -Support for Whistle-blowing (Index from WB_01 to 06)  
 -Support for Anonymous Reporting (WB_10a)  
 -Protection for Whistle-blowers (WB_07)  
 
missing data for this variable, resulting in N=38,233 total cases to use in analyses.  Of 
the retained cases, N=3,770 report observing illegal or wasteful activities in the past 
12 months.  For all other variables, unless otherwise indicated, missing values are left 
unchanged. 
Dependent Variables 
I construct five dichotomous dependent variables from the 2010 MPS question 
that asks respondents, who in the past 12 months had personally observed or obtained 
direct evidence of one or more illegal or wasteful activities, if they reported the 
activity.  This question (WB_20) allows respondents to choose one or more avenues 
of reporting from the list in Table 4.4. 
Again following Miceli and Near (1984), I organize the dependent variables 
based on whether respondents reported internally or externally.  I also conceptualize 
an “informal reporting” category, as this variation is identifiable in the 2010 MPS 
data.  All five dichotomous variables are coded where 0 = no and 1 = yes.  Not 
reporting encompasses respondents who observe illegal or wasteful activities but do 




Table 4.4: Possible Avenues of Whistle-blowing 
 
 No Report          
    I did not report the activity     
 Informal Report      
    Family member or friend     
    Coworker      
 Internal Report      
    Immediate supervisor     
    Higher level supervisor     
    Higher level agency official     
 External Report      
    Agency Inspector General (IG)    
    Office of Special Counsel (OSC)    
    Government Accountability Office (GAO)   
    Law enforcement official     
    Union representative     
    News media      
    Congressional staff member or member of Congress  
    Advocacy group outside the Government   
    Other            
        
reporting encompasses those who report to other-than-official sources, internal 
reporting encompasses those who report to sources in their own organization and 
external reporting encompasses those who report to sources outside of their own 
organization.  These three avenues of reporting are not mutually exclusive.  A fifth 
outcome, external-only, encompasses those who report to sources outside of their 
own organization without also reporting internal to their organization.  This 
distinction could be important, as literature (Miceli and Near 1984; Miethe and 




within their organization; deviation from this norm would be noteworthy, as would 
possible influences. 
Independent Variables 
I construct variables representing individual power, status and attitudes from 
three questions in the 2010 MPS.  As a power-status proxy, I use two questions from 
the Demographics section asking respondents to identify their years of federal service 
and supervisory status.  Years of federal service is taken from a question asking 
respondents to report their length of service; however, answers to this question are in 
non-standard ranges of years.  While most possible answers encompass four years, 
one encompasses three years and two others an undetermined amount of time (e.g. 
Under 1 year and More than 35 years).  Rather than recoding to an interval variable, I 
accept the respondents’ answers directly as an ordinal variable. 
Possible answers to the supervisory status question include non-supervisor, 
team-leader, supervisor, manager and executive.  Amplifying descriptions for each 
choice distinguish the first two categories as not officially having supervisory duties.  
Accordingly, I construct a dichotomous variable for supervisory status where 
respondents in the first two categories are coded as a 0 and those in the last three 
categories are coded as a 1.5 
I measure individual attitude towards anonymity from a whistle-blowing 
question asking respondents, “If you were to observe or have evidence of 
wrongdoing, how important would it be to you that you be able to report it without 
                                                 
5 I recode N=57 missing values for the supervisor variable as non-supervisors, as a majority of 




disclosing your identity?”  Responses range from 2 = very important to 5 = not 
important; I reverse code these responses and shifted them by one, resulting in a new 
range from 4 to 1 where higher responses equate to greater importance.6 
Moving to organizational variables, I construct an index measuring 
satisfaction with leaders from five questions in the Engagement section of the 2010 
MPS.  These questions ask for the respondent’s level of agreement (on a 1-5 scale) 
with the following statements: (1) Overall, I am satisfied with my supervisor; (2) 
Overall, I am satisfied with managers above my immediate supervisor; (3) My 
supervisor provides constructive feedback on my job performance; (4) My supervisor 
provides timely feedback on my job performance; and (5) The performance and/or 
conduct of my supervisors and managers are primary reasons my job performance is 
not higher.  I reverse-code responses to the final question so that higher values equate 
to positive responses, and average the five questions to construct an index of 
satisfaction with leaders (α=0.8568).7 
I construct an index of perceived leader behavior from 22 questions in the 
Merit Systems Principles and Prohibited Personnel Practices section of the 2010 
MPS.  These questions ask, in the past two years, if an agency official in the 
respondent’s work unit has partaken in a variety negative behaviors.  For each 
                                                 
6 N=2,151 respondents answered “Don’t Know/Can’t Judge”; I recode these responses to 1 (Not 
important) using the logic that indecision most equated to lack of importance. 
7 Factor analysis using the principle component factor option in Stata indicates a single factor.  For the 
five individual questions in this index, respondents ranging from N=162 to N=1,072 answered “Don’t 
Know/N/A”; I recode these responses to 3 (Neither Agree Nor Disagree) using the logic that not 
knowing most equated to neutrality.  Missing values for ENG_04 (N=159) and ENG_23 (N=62) 
occasionally prevent the calculation of a five-question average; instead, I generate a four-question 
average for these cases as the resulting index without each respective question included has a higher 





behavior, respondents can indicate: (1) I was personally affected by this; (2) This has 
occurred in my work unit, but I was not personally affected by this; and (3) This has 
NOT occurred in my work unit.  For each answer of (1) or (2), a respondent’s index 
score is incremented by one from a starting value of zero.  I reverse-code the resulting 
index so that higher values equate to less observed negative behavior. 
In constructing an index measuring trust in the organization, I consider 26 
questions in the Merit Systems Principles and Prohibited Personnel Practices section 
of the 2010 MPS.  These questions ask for the respondent’s level of agreement (on a 
1-5 scale) with a variety of organizational issues on merit systems principles and 
prohibited personnel practices (see Appendix B for the 26 specific items).  Factor 
analysis of these questions using the principle component factor option in Stata 
indicates three factors.  I create three indices from these factors by averaging 
individual variable values.  MSP_01a to MSP_01g formed one index (α=0.9077), 
MSP_01h to MSP_01t a second index (α=0.9395) and MSP_01u to MSP_01z a third 
index (α=0.9096).  All three indices perform similarly in subsequent regression 
analyses when considered individually, while the third index accounts for the first 
two when all three indices are included simultaneously.  For this reason, I use the 
third index comprised of six questions as a measure of perceived organizational trust.8  
This index includes two questions explicitly addressing whistle-blowing as well as 
                                                 
8 For the six individual questions in this index, respondents ranging from N=1,964 to N=8,572 
answered “Don’t Know/N/A”; I recode these responses to 3 (Neither Agree Nor Disagree) using the 
logic that not knowing most equated to neutrality.  Missing values for MSP_03z (N=18) occasionally 
prevent a six-question average from being calculated; instead, I generate a five-question average for 
these cases as the resulting index without MSP_03z included has a higher Cronbach’s alpha score than 




others on protection from arbitrary action, favoritism, political coercion and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
I construct an index measuring perceptions of organizational support for 
whistle-blowing from six questions in the Whistleblowing section of the 2010 MPS.  
These questions ask for the respondent’s level of agreement (on a 1-5 scale) with the 
following statements: (1) My agency actively encourages employees to report 
wrongdoing; (2) If I disclosed wrongdoing, I would be praised for it at work; (3) I 
feel that I could disclose wrongdoing without any concerns that the disclosure would 
make my life harder; (4) My agency has educated me about the purpose of the Office 
of the Inspector General; (5) My agency has educated me about how I can 
anonymously disclose wrongdoing; and (6) My agency has educated me about what 
my rights would be if I disclosed wrongdoing.  I average the six questions to 
construct an index of perceived organizational support for whistle-blowing 
(α=0.8869).9 
Other 2010 MPS questions measure perceived organizational protection 
against whistle-blowing and perceived organizational support for anonymous 
reporting.  I measure whistle-blowing protection from a question asking, “In your 
opinion, how adequate or inadequate is the protection against reprisal for federal 
employees who report wrongdoing?”  Responses range from 1 = Very adequate to     
5 = Very inadequate.10  I reversed code these responses.  I measure support for 
                                                 
9 Factor analysis using the principle component factor option in Stata indicates a single factor.  For the 
six individual questions in this index, respondents ranging from N=1,555 to N=7,227 answered “Don’t 
Know/N/A”; I recode these responses to 3 (Neither Agree Nor Disagree) using the logic that not 
knowing most equated to neutrality. 
10 N=12,203 respondents answered “Don’t Know/Can’t Judge”; I recode these responses to 3 (Neither 




anonymity from a question asking, “If you were to report wrongdoing to [your 
agency’s Office of the Inspector General(OIG)], and asked that your identity be kept 
confidential, to what extent do you believe that the organization would keep your 
identity secret?”  Responses range from 4 = Great Extent to 1 = Not at All.11  
Control Variables 
I construct control variables directly from 2010 MPS questions capturing 
Hispanic descent, race and years of education.  I measure Hispanic descent from a 
single yes/no question asking if respondents were Hispanic or Latino.  I recode the 
values to create a dichotomous variable, where 0 = no and 1 = yes.  Similar to other 
surveys of federal government employees, Hispanic descent is treated separately from 
race.12 
I measure race from a single question asking respondents to choose their race 
from these categories: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African 
American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and White.  Respondents are 
allowed to choose more than one race category if they feel it applies to them.  In order 
to construct a nominal race variable with independent categories and sufficient power 
in each category, I categorize respondents who identify as American Indian or Alaska 
Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander as “Other”, regardless 
of whether they also identify as Black or White.  Subsequently, I categorize 
                                                 
11 N=12,412 cases had an unidentified value of “98”; in other questions this equated to some form of 
“Don’t Know” but for this question “Don’t Know” is not a choice on the survey.  I assume that this is 
an omission on the electronic copy of the survey I have and treat these responses as neutral, recoding 
them to an average value of 2.5. 
12 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB 1977; OMB 1997) provides guidance on treating race 





respondents who identify as Black or African American as “Black”, regardless of 
whether they also identify as White.  I categorize the remaining respondents as 
“White”.13 
I measure years of education from a single question asking respondents about 
their current education level; responses to the question equate to the highest degree 
obtained.  I convert these answers to an interval variable based on the scale in     
Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Equivalent Years of Education for 2010 MPS Respondents 
                
 Current Education Level   Equivalent Years  
 Less than a high school diploma  10  
 High school, equivalent diploma, or GED  12  
 Some college credits but no degree  13  
 Associates’ college degree   14  
 Bachelor’s college degree   16  
 Master’s degree    18  
 Professional degree (e.g. J.D., M.D., D.D.S.) 20  
 Academic or scientific doctorate (Ph.D.)   20  
         
Analyses 
I use logit and ordinary least squares regression models for analyses in the 
subsequent chapter.  The logit regression model I use for analyses of dependent 
variables and preliminary analyses of one independent variable is of the general form: 
 log(p/1-p) = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3, where p=P(Y=1) 
where log(p/1-p) is the outcome of interest, X1 is a set of demographic control 
variables, X2 is a set of individual variables and X3 is a set of organizational 
                                                 
13 I recode N=333 missing values for the Hispanic variable as non-Hispanic, as a majority of 
respondents identify as non-Hispanic.  I recode N=5 missing values for the race variable as White, as a 




variables.  I present logit coefficients in all tables, while in written analyses I specify 
odds for ease of understanding.  The logit regression expressed in odds (Ω) is of the 
general form: 
Ω(X) = exp(β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3) 
with similar groupings of independent variables. 
The ordinary least squares model I use for preliminary analyses of 
independent variables is of the general form: 
Yi = α + β1X1  + εi 
where Yi is the outcome of interest X1 is a set of control variables. 
While respondents observing wrongdoing are the primary group of interest, 
similar to other research (MSPB 1981) I include a comparison group of respondents 
who say that they have not observed wrongdoing.  These non-observers have no 
reason for modifying their self-reported status and attitudes to achieve consistency 
with reporting behavior, and their responses may help to interpret results for those 
who did observe wrongdoing.  To begin, I compare values of demographic, individual 
and organizational variables for respondents observing unethical conduct with those 
who do not.  Observed differences lend context to further analyses of whistle-
blowers, and possibly shed light on organizational variables related to whether 
individuals observe wrongdoing in the first place.  Next, in the subset of respondents 
who have observed unethical conduct, I examine the relationship of control variables 
to individual and organizational independent variables.  Finally, I conduct logit 
regression analyses for the five dependent variables incorporating individual and 




factors related to the reporting of unethical conduct, and shed light on the different 
reporting avenues whistle-blowers use as well as which independent and control 
variables are related to each avenue. 
In this chapter I describe the 2010 MPS data and how I construct the variables 
I use in my analyses.  I also formulate my analyses plan.  In the next chapter, I 






Chapter 5: Secondary Data Analyses – Results and Discussion 
 
My analyses of the 2010 MPS data indicate that individual and organizational 
factors remain related to the reporting of unethical conduct.  In agreement with Near 
and Miceli (1996), these analyses find that organizational variables explain slightly 
more variance than individual variables in the reporting outcome.  Individually, being 
a supervisor and greater importance of anonymity are related to increased reporting.  
Organizationally, observing more leader misconduct, greater perceived support for 
anonymous reporting and greater perceived protection for whistle-blowers are all 
related to increased reporting.  Building on these whistle-blowing findings, I further 
analyze factors related to the various avenues respondents use to report (e.g. informal, 
internal and external). 
To begin, I present results of my analyses of the 2010 MPS data.  A 
discussion of how the variables relate to the reporting of unethical conduct follows, 
along with race implications on the reporting avenue.  Finally, based on my analyses, 
I present a general model for reporting unethical conduct. 
Results 
I first compare the values of demographic, individual and organizational 
variables for respondents observing unethical conduct with those who did not.  Table 
5.1 presents descriptive statistics for these control and independent variables, 
differentiated by whether the respondent reported observing unethical conduct or not.  
Individuals of other race are significantly14 more likely than white respondents to 
report observing unethical conduct, while black respondents are significantly less 
                                                 




Table 5.1: Control and Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics (Weighted) 
 
  Observed Unethical Conduct 
  Yes No 
N 3,770 34,463 
Control Measures      
   Hispanic Descent 7.5% 8.0% 
   Racea      
      Black 13.3% 15.5% 
      Other 14.0% 12.4% 
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
   Education in Years (10-20) 15.2 2.3 15.3 2.3 
Individual Variables      
   Supervisor Status 32.4% 33.6% 
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
   Length of Federal Service (1-11)b 5.7 2.7 5.4 2.8 
   Importance of Anonymity (1-4)b 1.7 1.0 1.9 1.0 
Organizational Variables      
   Leader Satisfaction (1-5)b 3.0 1.0 3.8 0.8 
   Leader Behavior (0-22)b 17.6 4.7 21.0 2.3 
   Trust in Organization (1-5)b 2.5 0.9 3.3 0.8 
   Support for Whistle-blowing (1-5)b 2.5 1.0 3.4 0.8 
   Support for Anonymous Reporting (1-4)b 2.3 0.9 2.8 0.8 
   Protection for Whistle-blowers (1-5)b 3.6 1.1 2.7 1.0 
a: Reference Group: White. 
b: Two-sample difference of means statistically significant (two-tailed, α=0.05) 
 
likely than white respondents to report observing such conduct.  Among individual 
measures, observers have significantly longer federal service and place less 
importance on anonymity.  For the organizational measures, observers of unethical 
conduct differed significantly on both leader metrics and on all four variables 
operationalizing attitudes towards the organization.  Logit regression analyses 
including all measures from Table 5.1 and controlling for department or agency 




related to whether a respondent observes unethical conduct or not (α=0.05, two-
tailed). 
Table 5.2 presents dependent variable descriptive statistics for respondents 
who reported observing unethical conduct; only these cases are used in further 
analyses.  Table C.1 in Appendix C presents a full correlation matrix for all control  
Table 5.2: Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N
a 3,768  
 Dependent Variables  
 Reported Incident 65.2%  
 Of Those Reporting (N=2,456)  
    Informal 51.8%  
    Internal 64.8%  
    External 29.6%  
    External Only 12.8%  
 a: Two cases had missing DV data and are not included in analyses 
 
and independent variables, along with the primary dependent variable of whether the 
respondent reported the observed unethical conduct.  There are significant but weak 
positive correlations between reporting unethical conduct and being of Hispanic 
descent, viewing the organization as supporting whistle-blowing and viewing the 
organization as supporting anonymous reporting.  There is also a significant but weak 
negative correlation between reporting unethical conduct and observed leader 
behavior, where more observed negative behavior is correlated to increased reporting.  
Among the independent variables, five of six organizational measures have a 
significant, strong positive correlations with each other. 
Table C.2 in Appendix C presents a correlation matrix of control and 
independent variables with the remaining four dependent variables, which are 




and respondents of Hispanic descent have a significant but weak positive correlation 
with reporting external to the organization.15  As well, these two categories of 
respondents have a significant, moderate positive correlation with reporting solely via 
external avenues.  Black respondents also have significant but weak negative 
correlations with reporting informally and internally.  Respondents who identify as 
supervisors have a significant but weak positive correlation with reporting internally, 
and a significant but weak negative correlation with reporting informally.  For the 
organizational measures, there are significant, moderate negative correlations 
between observed leader behavior and both external reporting outcomes.  There are 
also significant, moderate negative correlations between trust in the organization and 
both external reporting outcomes. 
Before analyzing the reporting outcomes further, I examine the relationship of 
control variables to individual and organizational independent variables.  Table 5.3 
presents ordinary least squares and logit regression analyses treating the three 
individual measures as outcomes.  The relationship between years of education and 
service length is significant (t=-6.15, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, for every eight 
years of education respondents are one category lower in service length after 
accounting for the other control variables.  As well, for every year increase in 
education respondents are 1.1 times as likely to be supervisors.  Finally, black 




                                                 
15 This reporting method includes respondents who also reported internal to the organization and those 












Control Variables       
   Hispanic Descent -0.303 -0.226 -0.060 
 (0.172) (0.143) (0.063) 
   Blacka -0.120 -0.216 0.109 * 
 (0.130) (0.112) (0.047) 
   Othera -0.322 * -0.152 0.038 
 (0.129) (0.107) (0.047) 
   Years of Educationc -0.122 * 0.120 * -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.007) 
Constant 7.652 * -2.485 * 1.744 * 
 (0.305) (0.273) (0.112) 
N 3,767 3,767 3,767 
R2 0.013 -  0.002 
-2LL -  4,569.48  -  
BIC’ -  45.800  -  
*p<0.05, Unstandardized coefficients, Standard errors in parentheses 
a: Reference Group: White 
b: Instead of weighting, department/agency controlled for (not shown) 
c: One case had missing data and is not included in analyses 
 
Table C.3 in Appendix C presents ordinary least squares regression analyses 
treating the six organizational measures as outcomes.   The relationships of Hispanic 
descent (t=-7.62, α=0.05, two-tailed), black (t=-6.53, α=0.05, two-tailed), other race 
(t=-2.00, α=0.05, two-tailed) and years of education (t=4.05, α=0.05, two-tailed) with 
leader behavior are significant.  On average after accounting for the other control 
variables, respondents of Hispanic descent report observing over two more instances 
of negative leader behavior than white respondents while black respondents report 
observing nearly one and a half more instances than white respondents.  The other 
significant relationships with leader behavior are not substantive.  Similar significant 
relationships exist between the control variables and trust in the organization and 




Table 5.4 presents logit regression analyses for the outcome of reporting 
unethical conduct.  I first estimate models for the reporting outcome including only 
individual or organizational variables with controls (not shown).  The full model for 
the reporting outcome includes both individual and organizational variables in 
addition to controls.  I present the results of the full model, which includes significant 
individual and organizational factors.  There are no substantive differences in 
significant variables between the full model and the reduced models. 
For individual variables, the relationship of supervisor status with reporting 
unethical conduct is significant (z=2.14, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, supervisors 
were 1.2 times as likely as non-supervisors to report unethical conduct after 
accounting for other variables in the model.  The relationship of the importance of 
anonymity with reporting unethical conduct is also significant (z=3.07, α=0.05, two-
tailed).  On average, a one-point increase on the importance of anonymity scale is 
related to a respondent being 1.1 times as likely to report unethical conduct after 
accounting for other variables in the model. 
For organizational variables, the relationship of perceived support for 
anonymous reporting with reporting unethical conduct is significant (z=2.45, α=0.05, 
two-tailed).  On average, a one-point increase on the perceived support for 
anonymous reporting scale is related to a respondent being 1.1 times as likely to 
report unethical conduct after accounting for other variables in the model.  The 
relationship of perceived protection for whistle-blowers with reporting unethical 
conduct is also significant (z=2.68, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, a one-point 




Table 5.4: Logit Regression Analyses of Reporting Unethical Conduct (Unweightedb) 
 




   Hispanic Descent 0.165  
 (0.139)  
   Blacka -0.172  
 (0.107)  
   Othera -0.039  
 (0.105)  
   Years of Education 0.005  
 (0.016)  
Individual Variables   
   Supervisor Status 0.175 *  
 (0.082)  
   Length of Federal Service -0.002  
 (0.014)  
   Importance of Anonymity 0.116 *  




   Leader Satisfaction -0.020  
 (0.042)  
   Leader Behavior -0.037 *  
 (0.010)  
   Trust in Organization 0.089  
 (0.062)  
   Support for Whistle-blowing 0.064  
 (0.054)  
   Support for Anonymous Reporting 0.107 *  
 (0.044)  
   Protection for Whistle-blowers 0.118 *  
 (0.044)  
Constant 0.066  
 (0.430)  
N 3,689  
-2LL 4,682.03  
BIC’ 216.055  
*p<0.05, Unstandardized coefficients, Standard errors in parentheses 
a: Reference Group: White 







respondent being 1.1 times as likely as to report unethical conduct after accounting 
for other variables in the model.  Although the relationship with leader behavior is 
significant, where more observed misconduct is related to increased reporting, there is 
no substantive change in odds for each additional negative behavior observed. 
Table 5.5 presents logit regression analyses for the outcomes of the various 
avenues to report unethical conduct.  I first estimate models for each outcome 
including only individual or organizational variables with controls.  The full model 
for each outcome includes both individual and organizational variables in addition to 
controls.  For two of the outcomes, the full model includes significant individual and 
organizational factors; as applicable I highlight differences in significant variables 
between the full model and the reduced models.  For the other two outcomes, I 
present the model including only individual or organizational variables as the full 
model contains no individually significant variables in the other category. 
For reporting unethical conduct informally, the relationship with supervisor 
status is significant (z=-7.65, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, supervisors were 0.5 
times as likely as non-supervisors to report unethical conduct informally after 
accounting for other variables in the model.  The relationship of reporting unethical 
conduct informally is also significant with three organizational variables; leader 
satisfaction (z=-2.81, α=0.05, two-tailed), leader behavior (z=-2.15, α=0.05, two-
tailed) and perceived support for whistle-blowing (z=-2.39, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On 
average, a one-point increase on the leader satisfaction or perceived support for 
whistle-blowing scale is related to a respondent being 0.9 times as likely to report 




Table 5.5: Logit Regression Analyses of Various Reporting Avenues (Unweightedb) 
 
 
Informal Internal External 
External  
Only 
Control Variables         
   Hispanic Descent -0.033 -0.174 -0.130 0.193  
 (0.160) (0.157) (0.174) (0.218)  
   Blacka -0.321 * -0.358 * 0.270 0.613 * 
 (0.134) (0.130) (0.139) (0.167)  
   Othera -0.138 -0.438 * -0.140 -0.031  
 (0.126) (0.125) (0.143) (0.196)  
   Years of Education 0.013 0.020 -0.042 * -0.035  
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028)  
Individual Variables      
   Supervisor Status -0.741 * 0.432 * -0.120 -  
 (0.097) (0.098) (0.108) -  
   Length of Federal 0.002 -0.019 0.000 -  
         Service (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) -  
   Importance of -0.027 0.178 * 0.148 * -  
         Anonymity (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) -  
Organizational Variables         
   Leader Satisfaction -0.142 * - 0.037 0.026  
 (0.050) - (0.055) (0.074)  
   Leader Behavior -0.025 * - -0.058 * -0.045 * 
 (0.012) - (0.012) (0.015)  
   Trust in Organization 0.014 - -0.065 -0.062  
 (0.073) - (0.080) (0.105)  
   Support for Whistle- -0.156 * - 0.001 0.071  
         blowing (0.065) - (0.071) (0.095)  
   Support for Anonymous 0.041 - 0.165 * 0.091  
         Reporting (0.052) - (0.057) (0.075)  
   Protection for Whistle- -0.030 - 0.228 * 0.131  
         blowers (0.053) - (0.059) (0.078)  
Constant 1.349 * 0.127 -0.456 -1.260  
 (0.513) (0.354) (0.557) (0.724)  
N 2,410 2,454 2,410 2,410  
-2LL 3,170.18 3,088.07 2,763.89 1,751.20  
BIC’ 113.379 140.744 115.278 173.755  
*p<0.05, Unstandardized coefficients, Standard errors in parentheses  
a: Reference Group: White 






Although the relationship with leader behavior is significant, where more observed 
misconduct is related to increased informal reporting, there is no substantive change 
in odds for each additional negative behavior observed. 
For reporting unethical conduct internally, the relationship with supervisor 
status is significant (z=4.40, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, supervisors were 1.5 
times as likely as non-supervisors to report unethical conduct internally after 
accounting for other variables in the model.  The relationship of the importance of 
anonymity with reporting unethical conduct internally is also significant (z=3.94, 
α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, a one-point increase on the importance of 
anonymity scale is related to a respondent being 1.2 times as likely to report unethical 
conduct internally after accounting for other variables in the model. 
For reporting unethical conduct externally, the relationship with the 
importance of anonymity is significant (z=3.17, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, a 
one-point increase on the importance of anonymity scale is related to a respondent 
being 1.2 times as likely to report unethical conduct externally after accounting for 
other variables in the model.  The relationship of reporting unethical conduct 
externally is also significant with three organizational variables; leader behavior    
(z=-4.81, α=0.05, two-tailed), perceived support for anonymous reporting (z=2.89, 
α=0.05, two-tailed) and perceived protection for whistle-blowers (z=3.89, α=0.05, 
two-tailed).  On average, a one-point increase on the perceived support for 
anonymous reporting scale is related to a respondent being 1.2 times as likely to 
report unethical conduct externally after accounting for other variables in the model.  




equates on average to a respondent being 1.3 times as likely to report unethical 
conduct externally after accounting for other variables in the model.  Concerning 
leader behavior, on average for each additional negative behavior observed a 
respondent is 1.1 times as likely to report unethical conduct externally after 
accounting for other variables in the model.16 
The relationship of reporting unethical conduct via solely external avenues is 
significant with leader behavior (z=-2.91, α=0.05, two-tailed), where more observed 
misconduct is related to increased external reporting.  However, there is no 
substantive change in odds for each additional negative behavior observed.  Being 
black as compared to white does have a substantive effect in this model, where black 
respondents are 1.8 times as likely as white respondents to report unethical conduct 
external without also reporting it internally.  This same race effect is mirrored in the 
informal and internal reporting outcomes, where black respondents are 0.7 times as 
likely as white respondents to report via these avenues. 
Discussion 
In considering the entire sample of the 2010 MPS (Table 5.1), it is clear there 
are differences between individuals observe unethical conduct and those who do not.  
However, observed differences lend mixed support for H1a which equates higher 
power and status to more observed unethical conduct.  As compared to white 
respondents, individuals of other race are significantly more likely to report observing 
unethical conduct while black respondents are significantly less likely to report 
                                                 
16 For reporting unethical conduct externally, supervisory status and being black as compared to white 
are significant in the individual-only model.  However, the organizational variables accounted for their 





observing such conduct.  Given that both groups are numeric minorities to the white 
reference group, it is noteworthy that opposite relationships are observed.  
Particularly, that respondents of other race report observing unethical conduct at the 
highest rate among all race categories does not support H1a and may indicate their 
increased willingness to expose wrongdoing.  An alternate explanation could be that 
white majority members seek to shield their organization and are unwilling to bring 
unethical conduct to light, but this would imply that black minority members do the 
same.  Additional analyses are necessary to address causality, but as these differences 
exist I address the effect of race in subsequent analyses of the subgroup of reporters. 
As compared to non-observers, respondents who report observing unethical 
conduct have significantly longer federal service and placed lesser importance on 
anonymity.  The length-of-service finding provides support for H1a, but more time 
with an organization could also equate to comfort with speaking up about observed 
wrongdoing.  Among the organizational measures, observers of unethical conduct 
scored significantly lower on both leader metrics and three of the four variables 
operationalizing attitudes towards the organization.17  One explanation for these 
relationships might be that observed misconduct negatively impacts views on the 
organization, although it is also possible that a pessimistic individual would be more 
willing to expose such behavior.  Whatever the cause, the subgroup that reported 
observing unethical conduct has a less favorable view of the organization and this 
view may impact whether they report such behavior or not. 
                                                 
17 It is logical that observers scored higher than non-observers on the fourth attitude measure, 
perceived protection for whistle-blowers.  Having observed misconduct, respondents may be more 




Moving to the subgroup of respondents who reported observing unethical 
conduct, I first address a counterintuitive finding from analyses of the independent 
variables.  On average, for every eight years of education respondents are one 
category lower in service length after accounting for the other control variables.  
While this difference is not substantive, it could be indicative of the technical skills 
and associated education required of more recent entry-level federal employees.  
Despite this relationship, the only power-status proxy supporting H1b is supervisory 
status.  H1b equates higher power and status to increased reporting of unethical 
conduct, and supervisors were 1.2 times as likely as non-supervisors to report 
unethical conduct after accounting for other variables in the model. 
H2 predicts that individuals observing more instances of leader misconduct 
would report unethical conduct less often than those who observe fewer instances.  
This hypothesis is based on previous literature (Miceli and Near 1984; Miceli and 
Near 1985) theorizing that a culture of silence would discourage individuals from 
reporting.  Analyses of the 2010 MPS data disconfirm this hypothesis, as there was a 
significant relationship between more observed leader misconduct and increased 
reporting.  Although the relationship is not substantive, the 2010 MPS data did not 
support the concept that cultural barriers related to observed misconduct discourage 
reporting.  Concerning avenues of reporting, on average for each additional negative 
behavior observed a respondent is 1.1 times as likely to report unethical conduct 
externally after accounting for other variables in the model.  Analyses of the external 




H3a predicts that more perceived organizational support for whistle-blowing 
would be related to increased reporting.  Analyses of the 2010 MPS data provide 
partial support for this hypothesis.  While two of the organizational measures (trust in 
the organization and perceived support for whistle-blowing) have no significant 
relationship with reporting, perceived protection for whistle-blowers provides 
evidence for increased reporting where, on average, a one-point increase on the 
perceived protection for whistle-blowers scale is related to a respondent being 1.1 
times as likely as to report unethical conduct after accounting for other variables in 
the model. 
There was support for H3b, which predicts that greater individual importance 
of and organizational support for anonymity would be related to increased reporting.  
On average, a one-point increase on the perceived support for anonymous reporting 
scale is related to a respondent being 1.1 times as likely to report unethical conduct 
after accounting for other variables in the model.  Anonymity is also important at the 
individual level where, on average, a one-point increase on the importance of 
anonymity scale is related to a respondent being 1.1 times as likely to report unethical 
conduct (and 1.2 times as likely to report such conduct via internal avenues18) after 
accounting for other variables in the model.  Taken together, these findings indicate 
that the concept of anonymity is an important factor as both organizational support 
for anonymous reporting and individual importance of anonymity have unique 
relationships with the reporting outcome. 
                                                 
18 Individuals are also 1.2 times as likely to report unethical conduct via external avenues.  This 





Analyses of the various reporting avenues find support for H4a and H4b, but 
not H4c.  H4a predicts that individuals with lower education would report unethical 
conduct via external channels more than those with higher education.  Education did 
have a significant relationship; while not substantive, there is a negative relationship 
between years of education and reporting externally.  H4b predicts that individuals in 
a supervisory role would use internal avenues to report unethical conduct more than 
those not in a supervisory role.  On average, supervisors are 1.5 times as likely as 
non-supervisors to report unethical conduct internally after accounting for other 
variables in the model. 
H4c predicts that individuals with lesser perception of organizational support 
for whistle-blowing would report more using external avenues than those who 
perceive greater support.  My analyses do not support this hypothesis.  For the 
measure of perceived protection for whistle-blowers, a one-point increase on the 
perceived protection for whistle-blowers scale equates on average to a respondent 
being 1.3 times as likely to report unethical conduct externally after accounting for 
other variables in the model.  As well, an average one-point increase on the perceived 
support for anonymous reporting scale is related to a respondent being 1.2 times as 
likely to report unethical conduct externally after accounting for other variables in the 
model.  However, when considering reporting done solely via external avenues these 
significant relationships no longer exist.  Taken together, my results indicate that 
greater perceived organizational support is related to increased external reporting, but 




respondents perceive organizational support for whistle-blowing, some other factor is 
driving them to report outside of the organization. 
While no hypotheses address the informal reporting avenue, there are 
significant relationships between informal reporting and multiple individual and 
organizational variables. Concerning individual measures, supervisors are on average 
0.5 times as likely as non-supervisors to report unethical conduct informally after 
accounting for other variables in the model.  For organizational measures, a one-point 
increase on the leader satisfaction and perceived support for whistle-blowing scales is 
related on average to a respondent being 0.9 times as likely to report unethical 
conduct informally after accounting for other variables in the model.19  The strongest 
finding here is that non-supervisors are much more likely to report unethical conduct 
to a family member, friend or coworker. 
Race Implications for Reporting Avenue 
Based on observed demographic differences between respondents who 
observed unethical conduct and those who did not, I now discuss the effect of race in 
analyses of the subgroup of reporters.  Initial analyses of independent variables reveal 
that, on average after accounting for the other control variables, black respondents 
report observing nearly one and a half more instances of leader misconduct than 
white respondents.  As opposed to observing illegal or wasteful activities, black 
respondents may be in a better position to observe leader misconduct.  Alternatively, 
they may be more willing than white respondents to highlight such misbehavior. 
                                                 
19 Although the relationship with leader behavior is significant, where more observed misconduct is 
related to increased informal reporting, there is no substantive change in odds for each additional 




This difference in observed misconduct does not translate to a relationship 
with reporting illegal or wasteful activities, however.  Black respondents are no more 
likely than the white reference group to report unethical conduct.  Moving beyond 
this finding, it is important to note that race does have an effect on avenue of 
reporting in the subgroup that does report such conduct.  Once the decision to report 
has been made, black respondents are 0.7 times as likely as white respondents to 
report via informal or internal avenues.  Coupled with the finding that black 
respondents are 1.8 times as likely as white respondents to report unethical conduct 
solely via external avenues, it is clear that black respondents are hesitant to report 
within their organization.  Of the external reporting avenues (See Table 4.4), three are 
most-frequently used by all respondents: Agency Inspector General, union 
representative and the “other” avenue.  As compared to the Agency Inspector 
General, black respondents report to union representatives at a proportionally higher 
rate than other races, accounting for 18.2% of the reports made via this avenue.  
Although the cross-sectional nature of the 2010 MPS data veils causality of 
the reporting decision, respondents are asked questions concerning hypothetical 
whistle-blowing that provide context to the race finding in preferred reporting avenue.  
As well, reported retaliation experienced by actual whistle-blowers could provide 
another lens to explain the race finding for avenues of reporting.  Data on 
hypothetical reporting and actual retaliation experiences for those who do report 
unethical conduct provide additional information to consider when analyzing the 




All respondents are asked (WB_12), upon observing a hypothetical “health or 
safety danger, unlawful behavior, fraud, waste, or abuse,” which of the following 
from a list of 21 items would factor into their decision whether or not to report the 
wrongdoing.  Respondents answer on a 1-4 scale where 1 = Not at All; 2 = Little 
Extent; 3 = Some Extent; and 4 = Great Extent.  Ordinary least square regression 
analyses of each question for respondents who reported actual unethical conduct 
reveal differences for some items across race.  Table 5.6 presents items differing 
significantly for black respondents as compared to white respondents, along with the 
unstandardized coefficient for each item. 
Table 5.6: Items Factoring More in Reporting Hypothetical Misconduct (Weighted) 
 
Coefficient Item               
0.20 Concern that I would be suspended, demoted, or fired.   
0.15 Belief that nothing would be done to stop it.    
0.15 Belief that nothing could be done to stop it.    
0.37 Belief that it would not happen again.     
0.21 Belief that someone else had already reported it.    
0.25 Concern that it might get someone in trouble.    
0.28 Concern that is might harm the reputation of my organization/agency. 
0.23 Concern that it might cause other things to be investigated.   
0.34 Concern that it might affect my performance appraisal.   
0.37 Concern that it might affect my ability to get a performance award. 
0.54 Concern that it might affect my ability to get training.  
0.38 Concern that it might affect my ability to get a promotion.   
0.29 Concern that management might become less tolerant of any small 
mistakes I might make.  
0.27 Concern that management might become less willing to grant me any 
favors that are optional for them.  
0.17 Concern that I might be retaliated against in another way not mentioned 
above. 
0.35 A lack of knowledge about to whom I should report.     
p<0.05 for all unstandardized coefficients (α=0.05), N ranges from 2,388-2,362 




Of note, there were no items that mattered significantly less for black 
respondents are compared to white respondents; this indicates that black respondents 
coefficient sizes equate to items reflecting some form of personal retaliation against 
give careful consideration to hypothetical reporting.  Of the items that did matter 
more for black respondents as compared to white respondents, four of the top five the 
respondent (e.g. appraisals, awards, training and promotions).  Black respondents are 
also more willing than white respondents to believe that observed misconduct will not 
be repeated.  Other themes include protecting individuals and the organization, a 
belief that the misconduct would continue even if reported, and a lack of knowledge 
on whom to report to. 
All respondents are also asked (WB_13), upon observing the same 
hypothetical misconduct as WB_12, how important each of the following from a list 
of nine items would be in their decision whether or not to report the wrongdoing.  
Respondents answer on a 1-5 scale ranging from 1 = Unimportant to 5 = Very 
Important.  Ordinary least square regression analyses of each question for respondents 
who reported actual unethical conduct reveal differences for some items across race.  
Table 5.7 presents items differing significantly for black respondents as compared to 
white respondents, along with the unstandardized coefficient for each item.  While the 
effect sizes are smaller as compared to Table 5.6, the theme of retaliation is repeated 
for which black respondents place a greater importance than white respondents. 
For the same group of respondents considered in the above two tables, 
information on actual retaliation experienced is available.  Respondents who reported 




Table 5.7: Importance of Items in Reporting Hypothetical Misconduct (Weighted) 
 
Coefficient Item               
-0.14 The activity might endanger people's lives.    
0.15 You would be protected from any sort of reprisal.    
0.27 You would be positively recognized by management for a good deed. 
0.17 The activity was something you considered to be a serious ethical 
violation, although the monetary costs associated with it were small.  
0.48 You would be eligible to receive a cash reward.       
p<0.05 for all unstandardized coefficients (α=0.05), N ranges from 2,342-2,206 
Black respondents as compared to white respondents. 
 
personally experienced some type of reprisal or threat of reprisal by management for 
having reported an activity?”  Of the 2,456 whistle-blowers, N=345 report 
experiencing reprisal or threat of reprisal.  Logit regression analyses of this outcome 
indicate a near-significant difference (p=0.06) for black respondents as compared to 
white respondents20, where black respondents are 1.4 times as likely as white 
respondents to experience retaliation or threatened retaliation for reported 
misconduct. 
Taken together, the fear of retaliation voiced in questions about hypothetical 
unethical conduct could be a reason why black respondents report observing unethical 
conduct at a lower rate than other race categories, are more likely than white 
respondents to report only via external avenues and less likely than white respondents 
to report via informal or internal channels.  Actual retaliation experiences of black 
whistle-blowers as compared to white whistle-blowers lend strength to this line of 
reasoning.  Determining causality is not possible with the 2010 MPS data; however, 
future work could explore this potential relationship. 
                                                 
20 The small number of black respondents reporting retaliation or threatened retaliation (N=55) may 




Modeling the Reporting of Unethical Conduct 
Based on analyses thus far, the model in Figure 5.1 displays relationships 
observed in the 2010 MPS data; only statistically significant relationships are shown.  
Figure 5.1: 2010 MPS Whistle-blowing Relationships 
 
 
Five relationships emerge; supervisory status, individual importance of anonymity, 
leader behavior and two measures of organizational protection.21  Individually, being 
in a supervisory position is related to increased reporting.  A greater individual 
importance placed on anonymity is also related to increased reporting, possibly 
indicating a level of belief by reporters that their anonymity will be protected if they 
report.  Another facet of anonymity is perceived support by the organization for this 
reporting method, where greater perceived support is related to increased reporting.  
Greater perceived organizational protection for whistle-blowers is also related to 
increased reporting.  Finally, counter to what previous literature theorized, more 
observed misconduct by leaders is related to increased reporting.  Rather than a 
culture of silence stifling reporting, observed leader misconduct by federal employees 
is related to increased reporting in the 2010 MPS data. 
                                                 
21 Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, arrows represent assumed causal relationships that I will 
test in my factorial vignette study. 
Individual Factors
Supervisor Position (+)
Importance of Anonymity (+)
Organizational Factors
Leader Misbehavior (+)
Support for Anonymity (+)
Perceived Protection (+)






Guided by these relationships, Figure 5.2 presents a general model for 
reporting unethical conduct.  This general model, supported by previous literature and 
my analyses of the 2010 MPS data, highlights that both individual and organizational 
factors contribute to the reporting of unethical conduct. 




Limitations and Future Direction 
Before testing the relationships in Figure 5.2 experimentally, I next consider 
the proposed relationship between trust in leaders and the reporting of unethical 
conduct.  As the 2010 MPS data excludes “unethical” from the definition of 
misconduct and does not contain measures of trust in leaders, I turn to qualitative 
interview data to address these shortcomings.  In doing so, I follow existing whistle-
blowing literature and include the word “unethical” when defining misconduct for 
potential reporting. 
A disadvantage of secondary data analyses is the inability to collect 
subsequent information deemed important during analyses.  One such variable 
missing from the 2010 MPS data is gender.  Previous research (Miceli et al. 2012; 
Near and Miceli 1996) indicates that gender is related to the reporting of unethical 
conduct, but this relationship is untestable in the 2010 MPS data.  In my qualitative 
analyses, I consider the relationship of gender to observed themes. 
Organizational Policies (+)








In conceptualizing the 2010 MPS data by individual and organizational 
categories, I chose exclude some data in the Whistleblowing section of the 2010 MPS 
(see Appendix B).  These data include the location of observed misconduct within the 
organization and the frequency of such misconduct.  In the next two chapters, my 
qualitative analyses reveal themes that individuals associate with the reporting of 
unethical conduct.  Should these themes merit revisiting the 2010 MPS data, I will do 





Chapter 6: Qualitative Analyses – Data and Methods 
 
My analyses of the 2010 MPS data identify factors positively related to the 
increased reporting of unethical conduct; these include supervisory status, individual 
importance of anonymity, leader misconduct, organizational support for anonymous 
reporting and organizational protection for whistle-blowers.  While these five factors 
are addressed in previous whistle-blowing literature22, one potential factor is absent 
from this literature; trust in leaders.  My primary goal for the qualitative analyses in 
this chapter and the next is to address the potential relationship between trust in 
leaders and the reporting of unethical conduct.  I also explore the mechanisms 
underlying relationships observed in the 2010 MPS data. 
Participants 
Twenty-five (N=25) individuals, including students from a military service 
academy and a large public university as well as active-duty military members from 
two service branches, participate in my interviews.  All participants are from the 
Northeast and West regions of the United States, and the three largest military 
services are represented.23  While exact participant age is not captured, the students 
vary in year from freshman to senior and include both men and women.  Active-duty 
military participants vary in position from junior enlisted to senior officer, include 
both men and women, and represent a variety of military career fields.  In total, four 
participants are women (16%); these participants represent three of the four interview 
                                                 
22 Previous literature hypothesizes a negative relationship between leader misconduct and the reporting 
of unethical conduct; I find a positive relation in my secondary data analyses. 





sites.  This is low in comparison to the general population, but is reflective of the 
gender composition of the active-duty military (DoD 2013).  Similar to previous 
research (Richardson and McGlynn 2011) I change the participants’ names in my 
research to maintain the anonymity promised as a condition of participating in the 
interviews (see Table 6.1).24 
Data Collection 
Beginning with an inductive approach, I conduct interviews with military and 
civilian individuals25 to determine how trust in leaders may relate to the reporting of 
unethical conduct; this is important due to the lack of whistle-blowing literature 
considering trust in leaders.  The goal of these interviews is to explore potential 
factors affecting the reporting of unethical conduct, and how these factors may vary 
in different settings.  I use open-ended, semi-structured interviews to inform my 
research question while allowing subjects to explore various themes that may emerge 
from the questions (Khan and Fisher 2014). 
At the military service academy and civilian university, participants are 
recruited from various academic classes and offered incentives for participating in the 
research.26  At the active-duty military sites, participants are recruited via the 
member’s chain of command but due to existing regulation are not reimbursed in 
 
                                                 
24 I give female participants a name that begins with the letter A, and male participants a name that 
begins with the letter B.  No race or ethnicity is implied by any assigned name. 
25 To gain access for these interviews, I served as a research assistant in an ongoing project funded by 
the Army Research Institute.  With Dr. Lucas and Dr. Hanges serving as co-primary investigators, this 
research investigates ethical leadership and organizational climate and culture at numerous civilian and 
military sites.  In preparation for my role in this research, I obtained Institutional Research Board 
(IRB) approval as a research assistant on this project. 
26 Extra class credit is the incentive offered at the military service academy.  At the civilian university, 




Table 6.1: Interview Participants 
Participant Interview Site   Seniority   
Andrea  Civilian University Junior  
Bill  Civilian University Junior  
Brian  Civilian University Seniority  
Alicia  Military Service Academy Freshman  
Alison  Military Service Academy Freshman  
Bob  Military Service Academy Freshman  
Brad  Military Service Academy Junior  
Brett  Military Service Academy Junior  
Benito  Active-duty Military Junior Enlisted 
Brayden  Active-duty Military Senior Enlisted 
Blake  Active-duty Military Senior Officer 
Brady  Active-duty Military Junior Enlisted 
Bryce  Active-duty Military Junior Enlisted 
Brandon  Active-duty Military Junior Enlisted 
Ashley  Active-duty Military Junior Enlisted 
Bo  Active-duty Military Senior Enlisted 
Bruce  Active-duty Military Senior Enlisted 
Byronab  Active-duty Military Senior Enlisted 
Baxterab  Active-duty Military Senior Enlisted 
Benedictc  Active-duty Military Senior Officer 
Barryc  Active-duty Military Senior Enlisted 
Benjamin  Active-duty Military Senior Enlisted 
Breccan  Active-duty Military Junior Enlisted 
Brockton  Active-duty Military Junior Enlisted 
Bustera   Active-duty Military Junior Officer 
a: While I initially introduced myself as a graduate student to all 
participants, I later told these three that I am in the active-duty military.  My 
methodology was to not mention this fact unless I was specifically asked. 
b,c: These participants were interviewed in pairs. 
 
any manner for their participation.27   I make every effort to obtain participants who 
span the breadth of seniority (e.g. from freshmen to senior year in the college setting 
                                                 
27 Although military members are directed to report to the interview site, before beginning the 
interview I emphasize that their participation is voluntary and give them multiple opportunities to opt-




and from junior enlisted to senior officer at active-duty military sites).  I do this to 
capture differing perspectives that develop with varying exposure to the institution. 
To afford the possibility of capturing different types of unethical conduct, my 
questions allow participants to envision a wide range of potential negative behaviors 
and address those most relevant to their situations.  I use a consistent protocol (see 
Appendix D28) when conducting my interviews, ensuring reliability in that all 
participants answer the same questions in the same order (Khan and Fisher 2014).  
Open ended questions first focus participants on broad areas of institutional and 
individual influences on reporting, without specifically prompting for any effect their 
leaders or supervisors may have.  If it does not develop unprompted, I ask participants 
if trust in their leaders would impact their decision to report unethical conduct.  
Themes from my interviews augment existing theory to inform predictions on the 
relationship between trust in leaders and the reporting of unethical conduct.   
I interview participants at the school they attend or the military installation 
they are currently employed at.  All participants consented to having their interviews 
recorded.  In accordance with the interview protocol, participants answer questions 
focusing on observed unethical conduct, the reporting of such conduct including 
potential consequences for the reporter, trust in leadership including factors that 
increase and decrease this trust and reactions to trust violation, and culture.  I probe 
for additional information when appropriate.  Interviews range in length from 35 
minutes to 76 minutes.  A professional transcribed the audiotaped interviews; these 
                                                 
28 Slight wording changes in the protocol are made for each interview site, due to cultural difference in 





transcribed interviews result in 748 single-spaced pages of data.  Transcribing 
interviews allows verbatim responses to be analyzed and coded. 
Analyses 
After reading all interview transcripts in their entirety to refresh myself with 
the interview content, I begin by coding 14 of the transcripts ensuring an even 
distribution of service academy/university students and active-duty military 
members.29  My unit of analysis for coding is each instance of a particular theme; 
when read by itself, the instance is required to stand alone to represent a particular 
theme.  As instances are coded, I first organize them into specific categories.  As I 
proceed through the initial 14 interviews, I compare subsequent instances with 
previously coded instances.  As a result, I restructure the coding scheme iteratively to 
incorporate new themes and consolidate infrequent themes under a more general 
category.  To determine if saturation is reached, I then code the remaining 11 
interviews30 using the coding scheme developed from the initial 14.  I did reach 
saturation, as no new major themes emerged; I was able to structure new instances 
logically under an existing theme in the coding scheme.31  Finally, I review the 
instances of each theme to determine which themes are common across different 
interview sites and also which themes are centered among certain demographic 
characteristics (e.g. gender, seniority). 
In this chapter I describe my interview participants and my methodology for 
collecting interview data.  I also formulate my analyses plan.  In the next chapter, I 
                                                 
29 I use the MaxQDA software program to code these transcripts. 
30 All of these 11 interviews except one are from the two active-duty interview sites where I had 
comparatively more participants than from the military service academy and civilian university. 









Chapter 7: Qualitative Analyses – Results and Discussion 
 
I present the results of my qualitative analyses in this chapter, with a primary 
focus on addressing the potential relationship between trust in leaders and the 
reporting of unethical conduct.  I also explore the mechanisms underlying the 
relationships observed in the 2010 MPS data.  Participants in my interviews reported 
observing a wide range of unethical conduct32, and based on these observations they 
provided insight into factors affecting whether such behavior is reported or not. 
I begin by presenting the major themes of unethical conduct that participants 
identify at their organizations.  It is important to establish the types of unethical 
conduct observed by participants, which give context to their subsequent discussion 
on the reporting of such conduct.  Next, I summarize reasons why participants said 
this unethical conduct may go unreported.  After expanding on factors previously 
identified in secondary data analyses, such as supervisory status, leader misconduct, 
organizational support for anonymous reporting and individual importance placed on 
anonymity, I identify two new themes related to the reporting of unethical conduct; 
in-group preference and the severity of the observed misconduct.  Finally, I explore 
whether trust in leaders is related to the reporting of unethical conduct. 
                                                 
32 The quotations presented in this chapter were elicited in response to an interview protocol (see 
Appendix D) that opened with multiple questions about unethical conduct.  Unethical conduct was 
defined as behavior that is illegal, immoral or illegitimate, with specific examples including false 
accountability, lying, alcohol use, cheating/plagiarizing, sexual harassment or assault, fraternization, 
and degrading humor.  Although the interview protocol progressed through the broader topics of 
leadership, trust, and culture, the majority of the initial questions centered on factors related to 
reporting unethical conduct. The views and conclusions expressed through quotations in this chapter 
should not be interpreted as representing the views and conclusions, either expressed or implied, of the 
Department of Defense regarding unethical conduct, specifically, or leadership, trust, or culture, in 
general. Additionally, the reader should not draw inferences regarding the prevalence within the 




Does Unethical Conduct Occur? 
 After being prompted with only the definition of unethical conduct used in my 
interviews, all participants except one were able to give at least one example of 
unethical conduct they were aware of.  Subsequently, after hearing a list of 
hypothetical negative behaviors, all participants were able to give multiple examples 
of unethical conduct they were aware of.  By far, the most frequent theme of 
unethical conduct is various instances of behavior related to alcohol; this theme is 
identified at all interview sites. 
 Underage drinking is an often-identified example of this theme, particularly at 
the civilian university and military service academy.  For example, Bob shared this 
observation: 
Yeah, the underage drinking is, you know, is pretty normal…I know a lot of, a 
lot of people do it.  I don’t personally but I have plenty of friends that do. 
 
and when prompted with my examples of unethical conduct, Bill offered this: 
Yeah, definitely underage drinking. I’ve seen that more than once on this 
campus, on campus and off campus, as well. 
 
While underage drinking itself is unethical by nature of being illegal, there are 
also numerous instances where the excessive consumption of alcohol led to related 
unethical conduct.  For example, take this story shared by Brian: 
When people get drunk, every now and then there might be some 
disagreements.  Or I seen one time, a couple times, where there’s been an 
argument…People have, I’ve seen people punch people before. 
 
and when asked about potential sexual harassment or assault Brandon had this to say: 
It happens a lot.  I think that's the saddest part about the military, it happens a 
lot.  And I think a lot of it directly correlates with the close quarters we are 
forced into…And of course that it ties into the alcohol culture.  There's a lot of 




Finally, drinking and driving is identified as a problem at both active-duty 
military sites.  In some cases, those who took part in this behavior are identified as 
receiving punishment.  In other cases, there appears to be some tolerance in the 
military justice system based on punishment the offender receives in the civilian legal 
system.  As Benjamin observed: 
DUIs, I have seen DUIs hidden, and by hidden I mean we had [an E6] get a 
DUI and the command kept it quite, and so his civilian punishment came out.  
Once that came out, then the command decided, “Hey, we’ll take it a certain 
route.”…so he never got punished [in the military] for having a DUI. 
 
The fact that alcohol-related incidents are identified most frequently may be 
related to an informal culture that supports the use of alcohol, which is another theme 
that emerges at all interview sites.  Brandon had this to say: 
I know [our] culture does, it allows for a lot of…alcoholism, it allows a lot of 
people to indulge in alcoholism because there's, the culture itself kind of 
revolves around our weekends.  
 
Buster also identified an alcohol culture in his organization.  When asked how 
pervasive he thought this culture was, he said: 
I think that’s a…military thing. I think, it’s a United States thing.  We’re 
pretty heavy drinkers. I think most Western nations are pretty heavy drinkers.  
I think the culture of the military lends itself to heavy drinking.  
 
Bob provided further evidence of a normative alcohol culture, offering this when 
asked which types of unethical conduct go unreported: 
Um, so that, [underage drinking] is definitely one that, you know, it’s kind of 
just expected that, you know, like I said, I have friends who underage drink all 
the time. 
  
 Buster shared his thoughts as to why an informal culture that condones the use 




Uh… well.  I think the biggest thing is the way it’s viewed.  If it’s not 
interfering with your professional side of things, which, in the military is kind 
of the most important thing.  What is your job performance?...And, um, [this 
is a] stressful job.  A lot of people view alcohol as a stress relief.  So, it’s 
present at most informal functions in good supply. 
 
Buster was also quick to point out that there is no official policy endorsing the use of 
alcohol or any peer pressure to consume alcohol, but rather it is each individual’s 
choice.  It is possible that the number of individuals partaking in the consumption of 
alcohol makes it easy to participate in a group setting. 
 Participants at each interview site also related that their organization does not 
formally tolerate unethical conduct related to the use of alcohol.  Bill had this to say 
about the stance his organization takes: 
I know the university’s been pushing students to take the alcohol ed[ucation] 
courses online before you can, it’s mandatory now, so I feel like that’s a big 
thing, just spread of information, just information on what to drink, how many 
ounces you take to get drunk, or stuff like that. 
 
Alison observed that excessive drinking is formally frowned upon as it may cast an 
unfavorable image on her organization, and Brandon offered a more specific example 
of how his organization approaches unethical conduct related to alcohol use: 
All right, so in the military we have a two alcohol-related incident 
limit…Whether it be your fault or not.…If it happens twice, I'll get kicked out 
whether I did anything wrong or not…And not only that, but now they're 
cracking down with DUI's, one will kick you out.   
 
 It appears that a mismatch exists between formal and informal cultures where 
alcohol is concerned.  Formally, organizations appear to discourage using alcohol to 
excess and have little tolerance for unethical conduct related to the use of alcohol.  
Despite this official stance, it is clear that the use of alcohol, in some cases to excess, 




 Another major theme of unethical conduct that emerges is sexual harassment 
and assault.33  Like alcohol-related incidents, this theme is present at all interview 
sites.  Multiple university and military service academy participants recalled stories of 
sexual harassment.  For example, Alison described: 
Um, for the most part. I mean, I've had friends tell me, um, that they've been 
like harassed in a mild way. Like, not really harassed so much as just like, you 
know, somebody made an inappropriate comment to them. 
 
and Bill was able to share this story after being prompted with only the definition of 
unethical conduct: 
I’ve seen, personally, one is Peeping Toms in bathrooms, in girl 
bathrooms…I’ve seen that first hand [here] because I live in a dorm…I’ve 
heard about it through the campus news as well, that there’s been a lot of 
Peeping Toms…reported in many different dorms, not just mine. 
 
 Some participants are also aware of instances of sexual assault; Ashley and 
Benjamin reported a vague awareness of rape occurring in their organizations.  Two 
participants, both women, shared stories of friends experiencing this type of unethical 
conduct.  In addition to recollecting a high-profile rape case that previously occurred 
at her organization, Alison had a friend who was “slapped…on the butt” in an 
unwanted manner.  Andrea shared two vivid examples of this behavior at her 
organization.  She first recalled: 
I had a friend who was picked up in a taxi to go home after she left a bar, and 
this taxi driver took her to a – and she had no idea where she was – an empty 
parking lot and said, “Pretty girls don’t have to pay, but they have to pay in 
different ways.”  And locked the doors, tried to get in the back seat with her, 
and thank God, she had clawed his face off, pretty much, and then just ran. 
 
and later in the interview she added: 
                                                 
33 Depending on the organization, different definitions of sexual harassment and assault exist.  In my 
research, I use the official Department of Defense definitions; the key difference being sexual assault 




I had a friend who was sexually assaulted.  She was raped, and she was really 
not okay.  Went through counseling and everything for a little while and had 
reported who the person was and things like that. 
 
 Unlike the alcohol theme, where there appears to be a mismatch between what 
formal and informal cultures espouse, there is unanimous agreement across interview 
sites that sexual harassment and assault is not condoned.  The formal culture 
described at all interview sites makes this clear, as Brian shared when asked what his 
organization’s values were surrounding sexual harassment and assault: 
Yeah, so for the most part, I think they do a very good job of having people be 
aware of different things like sexual assault, things of that nature. 
 
Brett added that sexual harassment and assault are not formally tolerated by his 
organization and that perpetrators should be severely punished. 
 Supporting this theme, it is apparent organizations are making an effort to 
encourage the reporting of sexual harassment and assault.  When asked what his 
organization did to make it more likely for sexual harassment to be reported, Bill 
offered: 
[My organization] has a has a really strong program that releases information 
about sexual harassment, and then teaches students about it.  I feel like [other 
organizations] aren’t as far in that process as [mine] is, so I feel that it’s just 
this knowledge…that people use to know that it’s wrong, and that you should 
report it, and that’s not okay to do. 
 
Complementing this formal culture, participants convey that their informal 
culture is also against blatant sexual harassment and assault.  Brett thought this of the 
members of his organization: 
But I think if you ask, if you ask [us] like what should, if it was clearly sexual 
harassment or sexual assault, what should you do, I think it should be the no 
toleration punishment against that. 
 




Um, but you know, if someone were to, obviously walk in on, on like a rape 
or a sexual assault or something like that I feel like, you know, most people 
here would do something about that.  I’d, I'd like to believe that anyways. 
 
Finally, Brad recalled a previous sexual assault case at his organization and shared 
how the perpetrator was hated by members of his organization for being a predator. 
 Despite an informal culture against blatant sexual harassment and assault, 
there is some confusion as to when sexual harassment crosses the line between joking 
and being harassment.  Bob offered this insight: 
I don’t think, you know, people are as in-tuned to hearing something, like, you 
know, I've heard uh, like a [man] say to [woman] oh, something like, you’re 
so fine or something like that…And um, the [woman] may not say anything 
about it and you know, it’s not a big deal.  But to her it could be a big deal in 
that situation. 
 
As well, Alison expressed a mistrust of the formal culture against sexual harassment 
and assault by some members of her organization: 
But, um, from what I've noticed, um, just talking to, um, especially the guys, 
um, is there's a lot of fear of getting, like, getting [charged with sexual 
assault].  Like, a lot of guys tend to be of the opinion that there's a lot of girls 
here that would falsely accuse them of sexual assault. 
 
Alison also felt that, despite being opposed to sexual harassment and assault, people 
at her organization did not want to report it for the most part.  This sentiment is 
exemplified in a story shared by Alicia where she expresses an attitude of acceptance 
for what she perceives as a relatively minor infraction: 
Saturday night I was in my room and one of my friends came in and was 
talking to me about the same perpetrator with a totally different situation.  
And it was just unwanted touching…he touched her, um, butt and she came 
and talked to me about it and wanted to know, um, if I or my roommate had 
experienced anything similar, you know, and we explained that we’d all been 
uncomfortable.  But where I was going with that is the reporting, we don't, we 





Alicia had said earlier that she viewed rape as a more serious form of sexual assault 
that needed to be reported. 
 A third major theme of unethical conduct that emerges at all interview sites is 
the use of degrading humor.  This is one type of negative behavior I use to prompt 
participants (see Appendix D), and it yielded many instances.  Take Benjamin’s 
perspective on this behavior: 
Degrading humor pretty much happens on a daily basis, but I know with our 
[workgroup], we always say, “If this really bothers anybody, let us know, and 
we’ll stop,” because you’re always just talking trash to your friends...Some 
people, if it does bother them, we don’t, well, I don’t, anyway, usually 
continue down that path. 
 
Bob provided examples of different variations of degrading humor he had heard: 
Um, I do think, you know, there’s a little bit of that college atmosphere 
sometimes. Uh, some of my guy friends or just peers in general say uh, like 
pretty sexist comments sometimes…I've [also] heard, I've heard like, you 
know, the racist jokes before…And it’s, I don’t think it’s ever directly said to 
anyone. I think it’s, you know, things that are said, you know, maybe behind 
someone’s back and never directly to them. 
 
and Bill was aware of “gay bashing” at his organization although he previously stated 
that the official culture welcomed diversity. 
 While participants often state that their formal culture does not tolerate 
degrading humor, the acceptance of degrading humor in the informal culture is a 
common theme across all interview sites.  Brandon pointed out the role that degrading 
humor plays in his organization: 
And it's done in good fun, it allows us to go through our day with a higher 
moral…It allows us to enjoy our day and enjoy each other's company more 
because, you know, if we just moved around like robots all day, the way [our 
organization’s] rules are set out…this would be the most depressing job in the 
world.  So we find ways to joke amongst ourselves and we all come from 





He then clarified that this type of humor is acceptable within a peer group, and when 
questioned as to whether he had observed it outside of his peer group he said: 
I have, but I've never seen it not addressed, where it was ended right then and 
there…at no point do we force the jokes on anyone or continue the jokes if 
someone feels uncomfortable.  I mean there is instances where that's happened 
and that's when the rules come into play. 
 
Brandon provided further insight as to why degrading humor may be acceptable in 
the culture of his organization, and expressed displeasure that change was being 
imposed from outside the organization: 
But we live this culture that we are okay with.  And there are current 
regulations and rules coming into effect that are asking us to change our 
culture that's been in effect for hundreds of years and worked.   Yes, it's crude, 
it's very almost, you know, like a verbally barbaric…But it’s okay, we're okay 
with it. 
 
Finally, Brett explained how peers may tolerate degrading humor while also signaling 
their disapproval of it: 
I mean, if it's really bad, uh, I don't doubt that most people will call them out.  
If it's like something that's like, uh, I mean, it's bad but it's not that bad, I feel 
like most people just wouldn't laugh at it and just be like, just like that, I feel 
like that person would be able to figure out that they don't think it's funny, 
maybe I should stop. 
 
 In addition to the three major themes already discussed, participants shared 
other instances of unethical conduct ranging from rule breaking and favoritism to 
hazing and drug use.  These types of unethical conduct are not prevalent across all 
interview sites and only mentioned sporadically.  Three additional types of unethical 
conduct do appear at multiple interview sites, however; these include fraternization34, 
false accountability and lying or cheating.  While not mentioned as often as alcohol 
                                                 
34 The term fraternization is used to describe a relationship between a senior and junior member of an 




use, sexual harassment/assault and degrading humor, their frequency merits further 
discussion here. 
 Although mentioned at multiple interview sites, fraternization is discussed 
more often at one in particular.  Multiple participants from this organization were able 
to share second-hand stories of fraternization.  Perhaps this behavior is best 
exemplified by a story Bryce shared: 
And [fraternization] is everywhere too.  Like you'd be coming out of the 
barracks…and they'll be, you know, [senior enlisted] like tiptoeing out, taking 
another walk of shame, basically. 
 
Brandon explained that this type of behavior is easily recognized and causes problems 
for members of his organization: 
Nine times out of ten we spot it….we can tell immediately when it's too 
friendly.  And it causes tension within the [workgroup] because we notice 
favoritism, we notice, when there's so many [assignments] handed out, 
nobody wants to do them.  And we notice when there's one person that gets 
out of all of them. 
 
 False accountability is also mentioned at all interview sites.  Specific instances 
vary from site to site; one common example is completing paperwork indicating 
something is accomplished when in fact it is not.  This type of unethical conduct 
varied in severity from backdating paperwork for work previously performed but 
undocumented to falsely signing work as completed that in reality never was.  
Another example of false accountability is knowingly stating someone is present 
although they are absent.  Bo shared his exposure to this type of behavior: 
I was in the, [a unit] here on [base], and…my last chain of command got, uh, 
in trouble because they were reporting this person as being here [when] in 






 Finally, lying and cheating are mentioned across all interview sites but seem 
to be most prevalent in the academic setting.  Bob had this to say: 
So, um, you know, I've heard of, I've heard of plenty of stories where people 
lie or cheat on a test.  And you know, you see it happen, you know, and you 
just don’t report it because, you know, like a care about this person.  I don’t 
want to see something really bad happen to this person. 
 
Andrea echoed her experience with this type of behavior: 
[J]ust recently, I took an exam, and I was talking to someone right outside the 
hall who I’d actually just met through a mutual friend, and … she was, like, 
the bathroom check… When you get to the end and you’re running out of 
material, and going to the bathroom and kind of check your phone, check your 
notes really quick, then coming back. 
 
 In summary, the three most prevalent themes of unethical conduct are alcohol-
related incidents, sexual harassment and assault, and degrading humor.  These 
behaviors are common across all interview sites.  Less frequently mentioned, but 
present at more than one interview site, are fraternization, false accountability, and 
lying and cheating.  It is clear that unethical conduct occurs; every participant was 
able to recollect some form of unethical conduct in their organization.  What remains 
to be explored are factors related to the reporting of such conduct, but I first present 
participants’ thoughts on why such behavior goes unreported.   
Why Individuals Do Not Report Unethical Conduct 
 Participants shared a variety of reasons why they would not report observed 
unethical conduct.  Some of these reasons are in line with pervious literature (Miceli 
and Near 2002), such as not being believed, feeling that reporting will not stop 
behavior that is occurring, and wanting to protect the image of the organization.35  
                                                 
35 Participants also highlighted that they would report unethical conduct to protect the image of the 




Other, more nefarious themes also emerge, such as a calculated decision that the 
perpetrator will not be caught and peer pressure not to report observed unethical 
conduct.  As highlighted in the above section on types of unethical conduct, some are 
more accepted in the culture of the organization and this also affects whether 
participants would report them or not. 
More so than any of these reasons, however, two themes emerge repeatedly at 
all interview sites that identify why participants may be less likely to report observed 
unethical conduct.  These themes are a peer-oriented culture and self-preservation.  
Participants share that they would not report unethical conduct when it was bad for 
their friends or bad for themselves.  I now explore these two themes in-depth. 
A peer-oriented culture is by far the number one theme that emerges when I 
ask participants about the informal culture of their organization.  This speaks to 
individuals’ desires to place their concern for peers above that for their organizations.  
Alison clearly made this point when discussing barriers to reporting unethical 
conduct: 
It's so hard because they, the culture here, like, I mean, from day one when 
you get here, you're kind of taught to bond together with your classmates, and 
watch out for them…And, that can come into a lot of conflict with having to 
uphold responsibility, and turn people in. Like, you feel like you're betraying 
them by turning them in because, you know, a lot of times we have to choose 
between being a [friend] and following the rules, I guess. 
 
Complementing Alison, Brett offered this insight as to why such extreme peer loyalty 
exists at his organization: 
Um, it’s kinda you live with them for four years, you can’t live off base, you 
go through basic training with them…So it’s kind of, you just develop bonds.  
And then when you see people breaking rules and stuff, you’re I think less 




and you don’t wanna deal with the consequences of that, like breaking a 
friendship over something, so. 
 
Andrea highlighted a mutual understanding between peers that, when witnessing 
unethical conduct, one could understand the stressors that may lead the individual to 
behave unethically.  As Andrea explained, this mutual understanding was also a 
detractor to reporting: 
There’s a mutual understanding and solidarity among students in general, 
where you can kind of see where this person is coming from, because you 
don’t know what their exam week was like. You don’t know a lot about their 
personal…life and everything like that, the pressures and tension that they 
have going on…So, you can understand from a point of, just mutual 
understanding of what it’s like to be in that situation, that it happens 
sometimes…So, it’s like, you don’t wanna, you would never wanna report 
something like that, because, something like that that is understandable and 
something that you know that you might be apt to do if you were in a similar 
situation. 
 
Benjamin pointed out that interpersonal relations affect whether an individual 
is reported for unethical conduct.  Particularly, one’s reputation as a hard worker 
could be a barrier to reporting:   
It’s actually kinda funny. I think it’s more based on if you like that person or 
not….Yeah, I think the guy that got the DUI and then flipped it under the rug, 
everybody liked him, and so he never burned any bridges. He was one of the 
guys. He can do his job, so you didn’t really care. 
 
Bob agreed with this outlook, saying that sometimes loyalty is given to friends over 
the organization, and he went on to say that it is hypothetically “much easier” to 
report the misbehavior of a stranger or someone you “don’t like.” 
 The second major theme that emerges as to why individuals do not report 
unethical conduct is self-interest.  When asked about potential consequences for 




outcomes as the main consequence.  Bill made this point as he talked about various 
degrees of unethical conduct: 
With regard to cheating and plagiarism, I think that would go somewhere in 
the middle.  I think people still has moral obligations to report that sorta thing, 
but they don’t really wanna get involved in it because I feel like it’s the same 
reason with drinking, where you’d be like, “Oh, you don’t wanna be a snitch. 
You don’t wanna be that guy who tells the teacher that this guy just copied his 
homework online.” 
 
Alison shared a similar insight, although for a more serious type of unethical conduct: 
Um, I would say, ah, like as far assault goes, I would say people still don't 
want to report, for the most part…Um, but there's, they're mostly, I think the 
biggest thing, well, really the only thing they're afraid of is, um, like, peer 
opinions.  So, like, if anyone reports an assault, they're kind of still seen as 
like a trouble-maker. 
 
Another consideration is not wanting to self-incriminate, as Brett pointed out 
when discussing types of unethical conduct that go unreported: 
 I’d say most [members of my organization] would not report underage 
drinking, ‘cause that, ‘cause they’re, if they’re gonna report it, they normally 
have some sort of involvement in it anyways, so it’s kind of…They’d get in 
trouble themselves. 
 
Brad agreed with this at a similar point in his interview, saying, “I feel like acting out 
of self-interest, if there's something that they reported but somehow affect themselves 
I doubt they would report it.” 
 Related to self-incrimination, some participants felt that by not reporting more 
senior individuals were protecting their image.  Bob had this insight: 
[T]here’s a lot of people in, like, very public, forward positons…And they 
have a lot of people looking up to them and they, they, I feel like they care a 
lot about their image.  So if they feel like anything could look bad on their 
image or, you know, they could be viewed as um, you know, you know, 
negatively because of the event of them reporting something then they would 





Junior individuals appear concerned with the ability of their supervisor to 
negatively impact their work environment, which could in turn become detrimental to 
their ability to advance in the organization (e.g. if their access to preferable 
assignments was limited, future performance evaluations could suffer).  Brockton had 
this to say: 
I mean fear of reprisal’s always going to be one of the factors that’s going to 
hinder people from reporting things. 
 
Direct official retaliation, such as outright lower scores on a performance evaluation, 
is rarely identified although positive official recognition for reporting unethical 
conduct is mentioned at most interview sites. 
Individual and Organizational Factors Revisited 
In the previous chapter, I present secondary data analyses of factors related to 
the reporting of unethical conduct.  These analyses indicate that supervisory status, 
leader misconduct, perceive organizational support for anonymous reporting and 
individual importance placed on anonymity are all significantly related to the 
reporting of unethical conduct.  These factors also emerge as themes in my 
interviews.  Exploring these themes could illuminate the mechanisms by which each 
factor is related to the reporting of unethical conduct. 
The theme of supervisory status emerges at multiple interview sites, in all 
cases supporting my analyses of the 2010 MPS data where supervisory status is 
related to increased reporting of unethical conduct.  When asked what types of 
unethical conduct are reported at his organization, Bob had this to say: 
Um, I think when it, when someone uh, of power or authority like sees, sees 





While discussing what made an individual more likely to report unethical conduct, 
Brian shared similar sentiments in thinking that a teacher’s assistant would be more 
likely to report observed cheating, and Andrea thought that a resident assistant in a 
dormitory would be more likely to report underage drinking. 
 Related to supervisory status are sentiments of longevity or age.  Bruce had 
this to say about individuals who were more likely to report unethical conduct: 
I would say the more senior personnel, it was easier for them to go ahead and 
put that out there.  Since they’ve been involved with the [organization], they 
know how the [organization] works, versus a junior [individual] that just got 
in and they're not sure exactly how things work. 
 
and Brandon felt that being with his organization for so long increased his knowledge 
of the rules, making infractions easier to report.  Benjamin thought that reporting was 
related to experience that comes with increased age: 
[J]ust maturing and knowing what is right and wrong, or not being afraid of, 
“Well, hey, I’ve been in long enough now. I will speak up. I’m not timid. I’m 
not afraid of the senior [individual] that’s gonna blast my face off if I tell him, 
‘Hey, your program’s screwed up.’” 
 
He went on to share that he had joined his organization at a higher-than-normal age 
after working in another field and felt that this experience made it easier for him to 
speak up if he saw something that was not right. 
Leader misconduct is another theme that emerges in my interviews, again 
supporting my analyses of the 2010 MPS data where observed leader misconduct is 
related to increased reporting of unethical conduct.  Bruce identified leader hypocrisy 
when discussing types of unethical conduct more likely to be reported.  After sharing 
a fraternization story involving senior individuals, he had this to say when asked if it 




Right, correct. They should be setting the example, leading my example. I was 
witness to that. To where you would have one person stand up and preach just 
like not drinking and driving…and then you have the junior [individuals] 
seeing you do the same stuff you just talked about not doing.  That doesn’t 
really set a good example as you being a leader. 
 
Organizational support for anonymous reporting is a third theme that appears 
at one interview site in particular.  As in my secondary data analyses, participants felt 
that their organization’s support for anonymous reporting made it more likely that 
unethical conduct would be reported.  Bruce identified an organization-wide survey in 
particular as increasing his confidence in reporting: 
We just had a [climate survey] for the command on how are things ran, how’s 
the atmosphere, everything like that…and it’s supposed to be 
confidential…And that goes directly to the [leader of our organization].  He 
reviews everything and that’s kind of everybody’s way out of saying this is 
what I've been seeing going on in the [organization], this is what I’m not 
comfortable with. 
 
and Benjamin pointed out another mechanism by which anonymous reporting could 
occur: 
Obviously, every command has an [anonymous] box, which means you can 
write a note, say, “Hey, I saw this. This was wrong.” and then just put a note 
and leave it anonymous.  Then, the [leader of the organization] reads it 
because he’s the one that has the key to the box, and then he can go forward 
with that. 
 
In addition to organizational support for anonymous reporting, the theme of 
individual importance placed on anonymity emerges.  Supporting my secondary data 
analyses, participants who identified anonymity as important said they would be more 
likely to report unethical conduct when they can remain anonymous.  This theme is 
particularly strong at one organization, as Bill shared:   
I would say that I would report these misconducts only if it’s anonymous, my 





Bill went on to say that he would shy away from informally confronting a wrong-doer 
as this would compromise his anonymity.  Brian said that some level of personal 
protection is important to him if he were to report unethical conduct, ensuring that 
individuals he might report on are not aware of who was making the report.  While 
not directly mentioning anonymity, Andrea identified concepts related to it when 
discussing possible reporting: 
[A]t [my organization], we actually have a very large student body. And 
having that clout of number behind you, you know, it’s easier to 
amass…support to kind of oppose that kind of injustice, than it would be at, 
say, a smaller institution, where there’s less student body and just, you feel 
less comfortable rocking the boat…and also the fact that…we’re very distance 
from the leadership to that point…versus at a smaller university or institution 
in general…[where] you’re a lot more likely to interact with those people and 
build a different kind of relationship, where you’re scared to cross them more 
so. 
 
The power of anonymity is exemplified by the social media application Yik 
Yak, which allows users to have an anonymous conversation with those in the same 
geographic area.  Bob identified this forum as an excellent source of “unvarnished 
opinion”: 
But if you went on the app you could, I mean, the truth is there.  I mean, what, 
what the problems are.  And people will vent their problems anonymously on 
this app…it’s right there…you know, if the administration really wanted to, 
they could just go into this app and, and see what people’s common opinions 
are and, you know, because it’s anonymous…Whereas with reporting, I mean, 
your name and your face is attached to that situation if you do something. 
 
Although technically not an avenue of officially reporting unethical conduct, the 
benefit of anonymity it provides is clear as compared to reporting with attribution. 
New Themes Identified 
 In addition to illuminating mechanisms underlying factors identified in my 




preference and severity of observed misconduct as related to the reporting of 
unethical conduct.  In summary, participants said they would be less likely to report 
on members of their own groups, and as the severity of the observed misconduct 
increased that they would be more likely to report the behavior.  I next cover these 
two themes in detail. 
 In considering the peer-oriented culture across interview sites, discussions 
surrounding the reporting of unethical conduct clearly indicate this is a factor that 
prevents such reporting.  In Brandon’s case, he defined the in-group by relative 
seniority: 
So when it comes to the lower enlisted, like when I say lower enlisted, that's 
E4 and below…we have a certain bond and we don't tell on each other unless 
it becomes dangerous…we're not in the business of putting each other in 
situations that could cost each other our careers. 
 
Bruce discussed similar feelings when asked why he thought individuals were not 
reported for falsifying job qualifications they received: 
From what I've seen, I think it’s more of a buddy thing. You get in with a 
crew, or a couple people that you're comfortable with, and they say hey man I 
need this qualification, I need this signature. I’m good, don’t worry about it 
type of thing…And you know it’s not the right thing to do. 
 
Andrea also spoke about a subgroup at her organization and how being in this group 
discourages reporting: 
I think that, for instance, in Greek life, this is kind of all pretty much well 
known, but, there’s definitely an incentive, like a loyalty incentive, not to 
report things like hazing and things like that. 
 
 There is one interview site in particular where participants’ loyalty to their 
peers over the organization is a very clear theme.  Bob had this to say about underage 




I have friends who underage drink all the time, I'm not going to turn them in.  
I'm not ever going to do that, you know. 
 
Peer loyalty at this interview site endures against one of the most severe examples of 
unethical conduct encountered during my interviews; sexual assault.  When asked 
why a peer did not initially report a case of sexual assault, Alicia shared this story 
about a situation that was occurring in her workgroup at the time of the interview: 
Um, I think, well, first of all, I mean, probably some shame and 
embarrassment, but most of all he knows that with his report, this uh, 
[perpetrator] will now be kicked out of the academy.  And no one wants to 
ruin someone’s career. 
 
This is the same perpetrator who Alicia had spoken of earlier that touched her friend 
in an unwanted manner, and the perpetrator also had a third sexual assault incident 
widely known of at the interview site.  The fact that this most recent infraction was 
initially allowed to go unreported for the sake of protecting the perpetrator’s career 
makes a strong case for peer loyalty.36 
As seen in Alicia’s story, related to peer loyalty is not wanting peers to be 
involuntarily separated from the organization.  This surfaced in multiple interviews at 
her organization, including this one with Alison: 
Um, I mean, there's, I think people, it depends, like, a lot on how good of a 
friend you are with the person. Because the closer you are with the person 
who you know broke the rules, the less you want to turn them in…Because 
you care about them, and you know what it's going to mean.  Ah, a lot of the 
times, especially when you get into the more serious things that could get 
them kicked out, like fraternization. 
 
Andrea was hesitant to report observed cheating if the wrong-doer was a senior, given 
the possible threat of separation from the organization:   
                                                 
36 Ultimately, Alicia and others convinced the victim of the latest incident that it needed to be reported, 





It’s not worth ruining that person’s life to report them to the Academic Board 
of Integrity and things like that, to get them kicked out of school, or to, I 
mean, especially if they’re a senior or something.  This girl was a senior.  
Having her get so close to graduation and then have all that money just go 
down the drain and ripped away from her, just for checking her cell phone to 
remember a few things during the exam. 
 
The theme of protecting peers from possible separation, a consequence which 
occurs only for more serious misconduct, is an example of the unwillingness of 
participants to report unethical conduct when the punishment is viewed as too severe.  
This theme surfaced at all interview sites.  Bob shared a story of unethical conduct he 
was aware of: 
I mean, I, I at least know of two or three specific examples where I have 
friends, um, who have upperclassmen relationships and I haven’t turned them 
in.  Um, simply because I just don’t want to ruin their lives, uh, over 
something like that, you know.  I mean, they made a dumb decision, but I 
don't think it’s worth maybe necessarily the, the punishment that would come 
along with it. 
 
Benjamin had similar feelings about fraternization at his organization, not wanting to 
“screw over somebody’s career.” 
Concerning severity, a second theme that emerges related to the reporting of 
unethical conduct is the severity of the observed misconduct.  Participants at all 
interview sites indicated their willingness to report unethical conduct when it became 
severe enough.  The definition of what is severe enough varied from participant to 
participant, however.  Buster expressed the difference in terms of harm to others: 
Now if it’s a situation where someone is going to hurt themselves, you put 
that in the system. So they can get the help they need. That’s how they get the 
help they need. 
 
Sharing a similar sentiment when asked at what point he would report excessive 




was in jeopardy or in danger.”  Bill felt that seeing someone bullied or in danger of 
alcohol poisoning would push him to formally report the behavior, while Bob’s 
conception of severity centered around violence.   
 Another way in which severity is expressed is in relative degrees of behavior.  
In a discussion of whether or not he would report cheating in an academic 
environment, Bill had this to say:   
For example, plagiarism and cheating, I wouldn’t [report] it if, I feel like I’d 
only do it if I see this personal do it multiple times, and they’re getting other 
people to cheat, and it’s expanding from themselves…If they just cheated on 
[one] quiz, I feel that it’s not worth to report, but if they cheated on the final 
exam, or the MCATs, or something like that, it has bigger repercussions. I feel 
that duty to report that action. 
 
A key point Bill mentioned when considering more serious cheating was the 
repetition of the behavior; this form of severity came up at all interview sites.  In a 
discussion about reporting unethical conduct, Buster identified repetitive behavior in 
his calculus for reporting excessive drinking: 
If there’s no, if all the person is, is exceptionally drunk, and it’s not a pattern, 
a destructive, habit pattern, you know maybe, it happens once at a big party 
and they go home…You know, that’s it, no one says anything. 
 
Brandon also made this point about repetitive behavior:  
Now if someone makes the mistake of doing something that we find out later, 
they drank and drove after, and we find out after the fact, I’m not going to go 
tell on them.  But if it becomes a pattern and even if you've gotten away with 
it two or three times, I would be urged to say something, only because I care 
about your safety. 
 
It is interesting to note that consideration for the offender’s safety also played into 





Is Trust in Leaders Related to the Reporting of Unethical Conduct? 
In addition to exploring mechanisms underlying previously-identified factors 
related to the reporting of unethical conduct, I seek to determine whether trust in 
leaders is related to the reporting of unethical conduct.  Brandon expressed how 
leader misconduct, a previously-identified factor, results in loss of trust in leadership; 
in this case trust that is not easily regained: 
I had a [senior leader] that had an affair with one of his [followers]…[a]nd she 
ended up being pregnant.  And she got kicked out of the military, but he being 
a [senior leader], and they have their own little mafia, they look out for each 
other and it got swept under the rug for him.  He's still in the military; he 
should have been kicked out first.  But I can't trust [him] because he's crossed 
a boundary that's unforgivable. 
 
Brandon went on to say that, in the case where such a conscious decision has been 
made, there is no way he could ever trust the senior leader again. 
Still unanswered is whether such a loss of trust is related to the reporting of 
unethical conduct.  When asked, participants expressed two conflicting themes.  The 
first emerges at all military interview sites; with some caveats, participants would 
report unethical conduct to an untrusted leader if this was the only option available.  
Buster had this to say about his decision to report: 
If it’s something that I felt, you know, strong enough to report to anyone, I 
would still report it to that person. 
 
For Buster, feeling “strong enough” about the observed misconduct would lead him 
to report it.  Brockton expressed a similar sentiment, identifying the severity of the 
observed misconduct as a factor: 
I mean it would depend on, yeah it would depend on the situation that I had to 
report, whether or not I would go to this person that I obviously don’t trust as 




the spectrum…then I would most likely report that to that leader regardless of 
how much I trust them. 
 
Other participants felt they would have no problem reporting to an untrusted 
leader regardless of the situation.  For Bo, it was about getting it off his chest: 
I would still trust them, in order for me to report.  Just to basically, like, get it 
off my chest…and put it in someone else’s perspective…and [get it] up 
higher. 
 
For Ashley, reporting work-related misconduct about someone other than herself 
made her confident she could go to her leadership regardless of her trust in them.  
Bruce echoed this feeling about reporting work-related misconduct to an untrusted 
leader: 
Work-wise I don’t have a problem with [reporting] because work is work, and 
I do still have to report up, and they have a job to do. If I do report something 
up to one person, and they don’t take action then I’ll go to the next person. 
 
Brad’s comfort in reporting to an untrusted leader was grounded in perceived support 
by his organization: 
Um, I mean, I feel like here especially, like, with the military background and 
everything that's going on…I think I could report something like [stealing] to 
pretty much anyone and be treated, be treated well. 
 
Whether participants felt comfortable outright or with some qualification such as the 
severity of the behavior, the theme of reporting to an untrusted leader is present at all 
military interview sites. 
A second theme running counter to this, expressed more often and across all 
interview sites including the civilian university, is the preference of reporting to a 
trusted leader.  When asked about reporting unethical conduct to leadership most 
participants began by expressing this theme; only a subset then go on to say they 




the preference for a trusted leader are reasons why participants say they prefer this 
reporting option.  Many identified having a good relationship with the leader as a 
reason.  When asked why he would prefer a trusted leader, Brockton had this to say:  
Maybe I’m just in a better, um, relationship with that person. Like, like what 
we were saying with the, uh, maybe somebody I’m deployed with and I’m 
closer too.  
 
Bob added that how much leaders care about their followers has an impact:  
I know…friends who are in other [units] who just, you know, they say [their 
leaders] are, you know…total dirt bags…they’re not good people. Or…they 
don't care about them…And if they feel like that someone’s not there for 
them, then they’re going to, it’s going to be very hard for them to come 
forward and say something. 
 
Brian thought having an established relationship is a reason why individuals would 
rather report to a trusted leader, but for him the relationship is about personally liking 
the leader: 
Definitely, because if a student likes a teacher, you know, and enjoys a 
teacher’s class, they’re gonna be more likely to look out for the interest of the 
teacher…so you know, the relationship is there. Where, you know, they can 
let the teacher know, hey, you know, professor, I kind of saw Johnny or 
whoever over there doing blah, blah, blah.  You might want to keep an eye on 
that. 
 
Bill stated that he would be uncomfortable reporting to a leader who he did not have a 
personal connection with.  Related to this, he felt that having a personal connection 
allows him to judge whether the leader would “do the right thing” if given a report. 
Perception of how a leader would handle a report is identified multiple times 
as a reason why participants prefer reporting to a trusted leader.  Brett expressed this 
as a function of protecting his reputation should he decide to report something: 
Um, so I think…it’s because, yeah, this is something that’s gonna probably 
cause personal ordeal with your social relationships and stuff. So, if you’re, 




reveal more about his reporting it than necessary…and that they’ll do the right 
thing with that information, you’re a lot more likely to report that. 
 
For Brandon, having a leader who prioritizes followers when learning of unethical 
conduct is the determining factor: 
I just feel like in certain situations if the leader has shown a pattern of looking 
out for themselves…they won't look out for those [individuals’] best 
interests…And I would want to take it to a leader who truly and genuinely 
cares about the welfare of the [individual]. 
 
Brandon went on to say that he supports a leader correcting unethical conduct with an 
appropriate response, but not one that destroys morale or individuals’ careers.  
For Benjamin, the decision to report is based on the belief that the leader 
would actually do something about the reported behavior: 
I think it depends on the leader for me.  If I know if I report something to 
them and they’re actually gonna do something about it, whether it’s a 
maintenance-related issue or personnel are having issues, if they’re more 
likely it do something with it, then yeah, I’d go to that person because I know 
he’s gonna handle it, but if I know they’re not, then I’ll be like, “Why am a 
gonna spin my wheels? It’s just wasted effort.” 
 
Related to taking action is confidence that the leader would take reported unethical 
conduct seriously in the first place.  Buster expressed this as a concern when 
expanding upon hypothetical reporting to a leader he had an established relationship 
with, feeling that the unknown of a less-trusted leader would weigh on his decision.  
Alison had this to say about a particular type of unethical conduct where personal 
accounts often differ: 
I think if you feel that your leaders will believe you…that they won't tolerate 
people treating you badly for it, then maybe there would be more 
reporting…especially with sexual assault…just because if you think your 
leaders are the type of people that just think everyone lies about it, then you 





Alison added that respecting a reporter’s privacy is also a factor that makes it more 
likely an individual would report unethical conduct to a leader, complementing 
Brett’s insight earlier on the manner in which a leader handles a report. 
Discussion 
 In my analyses of the 2010 MPS data, only 9.9 percent of respondents report 
observing “illegal or wasteful” activities.  In my interviews, almost every participant 
is able to provide an instance of unethical conduct after being prompted with only a 
definition of such behavior consistent with whistle-blowing literature.  Further 
probing resulted in rich data on observed unethical conduct ranging from themes of 
degrading humor and alcohol-related incidents to sexual harassment and in some 
cases sexual assault.  Minor themes of fraternization, false accountability and lying or 
cheating also emerge.  Although working with a small sample size, I assume this is a 
strong foundation from which to explore factors related to the reporting of such 
conduct. 
 My interviews address a previously unexplored relationship; whether trust in 
leaders is related to the reporting of unethical conduct.  Participants overwhelmingly 
felt that it was.  For a variety of reasons, a trusted leader is preferred when reporting 
unethical conduct.  These reasons include having an established relationship with a 
leader based on shared time together or friendship, having a leader who cares about 
followers or puts the welfare of followers before his or her own, having a leader who 
takes reported misconduct seriously, and having a leader who takes the appropriate 
action following a report.  Depending on the type of unethical conduct, the 




for preferring a trusted leader are identified in the whistle-blowing literature (Near 
and Miceli 2016) as related to the reporting of unethical conduct, and all are 
important for leaders to note in maximizing the chances that members of their 
organization will report observed unethical conduct. 
When presented with only an untrusted leader as a reporting option a 
significant number of participants (particularly from military interview sites) indicate 
they would still report unethical conduct.  This decision to report to an untrusted 
leader is in some cases moderated by the severity of observed misconduct; in other 
cases, no such moderation is mentioned.  As well, a known factor related to the 
reporting of unethical conduct (e.g. leader misconduct) is identified as related to trust 
in leaders.  Such relationships could preclude a focal relationship between trust in 
leaders and the reporting of unethical conduct. 
 In discussing reasons why unethical conduct may be reported, participants 
provide support for some of the factors previously identified in my secondary data 
analyses; supervisory status, leader misconduct, perceive organizational support for 
anonymous reporting and individual importance placed on anonymity.  One 
organization in particular had multiple methods for reporting unethical conduct 
anonymously, and participants from this organization identify the benefits of these 
reporting avenues.  Another outlet, the social media platform Yik Yak, provides 
further evidence that an anonymous reporting channel may yield increased reporting.  
While not an official avenue of reporting, multiple participants said that I could get an 





Participants identify two major contributors to why unethical conduct may go 
unreported; a peer-oriented culture and self-preservation.  Self-preservation is 
supported by the identified desire for leaders to use discretion as appropriate when 
addressing reported misconduct.  A peer-oriented culture could explain a new theme 
that emerges related to the reporting of unethical conduct, a consideration for in-
group preference when deciding whether to report or not.  What determines this in-
group preference is not consistent across participants, with explanations including 
similar entry times at an organization, rank and friendship.  Identifying how group 
boundaries are drawn in an organization may be a key contributor to predicting 
whether observed unethical conduct is reported or not. 
As well, the type of punishment an organization assigns for reported unethical 
conduct could play a factor in such reporting.  Contributing to an in-group preference, 
some participants are unwilling to report a group member if the punishment is viewed 
as too severe.  This is particularly true when punishment equates to separation from 
the organization.  Educating organization members on the rationale behind assigned 
punishments, or possibly reducing the severity of the punishment for non-critical 
misconduct, could assist in getting individuals to report unethical conduct. 
The range of unethical conduct observed in these data is related to a second 
new theme that emerges related to the reporting of unethical conduct; the severity of 
observed misconduct.  As highlighted above, this severity may moderate the 
relationship between trust in leaders and the reporting of unethical conduct.  Severity 
may also moderate the relationship between reporting and the in-group preference 




members of their group.  Some participants indicate they would report an in-group 
member, however, if a line of severity was crossed.  This line is expressed in different 
ways, such as repetitive behavior, behavior that put the safety of group members at 
risk, or behavior that was harmful to self or others.  Which behaviors cross that 
severity line are not constant across participants, and may vary based on individual 
and organizational influences.  It is possible that, for some individuals, a peer-
oriented culture blurs the severity line enough to allow in-group members to engage 
in unethical conduct that is ultimately harmful to themselves and others. 
Limitations and Future Direction 
One limitation of my qualitative data is that it is only representative of the 
interview sites visited, and given that interview participants are not obtained via a 
random sample of organization members the generalizability of these data is further 
restricted.  Despite this, new themes of in-group preference and severity of observed 
misconduct are identified at all interview sites and merit consideration in my factorial 
vignette study.  A further review of the whistle-blowing literature may provide 
broader support for their relationship to the reporting outcome.  In addition, it is 
possible to construct variables representing these concepts from the 2010 MPS data.  I 




Chapter 8: Secondary Data Analyses of Interview Themes 
 
In the previous chapter, I identify the themes of in-group preference and 
severity of observed misconduct as related to the reporting of unethical conduct.  
Both themes emerge as having a direct relationship with reporting, and the severity 
theme may also moderate the relationship between reporting and both trust in leaders 
as well as in-group preference.  One limitation of my qualitative data is that it is only 
representative of the interview sites visited, and given the lack of a statistically 
representative sample the generalizability of these data is further restricted. 
To provide broader support for the relationship between reporting unethical 
conduct and the themes of in-group preference and severity of observed misconduct, I 
further review the social psychological and whistle-blowing literatures for evidence 
supporting these situational factors.  Recent whistle-blowing literature (Miceli et al. 
2012) supports the inclusion of situational measures when considering the whistle-
blowing outcome.  To test hypotheses that follow from this review, I construct 
variables representing the respective concepts from the 2010 MPS data and 
incorporate these variables into analyses from Chapter 5. 
Theory Development and Hypotheses 
Social psychological literature supports the construction of in-groups and out-
groups as a potential factor in group member behavior (Turner and Reynolds 2008).  
In-group preference does not necessarily imply a desire to harm out-group members, 
as studies indicate that individuals favoring in-group members can at the same time 
view out-group members neutrally or even favorably (Allport 1954; Brewer 1999; 




previous research showing that ethnic majorities (Griffiths and Nesdale 2006) and 
women (Rudman and Goodwin 2004) exhibit a stronger in-group preference.  My 
interview data support previous literature in that participants express an in-group 
preference (e.g. not reporting unethical conduct observed within the group) without 
seeking to harm out-group members.  While greater preference based on ethnicity or 
gender is not evident in my qualitative data, past research merits the inclusion of 
these demographics as control variables when considering in-group preference. 
H5: In-group preference is related to the reporting of unethical conduct, where 
individuals are less likely to report on members of their in-group. 
 
The whistle-blowing literature indicates an organization’s dependence on 
wrongdoing (as measured by the frequency, duration and severity of observed 
unethical conduct) is shown to influence whether it is reported or not (Miceli and 
Near 2002; Miethe and Rothschild 1994).  Two possibilities flow from this 
observation; the first is that an ingrained culture of unethical conduct deters reporting 
as observers consider it normative, and the second is that with more severe unethical 
conduct comes increased reporting as it crosses some subjective line of severity for 
observers.  My interview data seem to support the latter.  Recent whistle-blowing 
literature demonstrates that type and moral intensity of wrongdoing correlate with 
whistle-blowing intentions (Chen and Lai 2014; Near et al. 2004) and moderate the 
impact of leadership on whistle-blowing (Bhal and Dadhich 2011).  Related to the 
type of wrongdoing, its severity may also factor into the decision to report or not 
(Vadera et al. 2009). 






Data and Measures 
I use the same data as in my previous secondary data analyses, the 2010 MPS.  
A full description of these data is found in Chapter 4.  For analyses in this chapter I 
consider the subset of respondents who observed illegal or wasteful activities in the 
past 12 months (N=3,770), with a single outcome of whether the misconduct was 
reported or not (regardless of the reporting avenue).  I retain the individual, 
organizational and control variables used in analyses in Chapter 5, and additionally 
introduce situational variables that operationalize the location and severity of 
observed misconduct. 
For the location of observed misconduct, I consider a question asking 
respondents observing illegal or wasteful activities in the past 12 months, “Where did 
this activity originate? (Please mark ALL that apply.)”  Respondents are offered the 
following choices: (1) Your workgroup; (2) Outside your workgroup but within your 
agency; (3) Another Federal agency; (4) Contactor or vendor; and (5) Other.  I 
construct a dichotomous variable from these responses, where 0 = outside the 
workgroup (any answer except 1) and 1 = inside the workgroup (answer 1 by itself or 
in combination with other answers). 
For the severity of observed misconduct, I consider a question asking 
respondents observing illegal or wasteful activities in the past 12 months, “How 
frequently did this activity occur?” with the following possible answers: (1) Once or 




answer “Don’t know/Can’t judge” as missing data.  The remaining responses range 
from 1 to 3, and I treat them as ordinal data.37 
Analyses 
I use logit regression models for analyses in this chapter.  The logit regression 
model I use for analyses of the dependent variable is of the general form: 
 log(p/1-p) = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4, where p=P(Y=1) 
where log(p/1-p) is the outcome of interest, X1 is a set of demographic control 
variables, X2 is a set of individual variables, X3 is a set of organizational variables 
and X4 is a set of situational variables.  I present logit coefficients in all tables, while 
in written analyses I specify odds for ease of understanding.  The logit regression 
expressed in odds (Ω) is of the general form: 
Ω(X) = exp(β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4) 
with similar groupings of independent variables. 
After presenting descriptive statistics for variables operationalizing the 
location and severity of observed misconduct, I explore their relationship to the 
reporting of unethical conduct.  I first consider each variable’s focal relationship with 
the outcome of interest, and then present a more complete model.  As the starting 
point for this complete model I use the individual, organizational and control 
variables from Chapter 5, after which I introduce the two situational variables. 
                                                 
37 I also considered a second question asking respondents to quantify the severity of observed 





Table 8.1 presents descriptive statistics for the situational variables 
operationalizing the location and severity of observed misconduct. 
Table 8.1: Situational Variable Descriptive Statistics (Weighted) 
 
Situational Variables   
   Location (In-group) 48.1% 
 Mean Std.Dev. 
   Severity of Observed Misconduct (1-3) 2.4 0.7 
 
While the location variable depicts an even distribution between misconduct observed 
in- and out-group, the severity variable is skewed towards the value representing 
frequently observed illegal or wasteful activity. 
Table 8.2 presents a correlation matrix of situational variables with the 
dependent variable and with each other.  Both in-group location and severity are 
positively correlated with reporting unethical conduct.  As well, in-group location has 
a moderate, positive correlation with severity. 
Table 8.2: Correlation Matrix for Situational Variables with Reporting Outcome 
 
  Reported Location Severity 
Reported 1.00   
Location (In-group) 0.06* 1.00  
Severity 0.14* 0.14* 1.00 
Pairwise correlation using weighted data. *p<0.05 (α=0.05) 
 
Table 8.3 presents logit regression analyses for the outcome of reporting 
unethical conduct.  The full model is a replication of the full model from Table 5.4, 
and includes both individual and organizational variables in addition to controls.  
Before adding situational variables to this model, I individually consider their focal 










Control Variables     
   Hispanic Descent, Blacka, Othera, and Years of Education 
   included in both models (although not shown, results are 
   substantively similar for both models)  
Individual Variables   
   Supervisor Status 0.175 * 0.235 * 
 (0.082) (0.090) 
   Length of Federal Service -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
   Importance of Anonymity 0.116 * 0.128 * 
 (0.038) (0.042) 
Organizational Variables     
   Leader Satisfaction -0.020 0.030 
 (0.042) (0.047) 
   Leader Behavior -0.037 * -0.034 * 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
   Trust in Organization 0.089 0.102 
 (0.062) (0.069) 
   Support for Whistle-blowing 0.064 0.067 
 (0.054) (0.060) 
   Support for Anonymous Reporting 0.107 * 0.111 * 
 (0.044) (0.048) 
   Protection for Whistle-blowers 0.118 * 0.114 * 
 (0.044) (0.048) 
Situational Variables   
   Location (In-group) - 0.344 * 
 - (0.081) 
   Severity of Observed Misconduct - 0.326 * 
 - (0.052) 
Constant 0.066 -1.234 * 
 (0.430) (0.502) 
N 3,689 3,190 
-2LL 4,682.03 3,956.34 
BIC’ 216.055 171.252 
*p<0.05, Unstandardized coefficients, Standard errors in parentheses 
a: Reference Group: White 






tailed) and severity (z=6.48, α=0.05, two-tailed) of observed misconduct have a 
significant relationship with the reporting of unethical conduct after controlling for 
supervisory status and department/agency.  The expanded model considers these 
situational variables along with individual, organizational and control variables.  As 
both situational variables maintain their significant relationship to the reporting of 
unethical conduct after accounting for the other variables in the model, I present the 
results of the complete model. 
For individual variables, the results of the expanded model are substantively 
the same as the full model.  The relationship of supervisor status with reporting 
unethical conduct is significant (z=2.61, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, supervisors 
were 1.3 times as likely as non-supervisors to report unethical conduct after 
accounting for other variables in the model.  The relationship of the importance of 
anonymity with reporting unethical conduct is also significant (z=3.06, α=0.05, two-
tailed).  On average, a one-point increase on the importance of anonymity scale is 
related to a respondent being 1.1 times as likely to report unethical conduct after 
accounting for other variables in the model. 
For organizational variables, the results of the expanded model are 
substantively the same as the full model.  The relationship of perceived support for 
anonymous reporting with reporting unethical conduct is significant (z=2.31, α=0.05, 
two-tailed).  On average, a one-point increase on the perceived support for 
anonymous reporting scale is related to a respondent being 1.1 times as likely to 
report unethical conduct after accounting for other variables in the model.  The 




conduct is also significant (z=2.37, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, a one-point 
increase on the perceived protection for whistle-blowers scale is related to a 
respondent being 1.1 times as likely as to report unethical conduct after accounting 
for other variables in the model.  Although the relationship with leader behavior is 
significant, where more observed misconduct is related to increased reporting, there is 
no substantive change in odds for each additional negative behavior observed. 
The addition of the situational variables makes the expanded model the best 
fitting model (BIC’=171.252) of all considered in my analyses.  The relationship of 
location of observed misconduct with the reporting of such conduct is significant 
(z=4.24, α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, respondents are 1.4 times as likely to 
report misconduct observed in-group as compared to misconduct observed out-group 
after accounting for other variables in the model.  The relationship of severity of 
observed misconduct with the reporting of such conduct is also significant (z=6.26, 
α=0.05, two-tailed).  On average, a one-point increase on the severity of observed 
misconduct scale is related to a respondent being 1.4 times as likely as to report 
unethical conduct after accounting for other variables in the model. 
Discussion 
Analyses accounting for situational variables reveal similar relationships 
between the reporting of unethical conduct and both individual and organizational 
variables.  Supervisory status, greater individual important of anonymity, more 
observed leader misconduct, greater organizational support for anonymous reporting 




reporting.  Given their continued significance after accounting for the situational 
variables, these are all factors I plan to include in my factorial vignette study. 
H5 predicts that in-group preference is related to the reporting of unethical 
conduct, where individuals are less likely to report on members of their in-group.  
This hypothesis is based on the social psychological literature of group behavior and 
themes from my interview data.  Analyses of the 2010 MPS data disconfirm this 
hypothesis, as there is a significant, substantive relationship between increased 
reporting and misconduct observed in-group as compared to out-group.  One 
possibility for this relationship is that most misconduct was observed in-group, 
although Table 8.1 indicates a nearly even distribution of misconduct location.  
Another possible explanation is that the mechanisms underlying in-group preference 
are not the same as those that define workgroups for federal civilian employees.  For 
example, suppose friendship was the actual driver of in-group preference; if 
workgroups for federal civilian employees are not determined by friendship, then an 
in-group preference would not be present across workgroups.  As it stands, there is 
something about workgroups for federal civilian employees that makes the reporting 
of unethical conduct more likely when misconduct is observed within them versus 
without. 
H6 predicts that more severe unethical conduct is related to increased 
reporting of such misconduct.  This hypothesis is based on previous whistle-blowing 
literature and themes from my interview data.  Analyses of the 2010 MPS data 
confirm this hypothesis, indicating a significant, substantive relationship between 




emerges in my qualitative analyses as a possible moderator to the relationship of 
reporting with both trust in leaders and in-group preference.38 
My analyses in this chapter provide broader support for the inclusion of both 
location and severity of observed misconduct when considering the reporting of 
unethical conduct.  My qualitative analyses in Chapter 7 revealed these themes, but 
the nature of the data left some question as to their generalizability.  Supported by the 
social psychological and whistle-blowing literatures, analyses in this chapter using 
representative data of federal civilian employees evidence the importance of 
considering both factors.  In-group preference and severity of observed misconduct 
maintain their significant relationship with the reporting of unethical conduct after 
accounting for known significant factors including supervisory status, individual 
importance of anonymity, leader misconduct, perceived organizational support for 
anonymous reporting and perceived organizational protection for whistle-blowers.  
Accordingly, I plan to include both situational factors in my factorial vignette study. 
Revised General Model for Reporting Unethical Conduct 
Based on subsequent analyses of the 2010 MPS data guided by themes from 
my interviews, the model in Figure 8.1 is an expanded version of my previous model 
in Chapter 5; as before, only statistically significant relationships are shown.  After 
including variables representing the location and severity of observed misconduct, the 
previous relationships of supervisory status, individual importance of anonymity, 
leader misconduct, organization support for anonymous reporting and organizational 
                                                 





Figure 8.1: Revised 2010 MPS Whistle-blowing Relationships 
 
protection for whistleblowers with the reporting outcome remain valid.  In addition, 
the added situational variables are both significantly related to reporting.39 
Situationally, both the location and severity of observed misconduct are related to the 
reporting of unethical conduct.  Observed misconduct located in the workgroup is 
reported more than that located outside the workgroup, which is opposite the 
relationship that previous literature and my interview themes predict.  An outstanding 
question is what actually defines group membership when considering in-group 
preference from past research.  Finally, as seen in previous literature and my 
interview themes, more severe unethical conduct is related to increased reporting.  
Guided by these relationships, Figure 8.2 presents a revised general model for 
reporting unethical conduct.  This revised model, supported by previous literature and 
my analyses of 2010 MPS and interview data, highlights that individual, 
organizational and situational factors all contribute to the reporting decision. 
                                                 
39 Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, arrows represent assumed causal relationships that I will 
test in my factorial vignette study. 
Individual Factors
Supervisor Position (+)
Importance of Anonymity (+)
Organizational Factors
Leader Misbehavior (+)
Support for Anonymity (+)
Perceived Protection (+)
Situational Factors
In-group Location of Misconduct (+)
Severity of Misconduct (+)






Figure 8.2: Revised General Model for Reporting Unethical Conduct 
 
Limitations and Future Direction 
Analyses in this chapter provide further evidence for the inclusion of in-group 
preference and severity of observed misconduct in my factorial vignette study.  
However, the relationship between trust in leaders and the reporting of unethical 
conduct is still unclear.  Based on my interview data alone, it is unknown if trust in 
leaders has a unique relationship to the reporting of unethical conduct or if this 
possible relationship could be explained by other factors.  As identified in my 
interviews, I also need to account for the theme of self-preservation.  In the next two 
chapters, I present a factorial vignette study to test the focal relationship between trust 
in leaders and the reporting of unethical conduct while accounting for identified 
individual, organizational and situational factors. 
  
Organizational Policies (+)









Chapter 9: Vignette – Data and Methods 
 The decision to report unethical conduct is a social process simultaneously 
affected by numerous influences.  A factorial vignette study is well-suited to examine 
this type of research question involving social judgement (Rossi and Nock 1982).  In 
such a study, participants view a standardized vignette in which multiple factors are 
simultaneously manipulated in a predictable manner.  The entire vignette population 
represents all possible combinations of factors (Wallander 2009).  Participants are 
randomly assigned to view one or more vignette(s), a sample of the entire vignette 
population, allowing many manipulations to be incorporated in a single experiment 
(Jasso 2006). 
Based on my secondary data analyses, Figure 8.1 in the previous chapter 
summarizes relationships between reporting misconduct and various individual, 
organizational and situational factors.  I use these relationships as the foundation for 
my factorial vignette study.  As well, in my analyses of vignette data I control for 
self-reported participant demographics.40 
My qualitative analyses also identify the theme of self-preservation as related 
to the reporting of unethical conduct, and recent whistle-blowing literature supports 
the inclusion of personality (Miceli et al. 2012) and self-interest (Jones, Spraakman 
and Sanchez-Rodriguez 2014) measures when considering the whistle-blowing 
outcome.  I use two concepts to operationalize the self-preservation theme; 
orientation towards Machiavellianism and orientation towards prosocial behavior.  
                                                 
40 I gathered demographic information before participants were made aware of the selection criteria for 
participation in my factorial vignette study.  As such, there is no reason to believe that participants 




Previous research (Dalton and Radtke 2013; Stylianou et al. 2013) relates individuals 
who are higher in Machiavellianism to the decreased reporting of wrongdoing.  
Individuals who are higher in Machiavellianism consider primarily self-interest when 
making ethical decisions and use deception and manipulation to achieve their 
objectives. 
The sociological literature of altruism indicates that social forces such as 
norms and social networks affect prosocial behavior (Simpson and Willer 2015), and 
both the individual and the situation interact when considering the effect of prosocial 
behavior (Simpson and Willer 2008).  Previous whistle-blowing research (Dozier and 
Miceli 1985) categorizes whistle-blowing as a form prosocial behavior, classifying 
the act as a positive social behavior intended to benefit others (and potentially, but not 
necessarily, the whistle-blower). 
Table 9.1 presents a list of all factors I consider in my factorial vignette study 
as potentially related to the reporting of unethical conduct.41  I organize these factors 
in two categories; vignette and participant.  The vignette factors are those I vary in a 
controlled manner across vignettes, and include organizational and situational 
measures from Figure 8.1 in the previous chapter.  Additionally, to test the 
relationship between trust in leaders and the reporting of unethical conduct, I vary the 
level of trust in the individual to whom misconduct is reported.  Finally, I vary the 
position and gender of the perpetrator to further test the in-group preference theme 
and explore possible correlation with participant characteristics.  Participant factors in  
                                                 
41 In seeking a compromise between including all significant factors from Figure 8.1 and limiting the 
number of vignette factors, I choose to omit perceived protection for whistle-blowers but include two 




Table 9.1: Vignette and Participant Factors 
Vignette Factors  
   Trust in Leaders  
   Leader Behavior  
   Support for Anonymous Reporting  
   Severity of Observed Misconduct  
   Location of Observed Misconduct  
   Position of Perpetrator  
   Gender of Perpetrator  
Participant Factors  
   Gender  
   Race  
   Age  
   Level of Education  
   Supervisor Status  
   Importance of Anonymity  
   Machiavellianism  
   Prosocial Behavior  
 
Table 9.1 include individual measures from Figure 8.1 in the previous chapter, self-
preservation measures and demographic characteristics.  
Experimental Procedures 
I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a crowd-sourcing service 
adopted by social scientists to recruit research participants interested in completing 
short tasks.  MTurk produces more demographically diverse samples as compared to 
traditional university-based settings (Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis 2010; Horton, 
Rand and Zeckhauser 2011).  However, MTurk workers tend to be younger and of 
higher educational attainment than survey data representative of the United States 
population (Huff and Tingley 2015).  A recent estimate numbers MTurk workers at 
approximately 500,000 (Hitlin 2016), and MTurk data have proven to be of high 
quality based on manipulation checks, completion time, item nonresponse and lack of 




For my vignette, I used a variation of a workplace scenario that research on 
ethical judgements (Mudrack and Mason 2013) recommends as an exemplary 
whistle-blowing vignette.  Although recognized as superior to other vignettes in 
previous literature, Mudrack and Mason also identify shortcomings.  One 
shortcoming is that the consequences of the unethical conduct are not highlighted.  
Explicitly stating consequences assists the participant in distinguishing between two 
potential unethical decisions in a whistle-blowing vignette; the decision to commit 
some form of unethical conduct (the desired decision to be evaluated) and the 
decision to report the offender (this could be seen by some participants as unethical).  
In addition to explicitly stating consequences, I incorporated manipulation checks to 
ascertain whether the consequences I stated had the desired effect of focusing the 
participant on evaluating the unethical conduct and not the decision to report the 
offender. 
Another recognized shortcoming of whistle-blowing vignettes is the challenge 
of participants evaluating the vignette as if they were experiencing the scenario 
themselves.  Phrasing a vignette in the second-person and asking participants what 
they would do leaves some question as to their emersion in the scenario, especially in 
the case of participants who are less likely to report unethical conduct.  Instead, 
Mudrack and Mason recommend a third-person vignette with questions asking 
participants how likely they would be to take the same action as the protagonist.  I 
used this likelihood evaluation as my outcome of interest. 
My factorial vignette study occurred in two phases.  In the first phase, I 




participants’ views on individual and organizational factors related to the reporting of 
unethical conduct.  Participants also completed an instrument designed to measure 
their orientation towards Machiavellianism.  Upon completing the first phase, 
participants were informed they may be contacted for participation in the second 
phase of the study.  I then used first phase data to select respondents into the second 
phase of my factorial vignette study.  I selected only employed participants, as the 
unethical conduct vignette is a workplace scenario.42  I next selected participants by 
gender to ensure an equal number of men and women in my second phase, in which 
participants answered questions on five vignettes and completed an instrument 
designed to measure their orientation towards prosocial behavior.43  Selection by 
gender is meant to address one limitation of the 2010 MPS data, in which 
respondents’ gender is not recorded. 
Design and Participants 
As shown in Table 9.1, I varied seven factors in my factorial vignette study.  
Table 9.2 lists these factors along with their tested conditions.  Although each factor 
has two conditions, I did not use the supervisor/out-workgroup combination resulting 
in 96 possible vignette variations that participants could view.  With the exception of 
perpetrator gender, the alternate condition for each vignette factor predicts an increase 
in reporting as compared to the control condition.  See Appendix F for the full text of  
                                                 
42 In free text responses, some first phase participants who are currently retired (and thus unemployed) 
relayed that their past employment experience would make their input valuable in the vignette phase.  
While true, I had enough currently-employed participants in the first phase to meet my needs in the 
second phase.  I chose to use only currently-employed participants in the second phase as their 
connection to a workplace scenario is more salient in their lives at the time of study participation. 
43 I administered the prosocial behavior instrument in the second phase in order to prevent fatigue in 
the first phase.  Without the prosocial behavior instrument, the first phase contained an appropriate 




Table 9.2: Vignette Factor Conditions 
  Condition 
  Control Alternate 
Vignette Factor    
-Trust in Supervisor to Whom 
Unethical Conduct is Reported 
Low High 
-Misconduct by Supervisor to Whom 
Unethical Conduct is Reported 
Yes No 
-Organizational Support for 
Anonymous Reporting 
Low High 
-Severity of Observed Misconduct Less More 
-Location of Observed Misconduct In-workgroup Out-workgroup 
-Position of Perpetrator Coworker Supervisor 
-Gender of Perpetrator Woman Man 
Note: With the exception of Perpetrator Gender, the Alternate Condition 
corresponds to a predicted increase in reporting. 
 
the control version of my vignette, as well as the wording changes I used for each 
alternate condition. 
In the first phase (see Appendix G), a short advertisement on MTurk directed 
potential participants to a survey hosted by Qualtrics.  I restricted participants to 
MTurk workers in the United States44 who are at least 18 years old and had at least 
97% of their previous assignments in MTurk accepted.  Upon reading and agreeing to 
the consent form, participants were informed they would participate in a study on the 
reporting of unethical conduct, and were told that unethical conduct is defined as, 
“any action that is illegal, immoral, illegitimate or inconsistent with the values of an 
organization.”  This definition mirrors the description used in my interview protocol 
(see Appendix D), and in line with whistle-blowing literature (Near and Miceli 1985) 
is meant to specifically include immoral behavior under the umbrella of unethical 
                                                 




conduct.  I expanded the definition of unethical conduct as compared to the 2010 
MPS data, where respondents are only cued to consider illegal behavior. 
Participants then completed the survey in Qualtrics and were subsequently 
verified as authentic via a unique random code received upon survey completion and 
entered in MTurk.  Upon finishing, participants were debriefed on the type of 
information gathered and informed they may be contacted for the second phase of my 
study (but not what my selection criteria would be).  Participants who successfully 
completed the first phase, which on average took just under 7 minutes, were paid 
$1.00 for their participation.45  Due to the large number of available MTurk workers, 
data collection for the first phase took less than two hours.  1,175 workers began the 
first phase and 40 did not finish, resulting in a drop-out rate of 3.4%. 
I selected all currently-employed participants passing both first-phase 
attention check questions46 (N=927) for participation in the second phase of my 
factorial vignette study (see Appendix H).  In order to obtain an equal distribution of 
participants by gender, men and women were directed to separate but identical 
versions of my second phase survey in Qualtrics.47  Upon reading and agreeing to the 
consent form, participants were again presented with the definition of unethical 
conduct used in the first phase and informed they would view five vignettes.  
Participants were explicitly made aware that, although the vignettes may appear 
similar, no two are the same and they should carefully read each vignette. 
                                                 
45 For financial reasons, the target participation in my first phase was N=1,130 workers. 
46 My first phase survey incorporated two attention check questions that asked participants to record a 
specific answer.  N=15 participants failed one or both of these attention check questions; I dropped 
these participants from consideration for the second phase. 
47 To ensure approximately 30 responses for each vignette while staying within my research budget, 




Participants then randomly viewed five of the 96 vignettes.48  Random 
assignment was managed by the Qualtrics program, where I specified the number of 
vignettes each participant should view and that Qualtrics assign the vignettes evenly 
to ensure sufficient data across vignettes.49  For each vignette, participants answered 
five questions including manipulation checks and dependent variable measurement.  
After viewing the vignettes, participants completed the prosocial behavior instrument 
and were subsequently verified as authentic via a unique random code received upon 
survey completion and entered in MTurk.  Upon finishing, participants were informed 
of the selection criteria for the second phase and were debriefed on the variations 
used in the vignettes.  Participants who successfully completed the survey, which on 
average took just under 10 minutes, were paid $1.50 for their participation. 
Upon initiating my second phase, 328 workers completed the vignette study in 
the first four days; after which, responses all but ceased.  At this point, the response 
rate for the second phase was 35%.  As this did not provide sufficient power for 
analyses, I sent a follow-up e-mail to all eligible workers reminding them that the 
second phase was open.  Within a day of sending the e-mail I received sufficient 
responses and closed my second phase survey with a final response rate of 63%.  619 
workers began my second phase survey and 38 did not finish, resulting in a drop-out 
rate of 6.1%.  The number of responses for each vignette ranged between 28 and 33.50 
                                                 
48 Participants are limited to five vignettes in order to prevent fatigue in the second phase.  Ideally, 
participants would only view one vignette to simplify subsequent analyses (see the analyses section of 
this chapter for further discussion).  However, my research budget necessitates that participants view 
multiple vignettes to obtain sufficient power for analyses. 
49 By assigning the vignettes evenly, Qualtrics did not truly randomize vignette viewing.  For example, 
in a given round of 96 vignettes if a particular vignette was chosen first it could not be viewed again 
until the other 95 vignettes were randomly presented. 
50 This variation in response across vignettes is partially due to dropped data from incomplete surveys.  





For my dependent variable, I asked second phase participants the following 
question after each vignette viewed, “How likely would you be to take the same 
action as Sam in this vignette; that is, to report [the offender]?”  Possible answers to 
this question are: (1) Very unlikely; (2) Somewhat unlikely; (3) Neither likely nor 
unlikely; (4) Somewhat likely; and (5) Very likely.  I treat responses as ordinal data 
representing the participant’s likelihood to report unethical conduct. 
I separate independent variables in my factorial vignette study into two 
categories; vignette and participant.  I construct seven vignette variables representing 
the vignette factors from Table 9.2.  All variables are dichotomous; I code the control 
condition as a 0 and the alternate condition as a 1 for all seven variables. 
I construct my individual independent variables from first and second phase 
data.  In the first phase, I gathered data representing supervisory status, individual 
importance placed on anonymity and orientation towards Machiavellianism.  For 
supervisory status, I asked participants, “What is your current employment status?”  
Possible answers to this question are: (1) Not employed; (2) Currently not employed, 
but actively seeking employment; (3) Employed, but not in a position that has 
supervisory responsibilities or conducts performance appraisals on other employees; 
and (4) Employed in a position that has supervisory responsibilities or conducts 
performance appraisals on other employees.  I construct a dichotomous variable for 
supervisory status where participants answering (4) are coded as a 1 and participants 




For individual importance placed on anonymity, I repeated a question from 
the 2010 MPS instrument asking participants, “If you were to observe or have 
evidence of wrongdoing, how important would it be to you that you be able to report 
it without disclosing your identity?”  Possible answers to this question are: (1) Not 
important; (2) Somewhat important; (3) Important; and (4) Very important.  Of note, 
this question is asked hypothetically and not with respect to a particular vignette.  I 
treat responses as ordinal data. 
For orientation towards Machiavellianism, in the first phase I had participants 
complete the Mach-IV scale (Christie and Geis 1970) that previous literature (Dalton 
and Radtke 2013) uses to operationalize orientation towards Machiavellianism.  For a 
series of 20 questions (see Appendix G), I asked participants to, “read each statement 
carefully and then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
question.”  Responses range from 1 = Completely disagree to 7 = Completely agree, 
with 4 = Neutral.  Responses from 10 of the questions are reverse-coded, and I 
average the resulting 20 answers to construct an index representing orientation 
towards Machiavellianism (α=0.8492). 
In the second phase, I gathered data to construct a variable representing 
orientation towards prosocial behavior.  I had participants complete an instrument that 
previous research (Van Lange et al. 1997) uses to measure social value orientation.  I 
asked participants to make nine point-distribution decisions (see Appendix H for a 
complete description of the instrument).  Possible orientations the instrument 
measures include prosocial, individualistic and competitive.  Participants are 




representing that orientation.  I construct a dichotomous variable representing 
orientation towards prosocial behavior, where participants making six or more 
prosocial point distributions are coded as a 1 and all others are coded as a 0. 
For control variables, I gathered data in the first phase to construct variables 
representing gender, race, age and level of education.  For gender, I asked 
participants, “What is your gender?”  Possible responses to this question are male and 
female.  I construct a dichotomous variable representing gender where participants 
answering male are coded as a 1 and participants answering female are coded as a 0. 
For race, I asked participants, “What is your race/ethnicity?”  Possible 
responses to this question include: (1) Black or African American; (2) White or 
Caucasian; (3) Hispanic or Latino; (4) Asian; (5) American Indian or Alaska Native; 
and (6) Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.  These options are consistent with 
race categories on federal government surveys such as the 2010 MPS, with the 
exception of including the “Hispanic or Latino” option.51  I allowed respondents to 
choose all categories that apply.  Due to the large majority of my first phase 
respondents identifying solely as “White or Caucasian”, I construct a dichotomous 
variable representing race where participants answering only “White or Caucasian” 
are coded as a 1 and all other participants are coded as a 0. 
I construct an interval variable for age from a question asking participants, 
“What is your age?”  Possible responses range from 0-100.  For level of education, I 
asked respondents, “What is your highest education level?”  Possible responses to this 
question include: (1) Less than a high school diploma; (2) High school, equivalent 
                                                 




diploma, or GED; (3) Some college credits but no degree; (4) Associates’ college 
degree; (5) Bachelor’s college degree; (6) Master’s degree; (7) Professional degree 
(e.g. J.D., M.D., D.D.S.); and (8) Academic or scientific doctorate (Ph.D.).  I treat 
responses as ordinal data representing the participant’s level of education. 
Manipulation Checks 
 Of the seven vignette factors, I manipulated four via differing statements in 
each vignette (see Appendix F); these include the gender and position of the 
individual committing the unethical conduct, the location of such misconduct with 
respect to the workgroup, and any misbehavior by the supervisor to whom such 
misconduct is reported.  Given the factual nature of the statements in the vignettes, I 
assume the manipulations for these four factors are successful. 
 I manipulated the severity of observed misconduct by varying the type of 
office equipment being used at home.  The less severe vignettes feature office 
supplies, while the more severe vignettes feature a laptop and laser printer.52  For 
each vignette, I asked participants to, “assess the level of harm done…in using 
company property for personal use.”  Possible answers to this question are: (1) Very 
low; (2) Low; (3) Moderate; (4) High; and (5) Very high.  The average response 
across less severe vignettes is 2.36, while the average response across more severe 
vignettes is 2.91.53  I conclude that my severity manipulation is successful. 
I manipulated organizational support for anonymous reporting by varying the 
emphasis placed on the availability of an anonymous reporting channel.  In the 
                                                 
52 In both cases, I presented the same consequence of the protagonist knowing, “from personal 
experience that they are in high demand at the office and productivity is sometime reduced as 
coworkers wait for resources to become available.” 




alternate condition, I explicitly state the availability of a supported anonymous 
reporting channel, while I omit mentioning it in the control condition (as compared to 
explicitly stating such a reporting channel does not exist).  For each vignette, I asked 
participants, “To you personally, how important would anonymity be in your decision 
to report such behavior?”  Possible answers to this question are: (1) Not at all 
important; (2) Slightly important; (3) Somewhat important; (4) Very important; and 
(5) Extremely important.  The average response across control vignettes for this 
factor is 4.30, while the average response across vignettes in the alternate anonymity 
condition is 4.26.  In a free text response at the conclusion of the second phase, one 
participant had this to say about my manipulation, “The fact that Sam confronted the 
other person, then the VERY next day reported the items makes anonymity useless.  
Everyone would know it was Sam.”  This same participant offered a solution of 
letting some time elapse in the vignette before Sam reported the misconduct; I 
recommend enacting this solution in future studies using my vignette. 
 I manipulated trust in leadership by varying the level of trust in the supervisor 
to whom misconduct is reported.  In the alternate condition, I explicitly state that the 
supervisor to whom misconduct is reported is trusted based on previous interaction, 
while in the control condition I state this supervisor is new at the company (as 
compared to stating they are untrusted).  As I did not ask participants a question 
regarding their level of trust after viewing each vignette, I can only assume this 
manipulation is successful. 
One feature of all vignettes is the use of a gender-neutral name for the 




Samantha.  As I designed an equal distribution of participants by gender, I did not 
want the gender of the protagonist in the vignette to affect how likely participants 
were to report they would take the same action as Sam.  This manipulation was 
generally unsuccessful, as 91% of men and 89% of women reported thinking Sam 
was a man after viewing their five vignettes. 
 Finally, to gauge how participants rank the ethicality of both the decision to 
use company property and the decision to report this misconduct, I asked participants, 
“how ethical you feel each person’s chosen action was in the vignette.”  Possible 
answers to these questions are: (1) Very unethical; (2) Somewhat unethical; (3) 
Neither ethical or unethical; (4) Somewhat ethical; and (5) Very ethical.  The average 
response to the decision to use company property is 2.03, while the average response 
to the decision to report this misconduct is 4.18.54  I conclude that participants view 
the decision to use company property as the primary form of unethical conduct in the 
vignette. 
Analyses 
Although I treat my dependent variable as continuous, I am unable to use 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression modeling for analyses of these data.  My data 
collection methodology had participants each view multiple vignettes, resulting in 
data at two distinct levels.55  Responses are assumed to be consistent at the participant 
level, but not totally distinct; it is necessary to account for the relationship of both 
vignette and participant to the outcome of interest.  The primary driver of this 
                                                 
54 Two-sample difference of means statistically significant (two-tailed, α=0.05). 
55 For my analyses, the vignette level is considered level 1 and the participant level is considered level 




necessity is that, by having a single participant provide dependent variable data on 
multiple vignettes, the OLS assumption of independent cases with uncorrelated error 
terms is violated.  Vignette responses are not from a random sampling of unique 
individuals but rather nested within participants (Gideon 2012; Hox, Kreft and 
Hermkens 1991; Wallander 2009). 
I use multi-level modeling for analyses of my dependent variable.  My first 
model is a variance components model with fixed effects for all covariates; only the 
intercept is allowed to have random effects (u0j) among participants.  The first model 
is of the general form: 
Yij = β0ij + β1X1ij + β2X2j 
β0ij = β0 + u0j + ε0ij 
where the errors are assumed to be independent with distributions 
 u0j ≈ N(0,σ
2
u0)   and   ε0ij ≈ N(0,σ
2
ε0) 
The βs in the equation are fixed effects, where X1 is a set of vignette variables and X2 
is a set of participant variables.  σ2u0 and σ
2
ε0 are the two variance parameters to be 
estimated, where the former is attributed to the participant and the latter to the 
vignette.  Both the conditional distribution and marginal distribution of random 
effects are Gaussian (Grilli and Rampichini 2005). 
I extend this model by allowing the effect of a given vignette variable to vary 
randomly among participants.  The extended model is of the general form: 
Yij = β0ij + β1jX1ij + β2X2ij + β3X3j 
β0ij = β0 + u0j + ε0ij 




where X1 is the varying vignette variable, X2 a set of other vignette variables and X3 
is a set of participant variables.  In the extended model, a third variance parameter 
(σ2u1) is estimated for the varying vignette variable.  The random effects at the 
participant level (u0j and u1j) are assumed to follow a bivariate Normal distribution 
with zero mean and no covariance.  This model assumes homoscedastic residual 
variance at the vignette level (Grilli and Rampichini 2005; Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal 
and Pickles 2004; Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal and Pickles 2005). 
To begin, I compare responses to demographic and individual variables for 
those who participated in the second phase of my study versus those who did not.  
Observed differences lend context to my results, as I did not randomly select 
participants into the second phase of my study.  Next, I compare the relationship of 
vignette and participant variables to the outcome of interest with particular attention 
to trust in leaders.  Based on the results of this model, I fit an extended model 
allowing the effect of the most substantive vignette variable to vary randomly across 
participants (Steenbergen 2012) and compare the relative effect sizes of various 
factors (Selya et al. 2012).  While accounting for the nested nature of my data, my 
analyses reveal that both vignette and participant variables are related to the reporting 
of unethical conduct. 
In this chapter I describe the vignette and participant data and how I construct 
the variables I use in my analyses.  I also formulate my analyses plan.  In the next 
chapter, I present the results of these analyses and discuss their implication for my 




Chapter 10: Vignette – Results and Discussion 
 
Analyses of my vignette data provide further evidence that individual, 
organizational and situational factors are all related to the reporting of unethical 
conduct.  As conceptualized in my factorial vignette study, these factors are organized 
at the vignette and participant level.  At the vignette level, greater organizational 
support for anonymous reporting, more severe observed misconduct, misconduct 
located in the workgroup, and good conduct by the supervisor receiving the report are 
all related to increased reporting.  At the participant level, supervisory status, greater 
individual importance placed on anonymity and a lesser orientation towards 
Machiavellianism are all related to increased reporting.  I observe more substantive 
relationships for the severity of observed misconduct, supervisory status and 
orientation towards Machiavellianism.  Finally, for non-supervisors greater trust in 
leaders is related to increased reporting.  
To begin, I present the results of analyses of vignette data with particular 
attention to the vignette factor representing trust in leaders.  Based on these results, I 
examine the relative effect size for each significant factor.  A discussion of how the 
factors relate to the reporting of unethical conduct concludes the chapter. 
Results 
Table 10.1 presents descriptive statistics for my employed participants from 
the first phase differentiated by their participation in the second phase.  Given that I 
did not randomly select participants into the second phase of my study, it is important 
to compare the characteristics of those who participate in the second phase versus 




Table 10.1: Descriptive Statistics for Vignette Study Participants 
  Phase 2 Participation 
  Yes No 
N 581 346 
Control Measures      
   Gender (Man) 50.1% 59.8% 
   Race (White) 81.8% 79.5% 
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
   Age (18-80)a 38.0 11.3 35.0 9.7 
   Level of Education (1-8) 4.2 1.3 4.2 1.4 
Old Individual Variables      
   Supervisor Status 33.4% 42.2% 
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
   Importance of Anonymity (1-4) 3.1 0.9 3.1 0.9 
New Individual Variables      
   Machiavellianism (1-7)a 3.5 0.8 3.6 0.8 
   Prosocial Behavior 60.6% Not Measured 
a: Two-sample difference of means statistically significant (two-tailed, α=0.05) 
 
who did possess similar characteristics for the following variables: Race, Education, 
and Importance of Anonymity.  Their scores on the Machiavellianism index are 
nearly similar, as well, although the different is significant. 
The characteristics of the two groups differ for the following variables: 
Gender, Age and Supervisory Status.  These differences are partially explained by the 
characteristics of all first phase participants and the choices I made in selecting 
second phase participants.  When considering the total number of employed first 
phase participants (N=927), there are significantly more men than women and men 
are significantly more likely to be supervisors than women.  In choosing to force an 




percentage of men and decreased the percentage of supervisors for second phase 
participants as compared those who did not participate. 
As described in the analyses section of the previous chapter, I use multi-level 
modeling for analyses of my vignette data.  To begin, Figure 10.1 presents a random 
effects analysis of variance (ANOVA) on just the outcome of interest; the likelihood 
that the participant would take the same action as the protagonist in the vignette and 
report the unethical conduct.  This random effects ANOVA allows me to determine 
what portion of the variance in likelihood to report is due to participant differences 
(level 2) as compared to vignette differences (level 1).  The model has 2,905 
responses nested within N=581 participants. 
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Equating the ANOVA results to the equations from the previous chapter, β0ij 
is the grand mean outcome score across all vignettes and β0 is the mean outcome 
score for a participant across the five vignettes viewed.  The level 1 error term (ε0ij) 
represents the difference between a particular vignette outcome and a participant’s 
mean outcome score.  The level 2 error term (u0j) represents the difference between a 
participant’s mean outcome score and the grand mean.  The variance associated with 
these two error terms allows me to distinguish what portion is due to participant 
versus vignette differences. 
Analyses using Stata’s xtmixed command show a grand mean (β0ij) of 2.988, 
represented in Figure 10.1 by the blue line.  For participant mean outcomes, the same 
figure reveals variance from the grand mean.  This variance occurs at both the 
participant (σ2u0=1.246) and the vignette (σ
2
ε0=0.646) levels; 66% of the variance is 
attributable to differences across participants.  When compared to the null hypothesis 
that there is no cross-participant variation in outcome (e.g. an OLS regression model 
allowing only for vignette-level variation), a likelihood ratio test indicates the null 
hypothesis is rejected (chibar2(01)=1747.33, p=0.000) providing evidence of cross-
participant variation in outcome. 
Table 10.2 presents a random intercept model of the reporting outcome, 
having 2,905 responses nested within N=581 participants.  In this model, the intercept 
is allowed to vary across participants while the coefficients are fixed effects.  In the 
first model I include vignette-level factors, which are jointly significant (Wald 
chi2(7)=239.05, p=0.000).  Individually significant vignette factors include leader 











Vignette Factors (Level 1)       
   Trust in Leaders 0.051 - 0.052 † 
 (0.031) - (0.031) 
   Leader Behavior 0.165 * - 0.165 * 
 (0.031) - (0.031) 
   Support for Anonymous Reporting 0.102 * - 0.102 * 
 (0.031) - (0.032) 
   Severity of Observed Misconduct 0.424 * - 0.425 * 
 (0.032) - (0.032) 
   Location of Observed Misconduct 0.011 - 0.013 
 (0.038) - (0.038) 
   Position of Perpetrator -0.124 * - -0.122 * 
 (0.038) - (0.038) 
   Gender of Perpetrator 0.005 - 0.005 
 (0.031) - (0.031) 
Participant Factors (Level 2)    
   Gender (Man) - -0.044 -0.043 
 - (0.097) (0.096) 
   Race (White) - -0.018 -0.013 
 - (0.125) (0.124) 
   Age - -0.001 -0.001 
 - (0.004) (0.004) 
   Level of Education - 0.001 -0.003 
 - (0.036) (0.036) 
   Supervisor Status - 0.220 * 0.227 * 
 - (0.101) (0.101) 
   Importance of Anonymity - 0.088 0.101 † 
 - (0.053) (0.053) 
   Machiavellianism - -0.307 * -0.306 * 
 - (0.060) (0.059) 
   Prosocial Behavior - 0.058 0.071 
 - (0.100) (0.099) 
Constant 2.652 * 3.727 * 3.368 * 
 (0.064) (0.382) (0.383) 
σ2u0 1.249 * 1.163 * 1.163 * 
 (0.080) (0.076) (0.075) 
σ2ε0 0.587 * 0.646 * 0.587 * 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) 
-2LL 8,121.31 8,312.83 8083.58 




the position of the perpetrator.  Comparing the remaining variance in this model with 
that in the random effects ANOVA, the added vignette factors account for about 3% 
of the total variance in the likelihood to report outcome.56 
To account for variation in the intercept across participants, my second model 
introduces participant-level factors.  These factors are jointly significant (Wald 
chi2(8)=37.53, p=0.000), with individually significant participant factors including 
supervisor status and orientation towards Machiavellianism.  The addition of these 
participant factors reduces the variance associated with participants (σ2u0) to 1.163, 
indicating that these factors account for about 7% of the variance across participants. 
As my full model includes both vignette-level and participant-level factors 
that are significant, I interpret the fixed effects of this model.  Significant vignette and 
participant factors from the previous two models remain so in the full model57, after 
accounting for all other factors in the full model.  Compared to vignettes highlighting 
misconduct by the supervisor accepting a report, participants rate vignettes without 
such misconduct 0.17 points higher on the likelihood to report outcome.  Similar 
differences in the reporting outcome occur when comparing higher versus lower 
support for anonymous reporting (0.10 point increase), more severe versus less severe 
observed misconduct (0.43 point increase), and misconduct perpetrated by a 
supervisor versus a coworker (0.12 point decrease).  For participant factors, 
supervisors rate the likelihood to report outcome 0.23 points higher than non-
supervisors and a one point increase on the Machiavellianism index is related to a 
                                                 
56 I determine this percentage by calculating the reduction in the total variance (σ2u0+σ2ε0) of the 
random intercept model as compared to the random effects ANOVA. 




0.31 point decrease in the likelihood to report outcome.  Comparing the remaining 
variance in the full model with that in the random effects ANOVA, the vignette and 
participant factors together account for about 7.5% of the total variance in the 
likelihood to report outcome. 
The relationship of trust in leaders with the likelihood to report outcome 
merits further attention, as it is nearly significant in the full model.  In a reduced 
model of trust in leaders interacted with supervisor status, analyses reveal significant 
main effects; as well, these factors are jointly significant (Wald chi2(3)=7.96, 
p=0.047).  These relationships remain after accounting for all other factors in the full 
model, as seen in Table 10.3.  Compared to lower trust vignettes viewed by non-
supervisors, non-supervisors rated higher trust vignettes 0.09 points higher on the 
likelihood to report outcome.  This effect is non-substantive, accounting only for an 
additional 0.13% of the total variance in the likelihood to report outcome as compared 
to the full model. 
The relationship of individual importance of anonymity with the likelihood to 
report outcome is also nearly significant in the full model and merits further attention.  
In Table 10.4, I modify the full model to allow a slope effect for the vignette variable 
representing the severity of observed misconduct.  I do this to better model my data, 
as the severity of observed misconduct has the most substantive effect of all vignette 
factors in the full model.  In the random slope model, an additional variance 












Vignette Factors (Level 1)      
   Trust in Leaders 0.052 † 0.086 *  
 (0.031) (0.038)  
   Trust in Leaders x Sup. Status - -0.103  
 - (0.066)  
    
   Leader Behavior, Support for Anonymous Reporting, Severity of 
   Observed Misconduct, Location of Observed Misconduct, 
   Position of Perpetrator and Gender of Perpetrator included in both  
   models (although not shown, results are substantively similar to  
   the full model in Table 10.2) 
 
    
Participant Factors (Level 2)    
   Gender, Race, Age, Level of Education, Importance of  
   Anonymity, Machiavellianism and Prosocial Behavior  
   included in both models (although not shown, results are  
   substantively similar to the full model in Table 10.2)  
 
    
   Supervisor Status 0.227 * 0.278 *  
 (0.101) (0.106)  
Constant 3.368 * 3.356 *  
 (0.383) (0.383)  
σ2u0 1.163 * 1.160 *  
 (0.075) (0.074)  
σ2ε0 0.587 * 0.586 *  
 (0.017) (0.017)  
-2LL 8083.58 8081.17  
*p<0.05, †p<0.10, Unstandardized coefficients, Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 10.4 shows a sizable variance component (σ2u1=0.633) for the severity 
of observed misconduct along with a logical reduction in vignette-level variance 
(σ2ε0=0.429).  Additionally, in this random slope model the individual importance of 
anonymity is significant where a one point increase on the importance of anonymity 
scale is related to a 0.11 point increase in the likelihood to report outcome.  The 










Vignette Factors (Level 1)      
   Trust in Leaders 0.052 † 0.046  
 (0.031) (0.029)  
   Leader Behavior 0.165 * 0.167 *  
 (0.031) (0.029)  
   Support for Anonymous Reporting 0.102 * 0.110 *  
 (0.032) (0.029)  
   Severity of Observed Misconduct 0.425 * 0.418 *  
 (0.032) (0.044)  
   Location of Observed Misconduct 0.013 0.008  
 (0.038) (0.035)  
   Position of Perpetrator -0.122 * -0.126 *  
 (0.038) (0.035)  
   Gender of Perpetrator 0.005 0.001  
 (0.031) (0.029)  
Participant Factors (Level 2)    
   Gender, Race, Age and Level of Education included in both  
   models (although not shown, results from are substantively  
   similar to the full model in Table 10.2)  
 
    
   Supervisor Status 0.227 * 0.244 *  
 (0.101) (0.101)  
   Importance of Anonymity 0.101 † 0.109 *  
 (0.053) (0.053)  
   Machiavellianism -0.306 * -0.304 *  
 (0.059) (0.059)  
   Prosocial Behavior 0.071 0.061  
 (0.099) (0.099)  
Constant 3.368 * 3.372 *  
 (0.383) (0.381)  
σ2u0 1.163 * 1.160 *  
 (0.075) (0.074)  
σ2u1 (a: Severity)
 - 0.633 *  
 - (0.064)  
σ2ε0 0.587 * 0.429 *  
 (0.017) (0.014)  
-2LL 8083.58 7858.86  






 Finally, Table 10.5 presents relative effect sizes for significant factors in the 
full model.  Multi-level analyses do not allow for the computation of standardized 
coefficients for fixed effects.  Instead, I estimate effect size by calculating the 
Cohen’s f2 statistic for each factor (Selya et al. 2012).  Of all significant factors, the 
severity of observed misconduct has the largest effect.58   
Table 10.5: Relative Effect Size for Significant Factors 
 Full Model Cohen’s f
2  
Vignette Factors (Level 1)      
   Location of Observed Misconduct and Gender of Perpetrator  
   included but not shown (see Table 10.2) 
 
    
   Trust in Leaders 0.052 † 0.368  
 (0.031)   
   Leader Behavior 0.165 * 0.382  
 (0.031)   
   Support for Anonymous Reporting 0.102 * 0.372  
 (0.032)   
   Severity of Observed Misconduct 0.425 * 0.470  
 (0.032)   
   Position of Perpetrator -0.122 * 0.373  
 (0.038)   
Participant Factors (Level 2)    
   Gender, Race, Age, Level of Education and Prosocial Behavior  
   included but not shown (see Table 10.2) 
 
    
   Supervisor Status 0.227 * 0.366  
 (0.101)   
   Importance of Anonymity 0.101 † 0.366  
 (0.053)   
   Machiavellianism -0.306 * 0.366  
 (0.059)    
  
See Table 10.2 for Constant and Variance Components  
    
-2LL 8083.58   
*p<0.05, †p<0.10, Unstandardized coefficients, Standard errors in parentheses 
                                                 
58 The similar effect size for participant factors is possibly due to the random assignment design of my 





 The most substantive finding in my factorial vignette study is the effect that 
the severity of observed misconduct has on the reporting decision, where more severe 
misconduct is related to increased reporting.  Other substantive participant factors 
related to increased reporting include supervisory status and a lesser orientation 
towards Machiavellianism.  Although not as substantive, vignette factors including 
greater organizational support for anonymous reporting, misconduct located in the 
workgroup, and good conduct by the supervisor receiving the report are all related to 
increased reporting.  At the participant level, greater individual importance placed on 
anonymity is also related to increased reporting.  Concerning my research question, 
greater trust in leaders is related to increased reporting only for non-supervisors. 
I now discuss these findings in greater depth.  As depicted in Table 9.2, I 
designed my factorial vignette study so that the alternate condition for each vignette 
factor predicts an increase in likelihood to report as compared to the control 
condition.  The only exception is for the gender of the perpetrator in the vignette; 
based on the lack of gender information in the 2010 MPS data, I include this factor to 
explore its relationship with the reporting outcome and for possible interaction with 
participant gender. 
 In my full model, the vignette factors as a whole account for about 3% of the 
total variance in the likelihood to report outcome as compared the reduced random 
effects ANOVA.  Of these factors, good leader behavior, higher support for 
anonymous reporting and more severe observed misconduct have the predicted effect.  




0.10 and 0.43 points higher, respectively, on the likelihood to report outcome.  A 
fourth factor, position of the perpetrator, has an effect opposite that expected where 
participants rate vignettes with misconduct perpetrated by a supervisor 0.12 points 
lower than vignettes where the perpetrator was a coworker.  Rather than supporting 
the theme of in-group preference, the position factor supports the notion that fear of 
retaliation from an individual in power (e.g. a supervisor) may factor into the 
reporting decision. 
 The vignette factor representing trust in leaders has the predicted effect when 
considering only non-supervisors.  Compared to lower trust vignettes viewed by non-
supervisors, non-supervisors rate higher trust vignettes 0.09 points higher on the 
likelihood to report outcome.  While this effect is small, it does highlight the 
additional importance that trust plays for lower-status individuals when deciding 
whether or not to report unethical conduct. 
Other vignette factors are not related to the reporting outcome; these include 
the location of the observed misconduct and the gender of the perpetrator.  My 
rationale behind including the location was to test the in-group preference theme from 
my qualitative analyses.  In my vignettes, when the perpetrator was a coworker I vary 
whether he or she is a member of the protagonist’s workgroup or from another 
workgroup.  However, the discovery of the misconduct always occurs at the 
perpetrator’s house.  It is possible that my location manipulation is obscured by the 
constant setting for the discovery of the misconduct.  Another possibility is that, 
similar to my secondary data analyses, workgroup membership is not a determining 




The gender of the perpetrator also has no effect on the reporting outcome.  
This is also true when exploring the interaction between perpetrator gender and 
participant gender.  Participant gender, along with other demographic participant 
factors including race, age and level of education, have no effect on the reporting 
outcome. 
Other participant factors, including supervisor status and orientation towards 
Machiavellianism, did have the predicted effect on the reporting outcome.  
Supervisors rate the likelihood to report outcome 0.23 points higher than non-
supervisors and a one point increase on the Machiavellianism index is related to a 
0.31 point decrease in the likelihood to report outcome.  Additionally, my random 
slope model indicates that individual importance of anonymity has an effect on the 
reporting outcome where a one point increase on the importance of anonymity scale 
is related to a 0.11 point increase in the likelihood to report outcome.  The prosocial 
behavior factor did not have an effect on the reporting outcome. 
Of all the factors I consider in my factorial vignette study, the one with the 
largest effect on the reporting outcome is the severity of observed misconduct.  This 
is evidenced by a Cohen’s f2 statistic that is 23% greater than the next closest factor.  
Even after considering other vignette and participant factors, severity’s effect on the 
reporting outcome across conditions is convincing with a 0.43 point increase in 
likelihood to report for participants viewing the more severe vignettes as compared to 






Limitations and Future Direction 
 While my factorial vignette study brings together a number of vignette and 
participant factors for analyses, it does have limitations.  One such limitation is in the 
sample I obtained via MTurk, which is not representative of the general population in 
the United States.  As seen in Table 10.1, white respondents are overrepresented as 
compared to the total adult population in the United States.  Also, although there is a 
representative distribution by gender this is owing to the design of my study rather 
than a random sampling method.  Accordingly, my vignette results alone should not 
be generalized beyond my sample of MTurk workers. 
 Free-text comments that participants voluntarily provided in the first phase of 
my study reveal another possible limitation.  By only selecting participants who are 
currently employed into the second phase, I unintentionally excluded participants 
who in some cases had many years of experience in the workplace but are not 
currently employed.  As one first-phase participant stated, “I am a homemaker now 
but have 22 years of work experience, and much experience with this topic.”  Another 
first-phase participant provided this insight, “I am unemployed, but I am 
retired/unemployed and I have 42 years of work experience.  I could have answered 
[vignette] questions based on my last job.”  I selected based on employment status 
using the logic that my workplace vignette is more salient to currently-employed 
individuals.  In hindsight, I would have been more inclusive in capturing previous 
work experience. 
In the next chapter, I consider the results of my factorial vignette study in 




interviews.  For some factors, the results reinforce each other providing strong 
support for their relationship with the reporting of unethical conduct.  For other 
factors, a single form of analysis provides more limited support for the relationship.  I 






Chapter 11: General Discussion 
 
I use multiple methods to address my research question exploring the 
relationship between trust in leaders and the reporting of unethical conduct.  In 
previous chapters, I present the results of my three methods individually.  In this 
chapter, I consider them as a whole and highlight gender considerations when 
interpreting the results.  When relationships emerge counter to my prediction, I use 
previous literature to provide possible explanations for the results.  Finally, based on 
these findings I present a final general model for reporting unethical conduct. 
Sample Considerations 
Before beginning a general discussion of my results, I address sampling in my 
research.  In using three different methods to address my research question, I analyze 
three different samples of adults in the United States.  In my secondary data analyses, 
this is a stratified, random sample of permanent, full-time federal employees in 24 
departments and agencies of the federal government.  In my qualitative section, I 
consider a convenience sample of available civilian and military personnel at a 
military service academy, a civilian university and two active-duty military sites.  In 
my factorial vignette study, I draw from available MTurk workers over age 18 in the 
United States and select my vignette participants by employment status and gender.  
For each of my methods, these are three different samples drawn from three different 
populations of adults in the United States. 
On one hand, having different samples limits the generalizability of my 
results.  For each method, I base my findings only on the sample I analyze.  As well, 




generalization to the population of permanent, full-time federal employees.  With 
these limitations in mind, the discussions in Chapters 5, 7, 8 and 10 address 
applicable findings for each sample. 
Theoretically, however, having different samples lends strength to my 
analyses.  This is due to the concept of triangulation (Khan and Fisher 2014).  By 
using multiple methods to address my research question, I am able to analyze 
different samples knowing the strength of one method compensates for the 
weaknesses of others.  When findings are repeated across different samples using 
different methods, they provide cumulative evidence for hypothesized relationships.  
For each of my samples, the results are one set of observations that offer support for a 
more general statement of theory.  By providing evidence for hypotheses and 
predictions derived from theory, my results may be seen as generalizable to a larger 
population especially if they are replicated in future studies (Lucas 2003; Lucas, 
Morrell and Posard 2013).  The general discussion that follows seeks to capitalize on 
the power of triangulation. 
Similarities and Differences Across Methods 
To begin, I review the findings from my secondary data analyses.  Guided by 
the literatures of whistle-blowing, power, status and attitudes, my analyses of the 
2010 MPS data reveal multiple factors related to the reporting of unethical conduct.   
Individually, supervisor status and greater individual importance of anonymity are 
related to increased reporting.  Organizationally, greater perceived support for 
anonymity and protection for whistle-blowers are also related to increased reporting.  




to increased reporting.  Finally, situational factors related to increased reporting of 
unethical conduct include in-group location and greater severity of observed 
misconduct.  I did not consider trust in leaders in my secondary data analyses due to 
the lack of quantifiable measures in the 2010 MPS data. 
My interview data provide further evidence for the relationship between the 
reporting of unethical conduct and five factors; supervisor status, individual 
importance placed on anonymity, leader misconduct, perceived organizational 
support for anonymous reporting and the severity of observed misconduct.  
Concerning the severity of observed misconduct, which is one of the most substantive 
factors in my secondary data analyses, interview participants repeatedly expressed 
this theme as a consideration in whether they would report misconduct or not.  As 
well, they indicated that the severity of observed misconduct may moderate the 
relationship between reporting and both trust in leaders as well as in-group 
preference. 
Another theme I identify in my interview data is self-preservation.  When 
considered alongside my secondary data, self-preservation is related to individual 
importance placed on anonymity, organizational support for anonymous reporting and 
organizational support for whistle-blowers.  All of these concepts speak to the fact 
that, although an individual may be willing to report unethical conduct, they also 
consider their own well-being when doing so.  It is possible that self-preservation 
(including anonymity considerations) may prevent an individual from saying 
anything out of fear of retaliation, as indicated in my secondary data analyses of 




policies, such as support for anonymous reporting and whistle-blowers, may 
overcome individual considerations and lead to increased reporting. 
As in my analyses of the 2010 MPS data, participants from my interviews 
shared that observing leader misconduct factors into their reporting decision.  
Hypocrisy by those in leadership positions is a specific instance of such misconduct.  
Together with my secondary data analyses, this provides further evidence against the 
theory that a culture of silence could stifle reporting.  Instead, individuals appear 
willing to hold those in a leadership position accountable for their actions.  An 
exception might be if such leader misconduct involves retaliation against a whistle-
blower; in that case, the misconduct may in fact suppress reporting. 
One finding that differs between my secondary data and qualitative analyses is 
the location of observed misconduct.  In my interviews, a peer-oriented culture was 
identified that relates to the theme of in-group preference.  Participants were clear in 
many instances that they would not report in-group members (e.g. friends, classmates, 
members of similar rank).59  Interestingly, my secondary data analyses indicate the 
opposite; that federal employees are more likely to report misconduct when it is 
observed in their workgroup.  As previously discussed, one possible explanation is 
that the workplace does not define group membership for federal workers with 
respect to in-group preference.  As with leader misconduct, federal workers appear 
willing to hold those in their workgroups accountable for their actions. 
Thus far, my analyses indicate that supervisor status, the concept of self-
preservation (including anonymity considerations), leader behavior, and the location 
                                                 




and severity of observed misconduct are related to the reporting of unethical conduct.  
In my interviews, I also explore the relationship of trust in leaders with reporting.  
When presented with the option, participants were clear that they prefer to report to a 
trusted leader versus an untrusted leader.  One caveat to this preference is that some 
participants, particularly in the military, expressed they would still report unethical 
conduct if an untrusted leader is the only option. Some participants related leader 
misconduct to trust in leaders, while others stated that the severity of observed 
misconduct may help them overcome the reporting barrier of an untrusted leader.  
These analyses provide partial support for my prediction that greater trust in leaders is 
related to increased reporting. 
In my factorial vignette study, I test observed relationships from my 
secondary data and themes from my qualitative analyses.  My vignette analyses 
reveal that greater trust in leaders is related to increased reporting only for non-
supervisors, highlighting the additional importance that trust plays for lower-status 
individuals when deciding whether or not to report unethical conduct.  Additionally, 
good leader behavior is related to increased reporting for all participants.  In my 
vignettes leader behavior is specifically attributed to the person to whom misconduct 
is reported, as opposed to my secondary data analyses where leader misconduct is 
more of a general concept.  Considering my interview themes, I constructed the 
vignette in this manner in an attempt to disentangle leader behavior from the concept 
of trust in leaders.  Of the two, leader behavior has the more universal effect on 




 My vignette analyses support the predicted relationship of two vignette factors 
to the reporting of unethical conduct; organizational support for anonymous reporting 
and more severe observed misconduct.  The severity of observed misconduct has the 
largest effect on the reporting outcome, with a relative effect 23% greater than the 
next closest factor.  Another vignette factor, the position of the perpetrator, has an 
effect opposite that predicted by my in-group preference theme; participants said they 
are less likely to report unethical conduct in vignettes with misconduct perpetrated by 
a supervisor as compared to a coworker.  I included the position of the perpetrator as 
another possible mechanism behind in-group preference.  Rather than providing 
support for this proposed underlying mechanism, the position factor supports the 
notion that fear of retaliation from an individual in power (e.g. a supervisor) may 
factor into the reporting decision. 
 In my vignettes, one concept not related to the reporting outcome is gender.  
This is true for gender of the participant, gender of the perpetrator in the vignette and 
any interaction between the two, and is despite the fact I force an equal gender 
distribution when selecting participants into my vignette study.  While gender may 
not play a role in the workplace misconduct depicted in my vignette, it is clear from 
my interview themes that gender does matter for certain types of misconduct.  
Interview participants who are women were more likely to discuss sexual harassment 
and assault as a form of misconduct they were familiar with, and only women shared 





Three participant factors did have an effect on the reporting outcome in the 
predicted manner.  Participants who are supervisors, those with a greater importance 
placed on anonymity and those with a lesser orientation towards Machiavellianism all 
are more likely to report unethical conduct.  The supervisor and anonymity results 
reinforce relationships observed in my secondary data and qualitative analyses, 
providing strong evidence that supervisors and individuals placing importance on 
anonymity are more likely to report unethical conduct.  Although not considered in 
other sections of my research, my Machiavellianism finding is in line with previous 
whistle-blowing literature. 
Considering my results as a whole reveals similarities and differences across 
the three sections of my research.  With one exception, the substantive results of 
which factors relate to the reporting outcome vary across methods; the exception is 
the severity of observed misconduct.  This factor is among the most substantive in my 
secondary data and vignette analyses.  As well, in my interviews the severity theme 
emerged in direct relationship to reporting in addition to moderating other themes 
such as trust in leaders and in-group preference. 
Final General Model for Reporting Unethical Conduct 
 Based on the results of my vignette analyses, and considering them as a whole 
with my secondary data and qualitative analyses, I further revise my proposed general 
reporting model.  Figure 11.1 presents a final general model for reporting unethical 
conduct.  This model retains some of the structure of my revised model in Figure 8.2, 
while in other areas it differs based on the results of my complete findings.  I choose 




Figure 11.1: Final General Model for Reporting Unethical Conduct 
 
leaving others under the broader individual category.  As well, I now conceptualize 
two organizational factors, support for anonymous reporting and protection for 
whistle-blowers, as organizational policies under the theme of self-preservation. 
 Having summarized my findings in light of each other, in the next and final 
chapter I present the implications of these finding for federal workers and leaders in 
general.  I also consider how future work on the reporting of unethical conduct could 











Gender->Type of Misconduct (+)
Status (+)
Personal Privacy (+)
Bad Leader Example (+)
Trust -> Low Status (+)




Chapter 12: Conclusion 
 
My research addresses an important issue in society.  As evidenced by the 
cases of Edward Snowden and CDR Strickland from Chapter 1, whistle-blowing 
serves an important role in exposing unethical conduct.  Unfortunately, reporting such 
conduct is not the norm (Miethe and Rothschild 1994).  My goal in researching 
factors related to the reporting of unethical conduct is to increase such reporting.  By 
identifying factors related to whistle-blowing I highlight barriers to reporting that 
leaders and organizations may address, possibly resulting in the identification and 
correction of unethical conduct.   
I make two contributions to the sociological body of knowledge.  First, I 
connect the well-established literature of trust with recent research on whistle-
blowing.  Not only does this connection make a unique contribution to the whistle-
blowing literature, but it also creates interdisciplinary ties between sociology and the 
fields currently attending to whistle-blowing; psychology and management.  In 
addition to trust, the sociological literatures of power and status, attitudes, and 
altruism enhance my findings.  Second, my factorial vignette study experimentally 
considers the effect of individual, organizational and situational factors on the 
reporting of unethical conduct, allowing me to determine the relative effect of each on 
the reporting outcome. 
Implications for Federal Departments and Agencies 
Federal departments and agencies can use my secondary data findings to 
improve their whistle-blowing programs.  Targeting non-supervisors with increased 




likelihood such employees will report observed misconduct, and realizing that greater 
individual importance of anonymity is related to increased reporting supports the 
development of more robust anonymous reporting channels.  This is especially true 
since greater perceived organizational support for anonymous reporting is also related 
to increased reporting.  On a positive note, federal departments and agencies should 
be happy that, counter to previous literature hypothesizing that a culture of silence 
would suppress reporting, more observed leader misconduct is related to increased 
reporting.  This relationship supports providing positive feedback to federal 
employees, possibly encouraging future reporting. 
Given the different avenues by which individuals may report unethical 
conduct, it could be argued that an organization would prefer internal reporting as it 
affords the chance to handle problems without involving outsiders who may impose 
undesired change on the organization (Near and Miceli 2016).  However, internal 
reporting needs to be distinguished from informal reporting where a supervisor is not 
informed.  Informal reporting by itself carries the risk that nothing is done about the 
misconduct, as it relies on friends or coworkers subsequently making a report to 
initiate action.  Of particular concern in the 2010 MPS data is that, when considering 
participants who reported via the informal avenue, those of other race were 1.5 times 
as likely as white respondents to solely use this avenue.  Federal departments and 
agencies should make a particular effort to engage this demographic, as the risk of 
misconduct continuing is higher when only using the informal avenue.  Respondents 
from organizations that demonstrate support for whistle-blowing are less likely to 




satisfaction.  As well, increased leader misconduct is related to more informal and 
external reporting.  Leader behavior and support for whistle-blowing are both factors 
federal departments and agencies have influence over; attending to them may give an 
organization the chance to address its own faults before outside intervention is 
required. 
The finding that black respondents are more likely than white respondents to 
report only via external avenues and less likely than white respondents to report via 
informal or internal channels should be a red flag to federal departments and 
agencies.  Black respondents are 15% of the 2010 MPS sample, a figure which 
slightly underrepresents their 17.5% composition of federal workers as of September 
2010 (OPM 2010).  Considering that black respondents report observing significantly 
more leader misconduct than white respondents, the fact they are more likely to only 
report via external avenues is a barrier to federal departments and agencies 
identifying and potentially correcting leader misconduct within their organization.  
Assuming these departments and agencies have the will to correct identified leader 
misconduct, they should want every member of their organization to feel comfortable 
reporting within the organization. 
More concerning are the reasons black respondents identify are influencing 
their decision to report hypothetical unethical conduct.  Across multiple measures, 
fear of retaliation is commonly expressed; this is reinforced by the retaliation 
experiences of actual black whistle-blowers.  Other reasons include belief that the 
misconduct would continue even if reported and a lack of knowledge on whom to 




the reporting process, a lack of trust that reports would matter, and a lack of trust that 
reports would be handled without retaliation targeting the reporter.  Training on the 
reporting process seems like the easiest of the three to address, while the other two 
are less straightforward. 
Implications for Leaders 
In summarizing 30 years of whistle-blowing research, recent literature (Near 
and Miceli 2016) makes the case that familiarity with the reporting process can help 
managers avoid external reporting and the associated costs to their organization.  
Managers are encouraged to investigate allegations, make the results know to those 
involved in the incident, correct problems that are identified and avoid reprisal 
against whistle-blowers.  Some of these findings are echoed by my interview 
participants as reasons they would rather report to a trusted leader, including belief 
that a trusted leader takes reported misconduct seriously and takes the appropriate 
action following a report. 
My data as a whole provide leaders an addition consideration for reporting 
with respect to findings on the severity of observed misconduct.  This is one of the 
most substantive factors from my secondary data analyses, frequently mentioned by 
my interview participants and the vignette factor with the greatest relative effect on 
the reporting outcome.  As expressed by my interview participants, which behaviors 
cross that severity line are not constant across participants and may vary based on 
individual and organizational influences.  Leaders who can influence how severe their 




example or supporting organizational policies, may be able increase the reporting of 
this conduct by their followers. 
My interview data provide further insight for leaders, particularly with respect 
to increasing trust, that may encourage increased reporting.  When asked to share 
their views on who their leaders are, my interview participants relate two broad 
perspectives.  The first centers around position; multiple participants from each 
interview site identified leaders as those in supervisory roles over them.  In the case 
of military participants, this is usually a squad leader or unit commander.  Students at 
the civilian university frequently mentioned professors or academic advisors.  The 
second perspective is more relational, where participants focused on personal 
connections and mentors.  Buster made this distinction: 
There’s people that are technically my subordinate that I would say, lead me. 
[My senior enlisted leaders] know a lot of things I don’t. Good mentors. So 
just people that can mold your behavior, not so much direct it. That would be 
what I would say are the leaders in the command. 
 
Brian singled out peer leadership as important in helping other students through their 
days, and Bill highlighted this difference between positional and relational leadership: 
Some of my professors, they know me, I know them, but just by name, and 
that’s pretty much it. I come to the lecture, I come to the lab, and leave, so I 
don’t talk to them afterwards. I don’t see them as a leader personally…[but] 
my professor in one of my classes. This past year, she also became my 
mentor. She helped me a lot with understanding, with my questions about grad 
school, with questions about taking the GRE, and doing research in 
psychology, all that stuff...I’ve talked to her about personal issues, as well. 
 
It is in discussing leaders through the lens of personal connections and 
mentorship that participants provided valuable insight into methods by which leaders 
may increase the trust of their followers.  Stated reasons participants would prefer 




based on shared time together or friendship, and having a leader who cares about 
followers or puts the welfare of followers before his or her own.  The following 
interview themes expand on how the personal leader-follower relationship may 
increase trust. 
One major theme is that leaders should get to know their subordinates 
personally.  Brett shared this though concerning fellow cadets: 
And then in cadets, you know them a lot better, you know them on a personal 
level, so I’d say I really trust most cadets here. 
 
He went on to say that “sharing their weaknesses” and “being…honest and personal” 
go a long way towards increasing trust. 
 Brian felt that being friendly and transparent are important to increase trust, as 
he shared in this story about a professor at his university: 
[T]hose professors that are a little more transparent are gonna’ talk about 
things on all different levels that may not be the most professional things to 
talk about, but they’re still relevant.  Those are the ones where you have more 
trust towards them, or they seem like they’re more trustworthy. 
 
At the same interview site, Bill also felt that trust comes from a personal connection 
with an individual. 
 The theme of time also emerges as related to increasing trust.  Leaders should 
not expect trust to be immediate, as Bill related: 
I didn’t trust her right away. I mean, you was kinda’ hesitant about going to 
her and talking to her about personal issues because she’s a professor, and I 
wanted to keep it professional, but she was very open about it. She became a 
really close mentor to me. Yeah, over time, definitely, it built up. 
 
He summed up the story by expressing that trust cannot be built overnight. 
 Related to time, shared experience over time is another way to increase trust.  




Just like…a closer group like my, uh, people that I’ve been deployed 
with...because when you’re on a detachment or deployment, you’re gonna’ 
naturally be closer with those people.  It’s...a much smaller group of people.  
So like, you’re gonna’ develop more relationships with those people...‘cause 
you- you have to live with those people when you’re in a situation like 
that...you’re with them 24/7. 
 
He finished by equating increased trust to the extended time he spent with people on 
deployment. 
 A final theme related to increased trust is setting a good example.  Participants 
at all interview sites shared this as a way that leaders can increase trust with their 
followers.  Ashely expressed this about one of her leaders: 
And when you see things like [hard work], you see somebody that I can look 
at them and…say that- she's living…by example, showing what the creed is 
saying you should do. 
 
Brad also felt that setting a good example and following the rules are ways for leaders 
to increase trust.  Alison provided specific ways leaders can set a good example, 
including not tolerating harassment or crude humor towards others. 
Competence in one’s job was commonly shared as another way to set a good 
example.  Bill put it this way: 
I trust [my advisor]…to help me select the right classes for my major and 
minor so that I graduate on time…I trust that she knows what she’s talking 
about, and my professor would know what she’s talking about when she’s 
helping us with the research questions. 
 
Buster also expressed that leaders need to know their job well enough to do it, and to 
be able to give direction to their subordinates. 
Other concepts from my interview data related to increasing trust include 
treating information confidentially when appropriate, having good interpersonal skills 




interview participants also shared ways that leaders can decrease trust.  Some are the 
exact opposite of the increasing trust themes, including not leading by example, 
perceived incompetence in the assigned job, breaking confidentiality and perceived 
negative motives. 
Two other themes are most prominent as related to decreased trust; leaders 
who do not support their followers and unethical conduct by leaders.  Concerning not 
providing support, Brocton shared this example of what would decrease his trust in 
leaders: 
I would say [if] someone asked me to do something that it wasn’t- either it 
wasn’t my job or I didn’t know exactly how to do it- and then I go to one of 
my [leaders] and I ask them, “Hey, I know you know how to do this, would 
you mind pulling this up or help me source this out for this person?” And they 
say, “No. You can find someone else to do it.” 
 
Ashley felt leaders who merely supervise their subordinates doing work without 
pitching in when appropriate are less trusted, and Bill felt the same of leaders who 
might let him down by saying one thing and doing another.  Brandon provided this 
specific example that caused distrust for him: 
[A] good leader is someone that stands up for his platoon even when it's 
against someone higher rank[ing] than them…But we have certain [enlisted 
leaders] that just take whatever's thrown at them, because they say, oh I guess 
they figure I don't have to do the manual labor.  My soldiers are going to do 
it…They'll get it done and I look good for it…And so then we lose trust in 
him because we're trusting you to look out for our best interests. 
 
 The second major theme related to decreased trust is various forms of 
unethical conduct by a leader.  When asked what would cause leaders not to be 
trusted, Alison shared these examples of such conduct: 
Um, I guess if like I saw them doing irresponsible things, or like if they 






She separately expressed that lying and favoritism would also cause leaders not to be 
trusted.  Brad felt that leaders who go on a “power trip” or talk down to their 
subordinates in a degrading manner also merit less trust.  Brandon provided this 
powerful example of unethical conduct he witnessed: 
I had a [senior enlisted leader] that had an affair with one of his soldiers…she 
ended up being pregnant.  And she got kicked out of the military, but he being 
a [senior enlisted leader] and they have their own little mafia, they look out 
for each other and it got swept under the rug for him.  He's still in the military; 
he should have been kicked out first.  
 
Brandon went on to say that he could not trust his senior enlisted leader because he 
crossed a boundary that is “unforgivable.” 
 Brandon’s unwillingness to forgive highlights another important aspect of 
trust; how does a leader regain trust once it has been lost?  Like Brandon, a few other 
participants said it would be hard to regain trust once lost.  This was particularly true 
for more severe breaches of trust.  The most commonly expressed theme for regaining 
trust is a change in behavior.  Leaders who apologize, take responsibility for their 
actions, and correct the behavior that caused the breach of trust might have the 
possibility of regaining trust with their subordinates.  Participants also point out that 
this process takes time, and open communication throughout is necessary. 
 One final aspect of my interview data is relevant for leaders who want to 
encourage the reporting of unethical conduct.  When asked what leaders can do to 
increase reporting, participants focused on themes similar to those shared when 
discussing trust.  To encourage reporting, leaders should care about their subordinates 
without expressing aloofness or arrogance, put their subordinates’ needs before their 




reported incidents for self-serving reasons, seek the knowledge and experience 
necessary to address the situation, handle the report in a professional and objective 
manner and avoid draconian responses. 
Limitations and Future Direction 
As mentioned in the discussion sections of my secondary data and vignette 
analyses, I am unable to replicate the in-group preference finding from my qualitative 
analyses.  The in-group preference theme was transmitted very clearly by my 
interview participants, who expressed their unwillingness to report unethical conduct 
by those they considered friends, those they considered classmates (in the case of the 
military service academy and civilian university) and those of the same rank (in the 
case of military participants).  Another possible group membership is in the 
workplace, as this vignette participant expressed in a free-text comment: 
[Reporting is a] very tough decision to make regarding other employees. 
Nobody should steal, that is the bottom line, but I also would feel equally bad 
about hurting someone’s career. 
 
My initial failed test of this theme involves the 2010 MPS data, where in-
group membership could be operationalized by workgroup.  I conclude that, for 
federal workers, workgroup membership did not trigger the in-group preference.  I 
also pursue workgroup membership as a factor in my vignette analyses, again with 
negative results.  In hindsight, I would have focused on two different group 
boundaries; shared experience and friendship.  In re-examining my qualitative data, 
these two concepts better encompass what I summarize as an in-group preference 




vary whether the protagonist is friends with the perpetrator or whether they have 
some sort of shared experience at the company. 
Future studies should also vary the type of misconduct in the vignette.  This is 
supported by previous whistle-blowing literature (Near et al. 2004), but in my 
factorial vignette study I chose to only pursue the severity theme from my qualitative 
analyses.  By also varying the type of misconduct, individual factors such as gender 
could possibly be made relevant.  As evidenced by my interview data, gender matters 
for misconduct such as sexual harassment and assault.  In future vignette studies, two 
degrees of this type of misconduct could be used; sexual assault and rude sexual 
jokes.  By varying both the type and severity of misconduct, the relative effect of 
gender to other reporting factors could be determined. 
Moving forward, sociology is well-positioned to make further contributions to 
the whistle-blowing literature because of its focus on group processes.  Specifically, 
my negative findings for in-group preference and participant gender merit further 
attention.  Future work reexamining these two factors could provide evidence for 
their relationship to the reporting of unethical conduct.  Such potential findings would 







Appendix A – 2010 Merit Principles Survey Weighting Methodology 
Survey Weighting  
 
Post-Stratification weighting is designed to compensate for that fact that persons with certain 
characteristics are not as likely to respond to the survey. For example, historically supervisors in the 
Federal government have a higher probability of responding than non-supervisors and may respond at 
a rate of 60/40 that of non-supervisors.  Because the survey over-represents supervisors to and under-
represents non-supervisors in the population a weight is used to compensate for this bias. 
There are many respondent characteristics that are likely to be related to the propensity to respond.  
However, the Merit Principle Survey, like most other large surveys of the Federal government weight 
only on Agency and Supervisory status. 
 
The Merit Principles Survey 2010 data set available for public use includes a weighting variable 
named STRAT_Weight. We recommend that any analyses conducted to make government-wide 
generalizations be weighted using this weighting variable. 
 
Survey Data Analysis: Calculating and Interpreting Weights 
• Only need one set of weights for all analyses 
• Weights are based on agency return rate and size of workforce 
• Formula for determining weights from Kraut (1996) Organizational Surveys:  
 
weight = W1/W2 
 
where   W1 =strata population/total 
population W2 = # of strata 
returns/total # returned 
 
example: Forest Service population = 24,723 
 Total population = 1,404,106 
Forest Service returns = 273 
Total returns = 13,657 
WI = 24,723/1,404,106 = .017607645 
 W2 = 273/13,657 =.019989749 
 weight = Wl/W2 =.017607645/.019989749 =.88083372 
 
• The only time you will not want to use weights is if reporting data within a single 
stratum. 
 
• Response rate formula for response rate = # returns/# delivered 
 
example: 
Forest Service = 273 returned surveys, 741 delivered 










                                                 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.2: Correlation Matrix for Reporting Avenue Outcomes 
 
  
Informal Internal External 
External 
Only 
Hispanic 0.03* -0.01 0.08* 0.11* 
Blacka -0.07* -0.09* 0.07* 0.13* 
Othera 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 
Education -0.04* 0.04* -0.01 0.01 
Service Length -0.03 -0.03* -0.04* -0.02 
Supervisor Status -0.09* 0.08* -0.04 -0.03* 
Anonymity -0.01 0.06* 0.06* 0.00 
Leader Satisfaction -0.09* 0.02 -0.09* -0.03* 
Leader Behavior -0.06* 0.05* -0.20* -0.19* 
Trust in Organization -0.04* 0.08* -0.18* -0.12* 
Support for WB -0.05* 0.05* -0.09* -0.03 
Anonimity Support 0.02 0.07* 0.02 0.00 
WB Protection 0.08* -0.02 0.17* 0.10* 
Pairwise correlation using weighted data. *p<0.05 (α=0.05) 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Begin orientation after check-in and getting food. Give each participant an informed 
consent information handout before starting. 
*****Say the following: 
Hello. Thanks for coming to participate in our research.  
I’m ____ from ____ , and I’ll be guiding our interview today. 
I’m part of a team of researchers studying leadership and organizational climate and 
culture. We’re studying these topics at your academy and other organizations as well. 
The research project is funded by the Army Research Institute. 
I want to go over a few important points about your participation. These are explained 
more fully on your informed consent form handout - please read this if you haven’t 
already. The study will last about 50 minutes. I’ll be asking questions about culture 
and leadership at the Academy, and related issues. Some of these issues may be 
sensitive, particularly issues about negative behaviors. There are no right or wrong 
answers - we simply want your perspectives. We’ve provided information about 
available resources in case they will be helpful. 
We’re taking steps to assure privacy of your identity and confidentiality of what is 
said to the maximum extent possible. We will not be collecting any names, and we 
ask that you do not provide any names, whether your own or others. However, there 
are exceptions to privacy and confidentiality. Your information may be shared with 
appropriate authorities if you or someone else is in danger, or we are required to do so 
by law. Active-duty military personnel are involved in this project, and they are 
required to report information about suspected honor offenses (meaning lying, 
cheating, or stealing) and potentially illegal or criminal behavior. Unless the incident 
is public knowledge, we ask you not to mention anything that may potentially identify 
an individual or group involved (for example, team or squadron). If you mention 
potentially identifying information about an incident, it may then require reporting. In 
all cases, we ask that you don’t mention any names. 
                                                 




We also need your help to maintain privacy and confidentiality. This depends on you 
not telling others outside of this study who participated or what was said. Do we have 
your agreement to this? (Obtain verbal assent from the individual or group.) 
If you’re okay with it, I’d like to audio-record our discussion so we have more 
accurate data. We’ll transcribe audio recordings into text, and then destroy the 
original recordings. We’ll only use a confidential number key to keep track of the 
conversation — no names will be involved. We’ll keep electronic copies of the 
transcripts and notes indefinitely, but we’ll destroy paper copies and other records 
according to Academy policy. Only members of the research team will have access to 
the data. 
We’ve provided relevant contact information in case you have questions or concerns 
about the research. We also remind you that your participation is completely 
voluntary, you may stop at any time, and there is no penalty for stopping or choosing 
not to participate. 
So now please let me know if you consent to participate in this research. This means 
you certify that you are you are at least 18 years old, the research has been explained 
to you, your questions have been fully answered, and you freely and voluntarily 
choose to participate in this research project. 
Please say “yes” if you consent to participate.  
(Ensure that any questions have been addressed.) 
Now, do I have your consent to audio-record the discussion? Please say “yes” if you 
consent to audio-recording.  
(Only begin to audio-record after gaining verbal permission) 
Identify my name, interview number and day of week. 
Before we start, can you state your class year? 
Now I have some questions… 
Probing and follow-up questions may be asked as appropriate. Ask about other 
military experiences, if relevant. 
 
1. I’d like to begin by discussing unethical conduct.  For the purposes of this 
interview, unethical conduct is defined as behavior that is illegal, immoral or 




academy].  Can you give me some examples of unethical conduct at the 
[service academy]? 
(examples include false accountability, lying, underage drinking, not stepping 
in when your [friend] is excessively drinking, DUI/DWI, 
cheating/plagiarizing, sexual harassment or assault, fraternization in 
dormitories, and degrading humor) 
 
2. What is an example of unethical conduct that cadets are likely to report?  Why 
do you think this is? Are there things about the [service academy] that make 
this behavior more likely to be reported?  Are there things about individual 
cadets that make them more likely to report this behavior? 
 
3. What is an example of unethical conduct that cadets are not likely to report?  
Why do you think this is? Are there things about the [service academy] that 
make this behavior not likely to be reported?  Are there things about 
individual cadets that make them unlikely to report this behavior? 
 
4. What are possible negative consequences for reporting unethical conduct? 
 
5. Would you feel comfortable formally reporting unethical conduct? Why or 
why not? 
 
6. Would you feel comfortable calling out unethical conduct informally? Why or 
why not? 
 
7. Do you know of anyone who has faced negative consequences for formally or 
informally reporting unethical conduct?  If so, can you give me an example 
(or, can you tell me what you think would happen if someone called out a 
negative behavior)? 
 
8. I’d like to switch the focus now to the leadership at the [service academy].  
Who do you consider your leaders? 
 
9. To what extent do you trust your leaders? 
a. What things increase or decrease your trust in these leaders? 
 
10. (Only ask if leader behavior wasn’t brought up in #9) What kinds of behaviors 
by your leaders violate your trust in them? 
 
11. What do your leaders do to restore trust after they have violated it? 
a. Is this effective? 





12. (Only ask if trust in leadership wasn’t brought up in #2 or #3) Do you think 
trust in leaders impacts cadets’ decisions to report unethical conduct?  How 
(or why not)? 
  
13. For you, would trust in your leaders impact your decision to report unethical 
conduct? How (or why not)?  
 
14. What do leaders do that encourages the reporting of ethical conduct? 
 
15. What do leaders do that discourages the reporting of ethical conduct? 
 
16. Finally, I’d like to talk about the culture at the [service academy].  What is the 
formal culture of the [service academy] – its official norms, values and 
practices? 
 
17. What about the academy’s informal culture—what are its unofficial norms, 




- We talked about a range of issues relating to ethical leadership and organizational 
culture. We appreciate your openness and help with our research. 
- We’re hoping to inform future research with our findings 
- We want to remind you to please maintain privacy of participation and 
confidentiality of what was said today. 
- If you need them, please refer to counseling resources and contact information on 
the consent sheet. Do not hesitate to get in touch if you have questions or concerns. 
- Do you have any questions for me? 





Appendix E – Final Coding Scheme 
 
Themes      Total Instances: 692 
Unethical Conduct 1 
  Fraternization 7 
  Hazing 3 
  Lying 6 
  Cheating 6 
  SHARP 14 
  Alcohol 17 
  Drugs 1 
  False Accountability 6 
    Gundecking 4 
  Degrading Humor 11 
  Favoritism 2 
  Sharing Personal Information 1 
  Breaking Rules 1 
More Likely to Report 1 
  Leader Acting Hypocritically 1 
  Older or More Mature 1 
    Length of Service 1 
  Spite for Offender 2 
  Position of Authority 7 
  Rules Support 5 
    Training on How to Report 1 
    Zero Tolerance Policy 3 
  Protect Ingroup or Like Family 3 
  Personal Values 4 
    Previous Experience With Violation 1 
  Personal Benefit 1 
  Excessive Interference with Personal Life 2 
  Anonymity 3 
  Trust in Leader - Handle Situation 3 
    Good Communication 2 
  Impact on Others 4 
    Impact Image of Unit 1 
    Impact Image of Service 1 
  Severity of Behavior 15 
    Abuse of Power 1 
    Pattern of Behavior 7 




Less Likely to Report 0 
  Doesn't Affect Observer 1 
  Individual Tolerance for Confrontation 2 
  Won't Get Caught 2 
  Won't Be Believed 2 
  Won't Change Anything 1 
  No Bad Consequence for Behavior 4 
  Punishment Too Severe 7 
  Peer Bonding 16 
  Peer Pressure 2 
  Limited Number of People Know 1 
  Culturally Normative 8 
    Differs by Subgroup 4 
  Embarrassing to Command 2 
    Disrupts Operations 1 
  Personally Detrimental 15 
    Fear of Reprisal 2 
Consequences of Reporting 3 
  Change Units 2 
  Interpersonal Conflict 4 
  Unfair Treatment by Supervisor 4 
  Positive Reinforcement 3 
  Negative Social 24 
    Peers Will Talk About It 4 
Formal Reporting 1 
  Anonymity 4 
  Strength of Evidence 4 
  Severity of Conduct 10 
  Take Fall to Protect Peer 1 
  Not Senior Person With Secret 1 
  Tolerance for Confrontation 1 
  Trust in Supervisors 3 
    Report to Knowledgeable Individual 1 
    Officers versus Cadets 1 
  Report Regardless of Trust in Leader 7 
  Preference for Trusted Leader 8 
    Protect Reporter 1 
    Do Right Thing With Report 5 
    Confidentiality When Able 1 





Informal Reporting 1 
  Results in Positive Working Environment 2 
  Some More Comfortable Than Others 2 
  Supported by Command Policy 1 
  Preference vs. Formal Reporting 12 
  Avoid Draconian Consequences 2 
  Catch Behavior Early 2 
Leaders 3 
  Equate to Power 1 
  Impact Culture 3 
  Observed Misbehavior 2 
  Positional 16 
    Job vs. Rank 2 
    Different Than Role Model 1 
  Relational 4 
    Mentor 6 
  Increase Reporting 0 
    Open Door Policy 1 
    Care About People 3 
    Take Report Seriously 2 
    Staying Positive 1 
    Professional 1 
    Objective 1 
    Knowledgeable/Experienced 2 
    Rational Action 1 
    Listening 1 
    People Skills 3 
  Decrease Reporting 0 
    Draconian Consequences 1 
    Project Negative Attitude 1 
    Place Self/Unit Above People 3 
    Seem Like They Don't Care 1 
    Aloofness 1 
    Arrogance 2 
Trust in Leaders 3 
  Honesty 1 
  Know Them Personally 8 
  Helpful 2 
    Take Care of People/Selfless 2 
  Know Job 4 




  Interpersonal Skills 3 
  Sets Good Example 4 
  Confidentiality When Appropriate 2 
    Suppress Rumors 1 
  Work vs. Personal 5 
  Time 2 
    Deployed Together 1 
  Homophily 1 
    Same Gender 1 
  Regardless of Rank 3 
  Decrease 0 
    Micromanaging 1 
    Don't Provide Support or Let Down 6 
      Look Out for Self First 1 
      Go Back on Word 1 
    Don't do Job 2 
      Incompetence 3 
      Refuse to do Job 1 
    Favoritism 2 
      Repetitively Assign   
Bad Duties 
1 
    Break Confidentiality 3 
    Unethical Behavior 6 
    Not Leading by Example 3 
    Leader Personal Life Problems 2 
    Insincere Actions 2 
    Leader Overcompensated 1 
    Don't Take Responsibility 1 
    Perceived Negative Motives 1 
  Regain 0 
    Hard to Regain Once Lost 3 
    Change Behavior 8 
      Takes Being Held 
Accountable 
1 
      Takes Time 1 
    Apologize 1 
    Take Responsibility 2 
    Open Communication 1 
Formal Culture 4 
  Value People 1 




  Liberal Attitudes 1 
  Encourage Innovation 1 
  Accept Diversity 3 
  Support SHARP Reporting 3 
  No Tolerance for Misbehavior 10 
    Alcohol Related 5 
  Protect Others 1 
  Maintain Physical Standard 2 
  Open Door Policy With Leadership 1 
    Anonymous Chanel 1 
  Unit Philosophy 2 
  Mission Accomplishment 10 
    Specialization vs. Jack-of-all-Trades 1 
  Different Across Subgroups 13 
  Chain of Command 5 
  Core Values 9 
  Accountability 1 
Informal Culture 1 
  Elite Mentality 1 
  Different Across Subgroups 2 
  Peer Accountability 2 
  Value People 5 
  Rank Equates to Power 1 
  Bend Rules to Get Job Done 4 
  Treat Outgroup Differently 4 
    Marginalize People Exiting Military 1 
  Women in Military 2 
    Physical Standards 1 
  Acceptance of Degrading Humor 8 
    Gender Degrading Humor or Sexual Harassment 4 
  Collectivism/Peer Culture 19 
    Hide Unethical Conduct 2 
    Personal Business is Known to All 2 
    Equate to Family 11 
  New Military 8 
    Individualism 3 
      Entitlement Mentality 1 
      Aren't Responsible for 
People Off Duty 
1 
      Favoritism/Individualism 





  Lack of Pride 2 
    Mission not Rewarding 2 
  Alcohol Culture 7 
    Not Mandatory 1 
    Related to Stress 1 
  Cynicism 7 
  Mistrust of SHARP 2 
  Zero Tolerance for SHARP 2 
    Consideration for Social Consequences 1 
  Hardship 0 
    Value Time Off 2 
    Long Hours/Hard Work 4 
    Family Separation 1 





Appendix F – Control Vignette and Variations 
 
The colored text in the control vignette indicates factors my study is varying.  The 
text below the vignette lists the wording for each factor in the alternate condition.  
 
Sam is invited to a social event at the home of a coworker; this is someone who is in 
the same workgroup as Sam (and performs a similar job [Note: omit wording in 
parentheses for supervisor/in-group conditions]).  While at the social event, Sam 
notices several piles of supply items from the office including notepads, printer paper, 
and boxes of pens.  When questioned, the colleague explains that she often brings 
work home from the office and even if she uses some of the work supplies for 
personal projects, she sometimes uses personal items for work-related efforts so it all 
washes out in the end.  Although the supplies don’t total a substantive amount, Sam 
knows from personal experience that they are in high demand at the office and 
productivity is sometime reduced as coworkers wait for resources to become 
available.  Sam also wonders what else the colleague may "borrow" for personal use.  
[Insert anonymity text here in alternate condition]  The manager to whom such 
misconduct is reported is new at the company, and Sam has yet to personally interact 
with this manager.  However, Sam is aware of instances of misconduct involving this 
manager and other company employees.  Taking all of this into consideration, at work 
the next day Sam decides to report the fact that the colleague is using company 
property for personal use. 
 
Alternate Condition Wording 
Trust: Based on previous interactions, Sam trusts the manager to whom such 
misconduct is reported. 
Misconduct: To Sam’s knowledge this manager has always displayed exemplary 
personal conduct. 
Anonymity: Sam’s company has an established system for anonymously reporting 
unethical conduct that the company actively supports. 
Severity: a work laptop and laser printer set up on the dining room table; the office 
equipment; The laptop and printer are high-value items, and 
Location: Although they perform similar jobs at their company they work in unrelated 
departments. 
Perpetrator Position: an immediate supervisor from work; supervisor; supervisor; 
supervisor 





Appendix G – Factorial Vignette Study Phase 1 
 
(Lines indicate a new page.)   
[The participant is first presented with a consent form] 
 
 
Thank you for participating in the first phase of our study on factors related to the 
reporting of unethical conduct.  For the purposes of this study, unethical conduct 
means any action that is illegal, immoral, illegitimate or inconsistent with the values 
of an organization.  Also, with respect to reporting such conduct, anonymous means 
that you can take an action without your identity being publicly revealed. 
To begin with, please answer the following background questions. 
1. What is your gender? male/female 
2. What is your race/ethnicity? 
(please mark all that apply) 
1=“Black or African American”, 2=”White or Caucasian”, 3=”Hispanic or Latino”, 
4=”Asian”, 5=”American Indian or Alaska Native”, 6=”Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander” 
3. What is your age? 0-100 
4. What is your highest education level? 
1=“Less than a high school diploma”, 2=”High school, equivalent diploma, or GED”, 
3=”Some college credits but no degree”, 4=”Associates’ college degree”, 
5=”Bachelor’s college degree”, 6=”Master’s degree”, 7=”Professional degree (e.g. 
J.D., M.D., D.D.S.)”, 8=”Academic or scientific doctorate (Ph.D.)” 
5. What is your current employment status? 
1=“Not employed”, 2=”Currently not employed, but actively seeking employment”, 
3=”Employed, but not in a position that has supervisory responsibilities or conducts 
performance appraisals on other employees”, 4=” Employed in a position that has 





Next, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements.  If unemployed, please answer N/A. 
1=“Strongly Disagree”, 2=”Disagree”, 3=”Neither Agree Nor Disagree”, 4=”Agree”, 
5=”Strongly Agree”, 6=”N/A” 
6. My employer actively encourages employees to report wrongdoing. 
7. If I disclosed wrongdoing, I would be praised for it at work. 
8. I feel that I could disclose wrongdoing at work without any concerns that the 
disclosure would make my life harder. 
9. My employer has educated me about how I can anonymously disclose wrongdoing. 




Next, please answer the following questions on the reporting of unethical conduct. 
11. If you were to observe or have evidence of wrongdoing, how important would it 
be to you that you be able to report it without disclosing your identity? 
1=“Not important”, 2=”Somewhat important”, 3=”Important”, 4=”Very important” 
12. In your opinion, how adequate or inadequate is the protection against reprisal for 
employees at your workplace who report wrongdoing?  If unemployed, please answer 
N/A. 
1=“Very inadequate”, 2=”Inadequate”, 3=”Neither adequate nor inadequate”, 
4=”Adequate”, 5=”Very adequate”, 6=”N/A” 
13. How likely would you be to report wrongdoing when the wrongdoer is your 
supervisor?  If unemployed, please answer N/A. 
1=“Very unlikely”, 2=”Somewhat unlikely”, 3=”Neither likely nor unlikely”, 
4=”Somewhat Likely”, 5=”Very likely”, 6=”N/A” 
14. How likely would you be to report wrongdoing when the wrongdoer is a peer-




1=“Very unlikely”, 2=”Somewhat unlikely”, 3=”Neither likely nor unlikely”, 
4=”Somewhat Likely”, 5=”Very likely”, 6=”N/A” 
 
 
Finally, please read these 20 statements carefully and indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with each question. 
1=”Completely Disagree, 2, 3, 4=”Neutral”, 5, 6, 7=”Completely Agree” 
24. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. 
25. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons 
for wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight. 
26. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
27. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 
28. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
29. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out 
when they are given a chance. 
30. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. 
31. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 
32. It is wise to flatter important people. 
33. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest. 
34. P.T. Barnum was very wrong when he said there’s a sucker born every minute. 
35. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put 
painlessly to death. 
36. It is possible to be good in all respects. 
37. Most people are basically good and kind. 




39. Most people forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their 
property. 
40. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. 
41. Generally speaking, men won’t work hard unless they’re forced to do so. 
42. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals 
are stupid enough to get caught. 
43. Most people are brave. 
[Items 25, 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40 and 43 will be reverse-coded, and then the 
answers of these questions averaged, to calculate an index of Machiavellianism] 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in the first phase of this study.  We are interested in 
factors related to the reporting of unethical conduct.  Besides gathering demographic 
information, you were presented with questions to gauge your views on 
organizational support for whistle-blowing and the importance you place on 
anonymity and type of offender (e.g. peer or supervisor) with respect to whistle-
blowing.  You also answered questions intended to measure your orientation towards 
prosocial behavior and Machiavellianism.  We will contact you if separately via 
MTurk if you are selected to participate in phase two of our study.  If you are not 
contacted by December 31st, 2016, your will only participate in the first phase. 
 
If you have any questions about the research or have trouble receiving payment, you 
can contact Michael Norton (nortonma@umd.edu), the Principle Investigator of the 
study, or the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (irb@umd.edu). 
   
We would value any comments you have on this phase of our study. 
[Free text box here] 
Please enter your MTurk account number: 
[participants enter their account number] 
 
You must enter this code [19972017] into Amazon MTurk to receive payment for 
your participation. 
 






Appendix H – Factorial Vignette Study Phase 2 
 
(Lines indicate a new page.) 
[The participant is again presented with a consent form, identical to the first phase.] 
 
 
Thank you for participating in the second phase of our study on factors related to the 
reporting of unethical conduct.  For the purposes of this study, unethical conduct 
means any action that is illegal, immoral, illegitimate or inconsistent with the values 
of an organization.  Also, with respect to reporting such conduct, anonymous means 
that you can take an action without your identity being publicly revealed. 
Next, you will be presented with a series of five vignettes.  Following each vignette, 
you will answer five questions about the actions of the characters in the vignette.  
Although some vignettes may seem similar, we ask that you carefully read each 
vignette as no two vignettes are identical. 
 
 
 [Participants are randomly assigned five vignette variations.  See Appendix H for all 
variations.]   
 
 
Indicate how ethical you feel each person’s chosen action was in the vignette: 
1. The decision by the coworker to use company property for personal use. 
1=”Very unethical”,2=”Somewhat unethical”,3=”Neither ethical or 
unethical”,4=”Somewhat ethical”,5=”Very ethical” 
2. The decision by Sam to report the coworker. 
1=”Very unethical”,2=”Somewhat unethical”,3=”Neither ethical or 
unethical”,4=”Somewhat ethical”,5=”Very ethical” 




3. How likely would you be to take the same action as Sam in this vignette; that is, to 
report your coworker? 
1=“Very unlikely”, 2=”Somewhat unlikely”, 3=”Neither likely nor unlikely”, 
4=”Somewhat Likely”, 5=”Very likely” 
4. To you personally, how important would anonymity be in your decision to report 
such behavior? 
1=“Not at all important”, 2=”Slightly important”, 3=”Somewhat important”, 4=”Very 
important”, 5=”Extremely important” 
5. Please assess the level of harm done by the coworker in using company property 
for personal use. 
1=”Very low”, 2=”Low”, 3=”Moderate”, 4=”High”, 5=”Very high” 
[Note: In some vignette variations, coworker is replaced by supervisor.] 
 
 
Next, please answer the following question about the vignettes: 
6. In the vignettes, Sam was the individual that reported the “borrowed” company 




Finally, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another 
person, whom we will refer to simply as the "Other."  This other person is someone 
you do not know and that you will not knowingly meet in the future.  Both you and 
the "Other" person will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C.  
Your own choices will produce points for both yourself and the "Other" person. 
Likewise, the other's choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every point 
has value: The more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points the 
"Other" receives, the better for him/her. Here's an example of how this task works: 
  A B C 
You get 500 500 550 




In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the other would 
receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500; 
and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and the other 300. So, you see that 
your choice influences both the number of points you receive and the number of 
points the other receives. Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that 
there are no right or wrong answers—choose the option that you, for whatever reason, 
prefer most. Also, remember that the points have value; The more of them you 
accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the "other's" point of view, the more 
points s/he accumulates, the better for him/her.  
For each of the nine choice situations, select A, B, or C, depending on which column 
you prefer most: 
15.  A B C 
You get 480 540 480 
Other gets  80 280 480 
16.  A B C 
You get 560 500 500 
Other gets  300 500 100 
17.  A B C 
You get 520 520 580 
Other gets  520 120 320 
18.  A B C 
You get 500 560 490 
Other gets  100 300 490 
19.  A B C 
You get 560 500 490 
Other gets  300 500 90 
20.  A B C 
You get 500 500 570 
Other gets  500 100 300 
21.  A B C 
You get 510 560 510 
Other gets  510 300 110 
22.  A B C 
You get 550 500 500 





23.  A B C 
You get 480 490 540 
Other gets  100 490 300 
[Participants are classified when they make 6 or more consistent choices. Prosocial 
choices are 15c, 16b, 17a, 18c, 19b, 20a, 21a, 22c, 23b; individualistic choices are 
15b, 16a, 17c, 18b, 19a, 20c, 21b, 22a, 23c; and competitive choices are 15a, 16c, 
17b, 18a, 19c, 20b, 21c, 22b, 23a] 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study.  We interested in factors related to the 
reporting of unethical conduct.  You were chosen for participation in the second 
phase of the study based on your employment status.  To ensure sufficient numbers 
for analysis, our team wanted an equal number of men and women to participate in 
the second phase.  In the second phase, you were presented with multiple vignettes 
depicting unethical conduct, with variations in the following factors: level of trust in 
the manager to whom unethical conduct is reported, misconduct by the manager to 
whom unethical conduct is reported, the availability of an anonymous reporting 
avenue, the severity of the unethical conduct, whether the unethical conduct occurred 
without or outside of a workgroup, the relationship of the perpetrator to the reporter 
(peer or supervisor) and the gender of the perpetrator.  We hope to see how varying 
these factors affects the reporting of unethical conduct.  We also asked you which 
gender you associated Sam with; we chose a gender-neutral name for the reporter in 
an attempt to neutralize this from affecting your answers. 
 
If you have any questions about the research or have trouble receiving payment, you 
can contact Michael Norton (nortonma@umd.edu), the Principle Investigator of this 
study, or the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (irb@umd.edu). 
   
We would value any comments you have on the vignettes you just read, or any 
comments in general on this phase of our study. 
[Free text box here] 
Please enter your MTurk account number: 
[participants enter their account number] 
 
You must enter [20071997] into Amazon MTurk to receive payment for your 
participation. 
 





List of References 
 
Allport, Gordon. W. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison 
Wesley. 
 
Bales, Robert F. 1965. “The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups.” In Small 
Groups: Studies in Social Interaction, eds. A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta and 
Robert F. Bales, 424-456. New York: Knopf. 
 
Berger, Joseph, Bernard P. Cohen and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1972. “Status 
Characteristics and Social Interaction.” American Sociological Review 37(3):241-255. 
 
Berger, Joseph., Susan J. Rosenholtz and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1980. “Status 
Organizing Processes.” Annual Review of Sociology 6(1):479-508. 
 
Berger, Joseph, David G. Wagner and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1985. “Introduction: 
Expectation States Theory: Review and Assessment.” In Status, Rewards, and 
Influence, eds. Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch, 1-72. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Bhal, Kanika T. and Anubha Dadhich. 2011. “Impact of Ethical Leadership and 
Leader-Member Exchange on Whistle Blowing: The Moderating Impact of the Moral 
Intensity of the Issue.” Journal of Business Ethics 103(3):485-496. 
 
Brewer, Marilynn B. 1999. “The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup 
Hate?” Journal of Social Issues 55(3):429-444. 
 
Chen, Ching-Pu and Chih-Tsung Lai. 2014. “To Blow or Not to Blow the Whistle: 
The Effects of Potential Harm, Social Pressure and Organisational Commitment on 
Whistleblowing Intention and Behaviour.” Business Ethics: A European Review 
23(3):327-342. 
 
Christie, Richard and Florence L. Geis. 1970. Studies in Machiavellianism. New 
York: Academic Press. 
 
Cook, Karen S. 2004. “Networks, Norms, and Trust: The Social Psychology of Social 
Capital -  2004 Cooley Mead Award Address.” Social Psychology Quarterly 68(1):4-
14. 
 
Correll, Shelley J. and Cecilia L. Ridgeway. 2003. “Expectation States Theory.” In 
Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. John Delamater, 53-76. New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers. 
 
Curtis, Mary B. and John M. Williams. 2014. “The Impact of Culture and Training on 
Code of Conduct Effectiveness: Reporting of Observed Unethical Behavior.” In 
Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting vol. 18, ed. 




Dalton, Derek and Robin R. Radtke. 2013. “The Joint Effects of Machiavellianism 
and Ethical Environment on Whistle-Blowing.” Journal of Business Ethics 
117(1):153-172. 
 
Department of Defense (DoD). 2013. 2013 Demographics: Profile of the Military 
Community. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military 
Community and Family Policy) under contract with ICF International. 
 
Dozier, Janelle Brinker and Marcia P. Miceli. 1985. “Potential Predictors of Whistle-
Blowing: A Prosocial Behavior Perspective.” Academy of Management Review 
10(4):823-836. 
 
Eagly, Alice H. and Steven J. Karau. 2002. “Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice 
Toward Female Leaders.” Psychological Review 109(3):573-598. 
 
Elliston, Frederick A. 1982. “Anonymity and Whistleblowing.” Journal of Business 
Ethics 1(3):167-177. 
 
Epitropaki, Olga and Robin Martin. 2005. “From Ideal to Real: A Longitudinal Study 
of the Role of Implicit Leadership Theories on Leader-Member Exchanges and 
Employee Outcomes.” Journal of Applied Psychology 90(4):659-676. 
 
Fazio, Russell. 1990. “Multiple Processes by which Attitudes Guide Behavior: The 
MODE Model as an Integrative Framework.” In Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology (Vol. 23), ed. Mark P. Zanna, 75-109. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
 
Fiedler, Fred Edward. 1967. A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
French, John R. P. and Bertram Raven. 1959. “The Bases of Social Power.” In 
Studies in Social Power, ed. Dorwin Cartwright, 118-149. Ann Arbor: Research 
Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. 
 
Gambetta, Diego. 1990. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell. 
 
Gideon, Lior. 2012. Handbook of Survey Methodology for the Social Sciences. New 
York: Springer. 
 
Glanville, Jennifer L., Matthew A. Andersson and Pamela Paxton. 2013. “Do Social 
Connections Create Trust? An Examination Using New Longitudinal Data.” Social 
Forces 92(2):545-562. 
 
Greenberg, Andy. June 6, 2013. “Watch Top U.S. Intelligence Officials Repeatedly 
Deny NSA Spying on Americans Over the Last Year (Videos).” Forbes. Retrieved 




Griffiths, Judith A. and Drew Nesdale. 2006. “In-group and Out-group Attitudes of 
Ethnic Majority and Minority Children.” International Journal of Intercultural 
Relations 30(6):735-749. 
 
Grilli, Leonardo and Carla Rampichini. 2005. A Review of Random Effects Modelling 
Using gllamm in Stata. Department of Statistics, University of Florence. 
 
Hitlin, Paul. 2016. Research in the Crowdsourcing Age: A Case Study. Washington, 
DC: Pew Research Center. 
 
Hollander, Edwin Paul. 1978. Leadership Dynamics: A Practical Guide to Effective 
Relationships. New York: Free Press. 
 
Horton, John J., David G. Rand and Richard J. Zeckhauser. 2011. “The Online 
Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market.” Experimental 
Economics: A Journal of the Economic Science Association 14(3):399-425. 
 
House, Robert J., Paul J. Hanges, Mansour Javidan, Peter W. Dorfman, and Vipin 
Gupta, eds. 2004. Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 
Societies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Hox, Joop J., Ita G.G. Kreft and Piet L.J. Hermkens. 1991. “The Analysis of Factorial 
Surveys.” Sociological Methods & Research 19(4):493-510. 
 
Huff, Connor and Dustin Tingley. 2015. ““Who are these people?” Evaluating the 
Demographic Characteristics and Political Preferences of MTurk Survey 
Respondents.” Research & Politics 2(3):1–12. 
 
Hughes, Richard L., Robert C. Ginnett and Gorden J. Curphy. 1996. Leadership: 
Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, 2nd ed. Chicago: Irwin. 
 
Jasso, Guillermina. 2006. “Factorial Survey Methods for Studying Beliefs and 
Judgments.” Sociological Methods & Research 34(3):334-423. 
 
Jones, Joanne C., Gary Spraakman and Cristobal Sanchez-Rodriguez. 2014. “What’s 
in it for Me? An Examination of Accounting Students’ Likelihood to Report Faculty 
Misconduct.” Journal of Business Ethics 123(4):645-667. 
 
Kang, Yue-min. 2015. “Anti-harassment Policy, Manager Integrity and Intention to 
Report Customer Sexual Harassment: A Taiwanese Case Study.” Leadership and 
Organization Development Journal 36(5):570-591. 
 
Khan, Shamus and Dana R. Fisher (eds). 2014. The Practice of Research: How Social 





Kolarska, Lena and Howard Aldrich. 1980. “Exit, Voice, and Silence: Consumers' 
and Managers' Responses to Organizational Decline.” Organization Studies 1(1):41-
58. 
 
Kotter, John P. and Leonard A. Schlesinger. 1979. “Choosing Strategies for Change.” 
Harvard Business Review 57(2):106-114. 
 
LaPiere, Richard. 1934. “Attitudes vs. Actions.” Social Forces 13(2):230-237. 
Lee, Gladys and Neil Fargher. 2013. “Companies’ Use of Whistle-Blowing to Detect 
Fraud: An Examination of Corporate Whistle-Blowing Policies.” Journal of Business 
Ethics 114(2):283-295. 
 
Lewin, Kurt, Ronald Lippitt and Ralph K. White. 1939. “Patterns of Aggressive 
Behavior in Experimentally Created “Social Climates”.” The Journal of Social 
Psychology 10(2):269-299. 
 
Liu, Sheng-min, Jian-qiao Liao and Hongguo Wei. 2015. “Authentic Leadership and 
Whistleblowing: Mediating Roles of Psychological Safety and Personal 
Identification.” Journal of Business Ethics 131(1):107-119. 
 
Lord, Robert G. and Rosalie J. Hall. 2003. “Identity, Leadership Categorization, and 
Leadership Schema.” In Leadership and Power: Identity Processes in Groups and 
Organizations, eds. Daan van Knippenberg and Michael A. Hoog, 48-64. London: 
Sage. 
 
Lount Jr., Robert B. and Nathan C. Pettit. 2012. “The Social Context of Trust: The 
Role of Status.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 117(1):15-
23. 
 
Lowery, Brian S., Miguel M. Unzueta, Eric D. Knowles and Phillip Atiba Goff. 2006. 
“Concern for the In-Group and Opposition to Affirmative Action.”  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 90(6):961-974. 
 
Lucas, Jeffrey W. 2003. “Theory‐testing, Generalization, and the Problem of External 
Validity.” Sociological Theory 21(3):236-253. 
 
Lucas, Jeffrey W. and Amy R. Baxter. 2012. “Power, Influence, and Diversity in 
Organizations.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
639(1):49-70. 
 
Lucas, Jeffrey W., Kevin Morrell and Marek Posard. 2013. “Considerations on the 







Mayer, David M., Samir Nurmohamed, Linda Klebe Trevino, Debra L. Shapiro and 
Marshall Schminke. 2013. “Encouraging Employees to Report Unethical Conduct 
Internally: It Takes a Village.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 121(1):89–103. 
 
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 1981. Whistle-blowing and the Federal 
Employee. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government. 
 
Miceli, Marcia P. and Janet P. Near. 1984. “The Relationships Among Beliefs, 
Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis.” 
Academy of Management Journal 27(4):687-705. 
 
Miceli, Marcia P. and Janet P. Near. 1985. “Characteristics of Organizational Climate 
and Perceived Wrongdoing Associated with Whistle-Blowing Decisions.” Personnel 
Psychology 38(3):525-544. 
 
Miceli, Marcia P. and Janet P. Near. 2002. “What Makes Whistle-blowers Effective?  
Three Field Studies.” Human Relations 55(4):455-479. 
 
Miceli, Marcia P., Janet P. Near, Michael T. Rehg and James R. Van Scotter. 2012. 
“Predicting Employee Reactions to Perceived Organizational Wrongdoing: 
Demoralization, Justice, Proactive Personality, and Whistle-blowing.” Human 
Relations 65(8): 923-954. 
 
Miethe, Terance D. and Joyce Rothschild. 1994. “Whistleblowing and the Control of 
Organizational Misconduct.” Sociological Inquiry 64(3):322-347. 
 
Molm, Linda D. 2003. “Theoretical Comparisons of Forms of Exchange.” 
Sociological Theory 21(1):1-17. 
 
Molm, Linda D. 2010. "The Structure of Reciprocity." Social Psychology Quarterly 
73(2):119-131. 
 
Molm, Linda D., Jessica L. Collett, and David R. Schaefer. 2007. “Building 
Solidarity Through Generalized Exchange: A Theory of Reciprocity.” American 
Journal of Sociology 113(1):205-242. 
 
Morral, Andrew R., Kristie L. Gore, Terry L. Schell, Barbara Bicksler, Coreen Farris, 
Bonnie Ghosh-Dastidar, Lisa H. Jaycox, Dean Kilpatrick, Stephan Kistler, Amy 
Street, Terri Tanielian and Kayla M. Williams. 2015. Sexual Assault and Sexual 
Harassment in the U.S. Military: Volume 2. Estimates for Department of Defense 
Service Members from the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation. 
 





Mudrack, Peter E. and E. Sharon Mason. 2013. “Dilemmas, Conspiracies, and 
Sophie’s Choice: Vignette Themes and Ethical Judgments.” Journal of Business 
Ethics 118(3):639-653. 
 
Myers, Meghann. February 27th, 2015. "Sacked Cutter XO Says He Was Target of 
Endless Inquest." Navy Times. Retrieved April 12th, 2016. 
 
Near, Janet P. and Marcia P. Miceli. 1985. “Organizational Dissidence: The Case of 
Whistle-Blowing.” Journal of Business Ethics 4(1):1-16. 
 
Near, Janet P. and Marcia P. Miceli. 1995. “Effective Whistle-blowing.” Academy of 
Management Review 20(3):679-708. 
 
Near, Janet P. and Marcia P. Miceli. 1996. “Whistle-Blowing: Myth and Reality.” 
Journal of Management 22(3):507-526. 
 
Near, Janet P. and Marcia P. Miceli. 2016. “After the Wrongdoing: What Managers 
Should Know About Whistleblowing.” Business Horizons 59(1):105-114. 
 
Near, Janet P., Michael T. Rehg, James R. Van Scotter and Marcia P. Miceli. 2004. 
“Does Type of Wrongdoing Affect the Whistle-blowing Process?” Business Ethics 
Quarterly 14(2):219-242. 
 
Office of Management and Budget. 1977. Directive No. 15: Race and Ethnic 
Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government. 
 
Office of Management and Budget. 1997. Revisions to the Standards for the 
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government. 
 
Office of Personnel Management. 2010. Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics: 
Demographic Profile of the Federal Workforce as of September 2010. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government. 
 
Paolacci, Gabriele, Jesse Chandler and Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis. 2010. “Running 
Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk.”  Judgment and Decision Making 
5(5):411-419. 
 
Park, ChongWoo and Mark Keil. 2009. “Organizational Silence and Whistle-Blowing 
on IT Projects: An Integrated Model.” Decision Sciences 40(4):901-918. 
 
Paxton, Pamela and Jennifer L. Glanville. 2015. “Is Trust Rigid or Malleable? A 





Pfeffer, Jeremy and Gerald R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations. 
New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia, Anders Skrondal and Andrew Pickles. 2004. “Generalized 
Multilevel Structural Equation Modelling.” Psychometrika 69(2):167-190. 
 
Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia, Anders Skrondal and Andrew Pickles. 2005. “Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation of Limited and Discrete Dependent Variable Models with 
Nested Random Effects.” Journal of Econometrics 128(2):301-323. 
 
Rehg, Michael T., Marcia P. Miceli, Janet P. Near and James R. Van Scotter. 2008. 
“Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation Against Whistleblowers: Gender 
Differences and Power Relationships.” Organization Science 19(2)221-240. 
 
Richardson, Brian K. and Joseph McGlynn. 2011. “Rabid Fans, Death Threats, and 
Dysfunctional Stakeholders: The Influence of Organizational and Industry Contexts 
on Whistle-Blowing Cases.” Management Communication Quarterly 25(1):121-150. 
 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 2014. “Why Status Matters for Inequality.” American 
Sociological Review 79(1):1-16. 
 
Risen, James. October 17th, 2013. "Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files to 
Russia." The New York Times. Retrieved April 12th, 2016. 
 
Ross, Catherine E. and John Mirowsky. 2003. “Social Structure and Psychological 
Functioning: Distress, Perceived Control, and Trust.” In Handbook of Social 
Psychology, ed. John Delamater, 411-447. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum 
Publishers. 
 
Ross, Catherine E., John Mirowsky and Shana Pribesh. 2001. “Powerlessness and the 
Amplification of Threat: Neighborhood Disadvantage, Disorder, and Mistrust.” 
American Sociological Review 66(4): 568-591. 
 
Rossi, Peter H. and Steven L. Nock. 1982. Measuring Social Judgments: The 
Factorial Survey Approach. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
 
Rothschild, Joyce and Terance D. Miethe. 1999. “Whistle-blower Disclosures and 
Management Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information About Organizational 
Corruption.” Work and Occupation 26(1):107-128. 
 
Rudman, Laurie A. and Stephanie A. Goodwin. 2002. “Gender Differences in 
Automatic In-Group Bias: Why Do Women Like Women More Than Men Like 





Schilke, Oliver, Martin Reimann and Karen S. Cook. 2015. “Power Decreases Trust 
in Social Exchange.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 112(42):12950-12955. 
 
Schuman, H. and Michael Johnson. 1976. “Attitudes and Behavior.” Annual Review 
of Sociology 2:161-207. 
 
Segal, David R. 1981. “Leadership and Management: Organizational Theory.” In 
Military Leadership, eds. James Harold Buck and Lawrence J. Korb. Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications. 
 
Selya, Arielle S., Jennifer S. Rose, Lisa C. Dierker, Donald Hedeker and Robin J. 
Mermelstein. 2012. “A Practical Guide to Calculating Cohen’s f2, a Measure of Local 
Effect Size, from PROC MIXED.” Frontiers in Psychology 3. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00111. 
 
Simpson, Brent, and Robb Willer. 2008. “Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The 
Interaction of Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior.” Social Psychology 
Quarterly 71(1):37-52. 
 
Simpson, Brent and Robb Willer. 2015. “Beyond Altruism: Sociological Foundations 
of Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior.” Annual Review of Sociology 41(1):43-63. 
 
Simpson, Brent, Ashley Harrell and Robb Willer. 2013. “Hidden Paths from Morality 
to Cooperation: Moral Judgments Promote Trust and Trustworthiness.” Social Forces 
91(4):1529-1548. 
 
Steenbergen, Marco R. 2012. Hierarchical Linear Models for Electoral Research: A 
Worked Example in Stata. University of Zurich: Department of Political Science. 
 
Stylianou, Antonis C., Susan Winter, Yuan Niu, Robert A. Giacalone and Matt 
Campbell. 2013. “Understanding the Behavioral Intention to Report Unethical 
Information Technology Practices: The Role of Machiavellianism, Gender, and 
Computer Expertise.” Journal of Business Ethics 117(2):333-343. 
 
The Courage Foundation. January 27th, 2014. “Transcript: ARD Interview with 
Edward Snowden.” 
 
Trongmateerut, Pailin and John T. Sweeney. 2013. “The Influence of Subjective 
Norms on Whistle-Blowing: A Cross-Cultural Investigation.” Journal of Business 
Ethics 112(3):437-451. 
 
Turner, John C. and Katherine J. Reynolds. 2008. “The Social Identity Perspective in 
Intergroup Relations: Theories, Themes and Controversies.” In Handbook of Social 





Vadera, Abhijeet K., Ruth V. Aguilera and Brianna B. Caza. 2009. “Making Sense of 
Whistle-Blowing's Antecedents: Learning from Research on Identity and Ethics 
Programs.” Business Ethics Quarterly 19(4):553-586. 
 
Van Lange, Paul A. M., Wilma Otten, Ellen M. N. De Bruin and Jeffrey A. Joireman. 
1997. “Development of Prosocial, Individualistic, and Competitive Orientations: 
Theory and Preliminary Evidence.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 73(4):733-746. 
 
Wallander, Lisa. 2009. “25 Years of Factorial Surveys in Sociology: A Review.” 
Social Science Research 38(3):505-520. 
 
Weinberg, Jill, Jeremy Freese and David McElhattan. 2014. “Comparing Data 
Characteristics and Results of an Online Factorial Survey between a Population-
Based and a Crowdsource-Recruited Sample.” Sociological Science 1(5):292-310. 
